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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis addresses the subject of political dissent during the Khrushchev era.  It 
examines the kinds of protest behaviours that individuals and groups engaged in and 
the way that the Soviet authorities responded to them.  The findings show that 
dissenting activity was more frequent and more diverse during the Khrushchev period 
than has previously been supposed and that there were a number of significant 
continuities in the forms of dissent, and the authorities’ responses to these acts, across 
the eras of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev.  In the early Khrushchev years a large 
proportion of the political protest and criticism that took place remained essentially 
loyal to the regime and Marxist-Leninist in outlook, though this declined in later years 
as communist utopianism and respect for the ruling authorities seem to have 
significantly diminished.  In place of mass terror, the authorities increasingly moved 
toward more rationalised and targeted practices of social control, seeking to ‘manage’ 
dissent rather than to eradicate it either by persuasion or by force.  All of this was 
reflective of the fact that the relationship between state and society was undergoing a 
vital transitional stage during the Khrushchev years, as both parties began to establish 
for themselves what had and had not changed since Stalin’s death. 
.
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
 
Aktiv – Communist Party activists 
 
ASSR – Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
 
CPSU – The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Kommunisticheskaya partiya 
Sovetskogo Soyuza) 
 
Gorkom – City Party Committee  
 
KGB – The State Security Committee (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti) 
 
Kolkhoz – A collective farm 
 
Komsomol – The Communist Youth League 
 
Memorial – a Russian charitable organisation that investigates and publicises abuses 
of human rights under the Soviet regime and since.  
 
MVD – The Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del) 
NKVD – The People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Narodnyi komissariat 
vnutrennikh del) 
 
Obkom – Oblast’ Party Committee 
 
Oblast’ – An administrative division used in the USSR and present-day Russia, 
meaning ‘province’ or ‘region’ 
 
Raion – An administrative division used in the USSR and present-day Russia, 
meaning ‘area’ or ‘district’ 
 
RSFSR – The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 
 
Samizdat – Self-published literature.  Printed and distributed by clandestine means. 
Sovkhoz – A state farm 
SSR – Soviet Socialist Republic 
Stilyagi – Young Soviet citizens who were characterised by a love of Western culture 
and fashions   
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Viewing conflict between authority and society as part of a cycle of events that had 
existed in Russia since the time of Peter the Great, the historian Marshall Shatz 
likened the dissent of the post-Stalin era to the major peasant rebellions of Tsarist 
times.1  When this analogy is applied to the Khrushchev period we can see that in 
some respects Shatz was correct: much dissenting activity in those years was 
ephemeral, uncoordinated and occupied a politically ambiguous position in regard to 
the ruling regime.  In other respects he was wrong, however.  Dissenting behaviour 
under Khrushchev usually involved either lone individuals or very small groups that 
were quickly neutralised and there were no charismatic or renowned leaders – though 
numerous dissenters from the period later went on to play a prominent role in the 
Brezhnev era human rights movement.   
 
Unlike in later years, there was no ‘dissident movement’ that one could speak of, yet 
thousands of citizens expressed varying gradations of disappointment, anger and 
opposition to the political authorities.  These expressions could take many forms, such 
as public speeches attacking state policies, leaflets calling for specific leaders to be 
expelled from the Party or the formation of underground groups that plotted uprisings 
and called for workers to take mass strike action.  That the Khrushchev period was a 
time of great political change and upheaval has been widely recognised by historians, 
                                                 
1 M. Shatz, Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 
10.  Presumably the peasant rebellions that Shatz had in mind included those led by Ivan Bolotnikov 
(1606-1607), Stenka Razin (1670-1671) and Emel’yan Puagchev (1773-1774).  Each of these uprisings 
flared violently and enjoyed a degree of popular support but was ultimately defeated by government 
forces.   
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yet the extent to which this was a time of considerable social volatility and ideological 
non-conformism has largely been overlooked.   
 
In addressing the topic of political dissent during the Khrushchev era, this thesis 
touches upon a number of subjects that are integral to the way in which we view 
Soviet history, such as popular adherence to communist ideology and the relationship 
between the state and society, as well as the more general theme of resistance to 
authority.  As distinct from many other studies on Soviet dissent, the present work 
also examines the policies and practices that were utilised by the Soviet regime in its 
struggle against protest and criticism.  This means that although this is primarily a 
study of dissent in particular, it is also very much a thesis about the Khrushchev era in 
general. 
 
There are three broad aims to this thesis.  The first is to provide an outline of the most 
important themes, debates and processes involved in political dissent and the official 
responses to them.  Expanding upon this, the second aim is then to draw out themes of 
change and continuity across the periods of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev in 
regard to the actions of dissenters and the authorities.  The third and final aim is to 
address the question of what all of this tells us about the relationship between state 
and society during the Khrushchev era. 
 
As a theme that has not yet been subjected to a great deal of rigorous academic 
scrutiny, the main goal of the present work is to fill this particular gap in the 
historiography of the Soviet period.  In doing so, it firstly demonstrates that political 
protest and criticism were significantly more prevalent and more diverse during the 
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Khrushchev period than is widely supposed and sketches an outline of the most 
important subjects in regard to acts of political protest and criticism.   
 
The thesis then seeks to fill the concomitant ‘gap’ in regard to how the regime 
responded to dissenting behaviour in the Khrushchev years – a field that has drawn 
even less academic attention.  It shows that characterisations of the Khrushchev years 
as a time of ‘thaw’ and of Khrushchev himself as a relative liberal are not entirely 
suitable when examined through the medium of the state’s responses to dissenting 
behaviour during his time as Soviet leader.  It is also possible to gain some valuable 
insights into policy formation, evolution and implementation as well centre-periphery 
relations and the ongoing power struggles at the highest levels of the regime. 
 
In terms of change and continuity across different periods of Soviet history one can 
see that although there were some major dislocations with the regime’s Stalinist past 
there were also many continuations with it.  Punitive policy against dissenters steadily 
evolved away from Stalinism rather than broke with it entirely after Stalin’s death in 
March 1953 and was still evolving for some time after the XX CPSU Congress in 
February 1956.  Among the most important themes in the latter part of the thesis is the 
trend of continuity between the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras in regard to both 
dissenting behaviour and the authorities’ responses.  In this one can also see how 
pragmatism and rationalism rather than ideology (i.e. Khrushchev’s much-vaunted 
‘return to Leninism’) or a sense of liberality set the agenda in dealing with the 
problem of dissent and that although at times its assumptions were based on 
fundamentally sound reasoning, the regime consistently exaggerated the threat posed 
to the state by dissenting behaviour and often overreacted to it as a result. 
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Factors that are highlighted in regard to the changing relationship between state and 
society include evidence of people’s broadening philosophical horizons, declining 
respect for, and fear of, the authorities along with the gradual emergence of the tacit 
Brezhnev era social contract between society and the regime (whereby society 
remained docile as long as the regime fulfilled basic tasks such as providing 
employment and an acceptable standard of living).  One can also see that after the 
isolation of the Stalin years both the regime and society were increasingly affected by 
events and powers outside of the USSR. 
 
0.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Ever since the January 1966 trial of Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel brought the 
Soviet regime’s domestic critics to the attention of Western journalists and academics, 
a reasonably substantial body of work has arisen on the theme of dissent and 
dissenters.2  However, very little academic study has addressed the subject of dissent 
during the preceding Khrushchev era.  This is perhaps unsurprising when one 
considers that very little information reached the outside world, or even wider Soviet 
society, in regard to dissenting behaviour prior to the mid 1960s.  The last few years 
have witnessed something of an upsurge in academic interest in the Khrushchev 
period and, to a slightly lesser extent, there has also been a revival of interest in the 
                                                 
2 Sinyavsky and Daniel had been arrested and were subsequently jailed after secretly transmitting a 
series of satirical works to the West, where they were published under the pseudonyms Abram Tertz 
and Nikolai Arzhak respectively.  The trial against the pair, and events surrounding it, are generally 
acknowledged as marking the first stages of the Soviet human rights movement.  As such, practically 
all works on Soviet dissent go into some detail on the subject.  The case against them is raised in more 
detail toward the end of this thesis.  
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history of the Soviet dissident movement, yet there has so far been minimal 
convergence between the two.3   
 
In order to illustrate the way in which commentators have previously depicted dissent 
during the Khrushchev era it is useful to cite three separate authors.  In 1972 Cornelia 
Gerstenmaier wrote that ‘for about a decade, during the mid 50s and early 60s, hostile 
political currents found expression almost exclusively in literary works’.4  In 1987 
Ludmilla Alexeyeva described dissent in the Khrushchev era as ‘an incubation period 
when people began to learn to talk about the problems of Soviet life’.5  Most recently, 
in 2002, Erik Kulavig pointed out that ‘the opening of archives has shown dissidence 
to be prevalent far below the intelligentsia level’.6  Clearly then, the passing years 
have seen a slightly more developed picture of dissent being established, yet even 
Kulavig’s remark only hints at just how unexplored this field has so far remained. 
 
It is important to flag up Kulavig’s work, Dissent in the Years of Khrushchev: Nine 
Stories about Disobedient Russians.  It is the only volume in the English language 
which has yet purported to tackle the same subject as this thesis, yet its similarities 
with the present study are surprisingly limited.  Although it presents some useful data 
and valuable avenues for further exploration, Dissent in the Khrushchev Era is a 
                                                 
3 Of the recent scholarly literature on the Khrushchev era, three of the most notable works include W. 
Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era, London: Free Press, 2003; R. Medvedev and Zh. 
Medvedev, Nikita Khrushchev: Otets ili otchim sovetskoi ‘ottepeli’, Moskva: Yauza, 2006; P. Jones ed. 
The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Social Change in the Khrushchev Era, London: 
Routledge, 2006.  Impressive recent works on the Soviet dissident movement have included P. 
Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia, London: Routledge, 2005; R. Horvath, 
The Legacy of Soviet Dissent: Dissidents, Democratisation and Radical Nationalism in Russia, 
London: Routledge, 2005. 
4 C. Gerstenmaier, The Voices of the Silent, New York: Hart Publishing Company, 1972, p. 32. 
5 L. Alexeyeva, .  Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and Human 
Rights, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1987, p. 269. 
6 E. Kulavig, Dissent in the Years of Khrushchev: Nine Stories About Disobedient Russians, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 15. 
 5
rather limited and unsatisfying study.  One reviewer labelled it as ‘frustrating as much 
as enlightening’ and justifiably argued that several of its chapters have ‘little to do 
with dissent or disobedience’.7  This is a judgement from which the present work does 
not demur.       
 
The most notable work of recent times on this subject is a 2005 Russian-language 
volume edited by Vladimir Kozlov and Sergei Mironenko entitled Kramola: 
Inakomyslie v SSSR pri Khrushcheve i Brezhneve 1953-1982 (Subversion: Non-
conformism under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, 1953-1982).8  Using archival sources 
drawn from the files of the Soviet Procurator, the pair have reproduced a number of 
anti-Soviet leaflets and letters from the period as well as detailing the activities of 
numerous underground groups.  This will perhaps prove to be a seminal work on 
dissent, and will apparently be translated into English in the near future, yet its focus 
does differ somewhat from the present work – most notably in the fact that it draws on 
a smaller range of sources and looks only at dissenting behaviour and not at official 
responses.  Furthermore, the bulk of Kozlov and Mironenko’s work consists of 
reproductions of documents rather than commentary and analysis.   
 
In regard to the subject of Soviet dissent in general, Ludmilla Alexeyeva’s 1987 work 
Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and Human Rights 
undoubtedly remains the touchstone.  It presents an authoritative overview of the 
many different struggles that existed within the USSR, and, where appropriate, shows 
how these struggles related to each other.  However, like most other works on dissent, 
                                                 
7 T. Friedgut, ‘Review of Dissent in the Years of Khruhchev: Nine Stories About Disobedient 
Russians’, Slavic Review, Vol. 63, No. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 419-420. 
8 V. Kozlov and S. Mironenko eds, Kramola: Inakomyslie v SSSR pri Khrushcheve i Brezhneve 1953-
1982, Moskva: ‘Materik’, 2005. 
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its focus lies overwhelmingly upon the events of the Brezhnev era.9  Covering a 
subject which is both thematically and chronologically narrower than that tackled by 
Alexeyeva, the present work seeks to present a more detailed and nuanced picture of a 
considerably less wide-ranging subject.   
 
Where this thesis ties in with previous works and seeks to build on them is by 
presenting a more detailed and analytical - as opposed to narrative - account of 
dissenting behaviour under Khrushchev.  It shows that Gerstenmaier was wrong to 
argue that there was little or no political criticism outside of the literary sphere and 
that Alexeyeva was correct to see the Khrushchev period as a formative time for the 
subsequent dissident movement.  It demonstrates how and why this was the case as 
well as showing that there was a considerably greater range of dissenting behaviour in 
the Khrushchev years than Alexeyeva’s remarks acknowledge.  Kulavig’s assertion 
that dissent existed below intelligentsia level is supported and significantly enhanced 
with a sizable volume of evidence.  In other words, the present work seeks to expand 
our understanding of a period that has so far been covered with essentially correct but 
overly simplistic depictions.  
 
One of the main reasons why many previous works have either provided simplistic 
depictions of dissent in the Khrushchev era or largely overlooked the period was the 
context in which they were produced.  The vast majority of studies on Soviet dissent 
were written during the Cold War period.  This meant that they were perhaps shaped 
by the politically charged atmosphere of the time.  Importantly, studies on dissent 
                                                 
9 Other volumes on Soviet dissent that have largely focussed upon the Brezhnev era include J. 
Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggle for Human Rights, Boston: Beacon Press, 1980; A. 
Rothberg, The Heirs of Stalin: Dissidence and the Soviet Regime 1953-1970, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1972. 
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from the Cold War era were also written without access to the kind of archival sources 
that inform the present work.  While one must be careful not to accept these sources 
unquestioningly or to present an entirely bureaucratic picture of events by over-
reliance on official documents, they undoubtedly do help to build a more detailed 
picture.   
 
Furthermore, it is also important to acknowledge that this ‘first generation’ of research 
on Soviet dissent was written almost exclusively by sympathetic parties in the West or 
by former dissenters who had emigrated or been exiled from the USSR.10  It must be 
accepted that this was, and to some extent still is, a particularly emotive subject and 
one could not suggest that these were entirely impartial chroniclers.  The question of 
whether historians can ever be truly impartial falls beyond the remit of this thesis, 
though it is surely easier to achieve a degree of objectivity today than it was twenty or 
thirty years ago.  None of this is to suggest that recent research has found earlier 
accounts to require a thoroughgoing revision but that they can now be expanded upon 
and, in places, challenged.  
 
Another theme that one encounters in looking at the way in which dissent has often 
been written about in the West is what Ben Nathans has labelled a ‘person-centric 
approach to dissent’.11  This has meant a strong focus on the ideas and works of 
prominent individuals, most notably Andrei Sakharov and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, or 
in Nathans’ case Alexander Esenin-Volpin, rather than looking at wider currents 
                                                 
10 Examples of the former include Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents; A. Axelbank, Soviet Dissent: 
Intellectuals, Jews and Détente, New York: Franklin Watts Inc., 1975.  Examples of the latter include 
P. Grigorenko, Memoirs, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1982; Yu. Orlov, Dangerous 
Thoughts: Memoirs of a Russian Life, New York: William Morrow and Company, 1991. 
11 B. Nathans, ‘The Dictatorship of Reason: Aleksandr Vol’pin and the Idea of Rights Under 
“Developed Socialism”’, Slavic Review, Vol. 66, No. 4, Winter 2007, p. 631.  
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across a particular genre of dissent.12  While this approach undoubtedly has some 
merit for the Brezhnev period, it is one that does not suit the kinds of dissent 
witnessed in the Khrushchev period, largely because there were no truly prominent 
dissenters or ‘figureheads’ at that time and far more limited philosophical divergences 
between dissenters.   
 
This ‘person-centric approach’ is, of course, an unavoidable presence in the memoirs 
of former dissenters.  In regard to the present study, these memoirs can be categorised 
into three groups.  The first group consists of works by prominent Brezhnev era 
dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov, Andrei Amalrik and Leonid Plyushch.13  These 
occasionally contain useful scraps of information on the Khrushchev period but are of 
limited use overall.  The second group contains memoirs by the likes of Vladimir 
Bukovsky, Yuri Orlov and Petr Grigorenko, which provide a wealth of detail on 
specific events from the Khrushchev period yet remain largely focused on the 
Brezhnev era.14  Most useful, and least numerous, are the third group of works which 
were written almost exclusively on the Khrushchev years, by individuals such as 
Revolt Pimenov, Boris Vail’ and Valery Ronkin – all of whom were active dissenters 
during the time in question.15    
 
                                                 
12 One can find, for example, multiple biographies on Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn as well as volumes 
dedicated to individuals such as Sergei Kovalev and Anatoly Shcharansky.  See R. Lourie, Sakharov: A 
Biography, London: Brandeis University Press, 2002; M. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn: A Biography, New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1984; E. Gilligan, Defending Human Rights in Russia: Sergei Kovalev, 
Dissident and Human Rights Commissioner, 1969-1996, London: Routledge, 2004; M. Gilbert, 
Shcharansky: Hero Of Our Time, London: Macmillan, 1986.      
13 See A. Sakharov, Memoirs, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990; A. Amalrik, An Involuntary Journey 
to Siberia, Newton Abbot: Readers Union, 1971; L. Plyushch, History’s Carnival: A Dissident’s 
Autobiography, London: Harvill Press, 1979. 
14 See V. Bukovsky, To Build a Castle: My Life as a Dissenter, London: Andre Deutsch, 1978; Orlov, 
Dangerous Thoughts; Grigorenko, Memoirs. 
15 See R. Pimenov, Vospominaniya, Moskva: Informatsionno-ekspertnaya gruppa ‘Panorama’, 1996; B. 
Vail’ Osobo opasnyi, London: Overseas Publications Interchange, 1980; V. Ronkin Na smenu 
dekabryam prikhodit yanvari…, Moskva: Obshchestvo ‘Memorial’, 2003. 
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Russian scholarship on dissent has, of course, experienced a markedly different 
history to that of Western research.16  In the Soviet period there was no rigorous 
academic study of dissent and instead there were a handful of anti-dissident 
propaganda works masquerading as scholarly volumes, such as Nikolai Yakovlev’s 
CIA Target: USSR.17  Running counter to such works was a stream of samizdat 
material on dissent from the late 1960s. Although their authors were undoubtedly 
some of the most knowledgeable people on the topic, this was itself a genre that ought 
not to be accepted without question as offering an accurate or balanced depiction of 
events solely on the basis that these were works written by ‘the good guys’. 
 
As Horvath has shown, glasnost’ and the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union saw a 
major upsurge of interest in dissent and dissidents in Russia and elsewhere across the 
former USSR.  This interest was initially met by a glut of sensationalist journalism 
rather than scholarly research, with the most notable exception being the historians 
and enthusiasts working at Memorial.  Since that time, Russian scholarship on the 
subject has reached particularly high levels of quality and many of the most useful 
works of the last decade on the themes of dissent, politics and society in the 
Khrushchev period have been written by Russian historians.  Foremost among them 
are included Vladimir Kozlov, Aleksandr Pyzhikov, Gennadyi Kuzovkin, Elena 
Zubkova and Boris Firsov.18 
                                                 
16 It is worth drawing the reader’s attention to the fact that numerous dissidents’ autobiographies that 
were released in English language editions in the West during the 1970s and 1980s have recently been 
published for the first time in the Russian language.  These include Yu. Orlov, Opsanye mysli: 
Memuary iz russkoi zhizni, Moskva: Zakharov, 2008; L. Alekseeva and P. Goldberg, Pokolenie 
ottepeli, Moskva: Zakharov, 2006; V. Bukovskii, I vozvrashchaetsya veter…, Moskva: Zakharov, 2007. 
17 N. Yakovlev, CIA Target: USSR, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982. The basic premise of 
Yakovlev’s work was to assert that dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov and Yuri Orlov were actually 
CIA agents.  This was a translation of the mass-market Russian language volume by Yakovlev entitled 
TsRU protiv SSSR, Moskva: Molodaya gvardiya, 1979.   
18 See Kozlov and Mironenko eds,  Kramola; A. Pyzhikov, Opyt modernizatsii sovetskogo obshchestva 
v 1953-1964 godakh: obshchestvenno-politicheskii aspekt, Moskva: Izdatel’skii dom ‘Gamma’, 1998; 
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All of these authors have utilised a strong combination of archival material along with 
a wealth of other primary and secondary sources to produce works of a very high 
standard.  What these works and others have consistently demonstrated is a 
willingness to question and cast doubt upon the occasionally exaggerated Western 
view of the Khrushchev years as a time of liberalisation and of dissenters as 
opponents of communism – a characterisation that again raises the issue of the Cold 
War context in which most histories of Soviet dissent were written.  This questioning 
of traditional characterisations of the Khrushchev era and of dissenters’ political 
attitudes are both important themes that run through this thesis.  
 
0.2 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
The next task at hand is to provide a definition of exactly what is meant by the term 
‘political dissent’: what behaviours it encompasses and what it does not.  In fact, one 
finds the term ‘political dissent’ in a number of works, though rarely with any 
explanation of precisely what it entailed.19  Indeed, recent Russian sources on this 
theme have used several terms including: inakomyslie (otherwise-thinking), kramola 
(subversion or sedition), raznomyslie (different-thinking) and protivostoyanie 
(confrontation).20  It is clearly the case, therefore, that although the term ‘political 
                                                                                                                                            
L. Eremina and E. Zhemkova eds,  Korni Travy: Sbornik statei molodykh istorikov, Moskva: Zven’ya, 
1996; E. Zubkova, Obshchestvo i reformy, Moskva: Rossiya molodaya, 1993; B. Firsov, Raznomyslie v 
SSSR 1940-1960 gody: Istoriya, teoriya i praktika, Sankt Peterburg: Izdatel’stvo Evropeiskogo 
universiteta v Sankt Peterburge, 2008. 
19 For example, Fursenko and Naftali refer to a ‘hardening of attitudes toward political dissent’ in 
Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary, New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2006, p. 141.  The same theme has also been addressed by historians of Nazi Germany such 
as I. Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich: Bavaria 1933-1945, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1983.  
20 See Kozlov and Mironenko  eds, Kramola; Firsov, Raznomyslie v SSSR, and V. Kozlov, Neizvestnyi 
SSSR: protivostoyanie naroda i vlasti 1953-1985, Moskva: Olma-Press, 2006. 
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dissent’ can be broadly understood, it is worthwhile to explore its dimensions in some 
depth and to define its parameters. 
 
However, before expanding further on a definition of what is meant by ‘political 
dissent’, it is worthwhile briefly to revisit and restate what we understand by the 
broader notion of ‘dissent’.  As Robert Cutler has already pointed out, this is a 
question that has roused considerable and heated debate.21  In the historiographical 
context of the Soviet regime the term ‘dissent’ means something more than simply 
‘disagreement’ or ‘dispute’ as one would find in a standard dictionary definition or 
might encounter in political discourse on Western democracies.  For example, 
‘dissent’ generally does not refer to any kind of intra-elite factional strife or 
sanctioned and tolerated debate.  Instead it denotes some degree of conflict with the 
political authorities whereby citizens engaged in any of a number of actions that, 
although in many instances not actually against the law, nonetheless seriously 
breached the behavioural norms that the regime demanded of its citizens. 
 
Frederick Barghoorn, one of the leading scholars on the dissident movement of the 
Brezhnev period, defined dissent as ‘the persistent - and from the official point of 
view - objectionable advocacy of policies differing from or contrary to those which 
the dominant group in the supreme CPSU control and decision making 
bodies…adopt’.22  The only significant point on which this study diverges from 
Barghoorn’s definition is by omitting the term ‘persistent’.  What this thesis 
addresses, therefore, are various forms of criticism, protest and abuse aimed at the 
                                                 
21 R. Cutler, ‘Soviet Dissent Under Khrushchev: An Analytical Study’, Comparative Politics, Vol.13, 
No.1, October 1980, pp. 15-35. 
22 F. Barghoorn, ‘Soviet Political Doctrine and the Problem of Opposition’, Bucknell Review, Vol. 12, 
No.2, May 1964, p. 4. 
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political authorities and the policies or activities that they undertook, whether 
occurring on one occasion or many occasions. 
 
Perhaps the most instructive way in which to elucidate dissent as a social phenomenon 
is with reference to Albert O. Hirschman’s model on ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty’.23  
The subject of Hirschman’s work, as it relates to this thesis, concerns the way that 
citizens respond to decline in regimes, in particular ones with the potential to be 
rejuvenated if sufficient effort and attention are expended on the task.24  It would, of 
course, be incorrect to staunchly assert that the Soviet regime was one in definite and 
comprehensive decline by the Khrushchev period - in fact quite the opposite was true 
in certain fields.  What was undergoing decline, however, was the Stalinist system of 
rule that had been in place for many years and, with the benefit of hindsight, 
ultimately proved to be in a state of relatively limited decline.  It is important to state, 
however, that the aim here is not to analyse Soviet dissent in terms of Hirschman’s 
model but to clarify further what is meant by ‘dissent’ as a social phenomenon. 
 
The crux of Hirschman’s model argues that citizens of states in decline are presented 
with three options: ‘exit’, ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’.  The ‘exit’ option is simply to 
abandon or attempt to abandon the system in its entirety, namely by emigration or by 
some other means of detaching oneself from the regime in question.  The ‘voice’ 
                                                 
23 A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations and States, 
London: Harvard University Press, 1970. 
24 As an economist by profession, Hirschman’s main preoccupation has been with the manner in which 
consumers respond to decline in companies.  Nonetheless, he asserts that the same principles apply to 
the relationship between regimes and their citizens.  His model has been applied to dissenting 
behaviour under various regimes including Cuba, Mexico and the former GDR.  See J. Colomer, ‘Exit, 
Voice and Hostility in Cuba’, International Migration Review, Vol. 34, No. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 423-
442; J. Langston, ‘Breaking Out Is Hard To Do: Exit, Voice and Loyalty in Mexico’s One-Party 
Hegemonic Regime’, Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 44, No. 3, Autumn 2002, pp. 61-88; S. 
Pfaff and H. Kim, ‘Exit-Voice Dynamics in Collective Action: An Analysis of Emigration and Protest 
in the East German Revolution’, The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 109, No. 2, September 2003, 
pp. 401-444.       
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option is predicated on manifesting dissatisfaction by engaging in various activities 
that do not adhere to established behavioural norms.  The final category of ‘loyalty’ is 
one where citizens’ grievances are endured without recourse to overt complaint yet 
their loyalty remains conditional upon the state continuing to uphold its end of the 
social contract on which its relationship with society is based. 
 
It is, therefore, the second, ‘voice’, option with which the present study is 
predominantly concerned.  As Hirschman states: ‘Voice is here defined as any attempt 
at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs whether 
through individual or collective petition to the management directly in charge…or 
through various types of actions and protests, including those that are meant to 
mobilize public opinion’.25  
 
All of this provides a useful platform on which to base our approach to the wider 
phenomenon of Soviet dissent, but it is also vital to elaborate what is meant by 
‘political dissent’.  Perhaps the most useful analogy to draw at this initial stage is with 
the Brezhnev era dissident movement.  Scholars have long acknowledged it as 
consisting of three quite distinct facets: nationalist, religious and human rights 
movements.26  Similarly, in the Khrushchev period one can quite clearly distinguish 
nationalist and religious dissent but also something else that fits into neither category, 
though it was not primarily concerned with defending rights either.27  One can 
broadly define political dissent as being that ‘something else’: those acts of dissent 
                                                 
25 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, p. 30. 
26 The best example of this can be seen in the title of Ludmilla Alexeyeva’s 1987 work Soviet Dissent: 
Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and Human Rights. 
27 In fact, the Western tendency to label the Brezhnev era pravozashchitniki as human rights activists is 
in itself somewhat misleading.  As Robert Horvath has pointed out, they were primarily interested in 
the defence of rights and the rule of law as a whole rather than just human rights.  Horvath, The Legacy 
of Soviet Dissent, p. 84. 
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that were neither religious nor nationalist in sentiment but instead were ideological in 
nature.  While many members of the Brezhnev era human rights movement shied 
away from overtly political protest and criticism, the Khrushchev years witnessed a 
considerable flourishing of exactly this kind of behaviour. 
                                                
 
It is important to emphasise that this thesis does not seek to look at all types of non-
conformity in the Khrushchev years.  The key point is that these were acts of dissent 
that reflected or implied political discontent.  The apparent rise in hooliganism – such 
as gang fights among youths or robberies and assaults – that took place during the 
period is therefore not a major concern of this thesis.  Similarly, what could be termed 
the cultural non-conformism of stilyagi, falls beyond the remit of the present work.  
Although both of the above to some extent demonstrated a rejection of the regime’s 
values, they were also distinct socio-cultural phenomena in their own right.  
 
The behaviours under discussion are ones that either reflected or implied discontent 
with the contemporary Soviet political environment and did so without reference to 
what Yitzhak Brudny has labelled a ‘terminal community’ – meaning an entity such 
as a state or religion for whose benefit dissenting acts were undertaken.28  In their 
place one encounters a profusion of themes and aims based upon criticism or rejection 
of some aspect of the existing regime such as excessive bureaucracy, foreign policy or 
elite privilege.  Essentially, this meant acts of dissent that can be defined as ‘protest 
and criticism involving language and behaviours that either reflected or implied 
discontent at the policies, representatives and goals of the contemporary Soviet 
regime’.  For example, this could involve citizens making public outbursts such as 
 
28 See Y. Brudny, Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State 1953-1991, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.   
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‘long live President Eisenhower!’ or ‘communists are worse than fascists’, writing 
anonymous letters and leaflets calling for Khrushchev to be branded an ‘enemy of the 
people’ or forming underground groups to struggle for workers’ interests. 
 
One of the vital criteria of the present work is that it addresses what could be termed 
‘active dissent’ rather than ‘passive dissent’.  Behaviours such as simply listening to 
Radio Liberty in the privacy of one’s own apartment are generally not a feature of this 
thesis – unless followed by some more purposive behaviour.  In this sense it is useful 
to think in terms of a spectrum of dissenting behaviour rather than in simple binary 
terms of ‘dissent’ or ‘not dissent’.  Listening to Western radio broadcasts and 
privately criticising any given policy or individual would occupy the lower end of 
such a dissenting spectrum whereas activities such as distributing anti-Soviet leaflets 
and forming underground groups were clearly higher up the scale.  It is the higher end 
of the spectrum with which the present work is primarily concerned.  Among the 
fields that the present study does address are what caused passive discontent to be 
translated into action and how far the criticisms made by dissenters were in some way 
reflective of wider public moods.       
 
This focus on active dissent does not imply that passive dissent was somehow 
unimportant or unworthy of study.  Indeed, themes of passive dissent such as 
workplace drunkenness, theft and feigned compliance are undoubtedly subjects 
worthy of future research in this context.  The point to be emphasised here is that this 
thesis is primarily concerned with the way that citizens expressed opposition or anger 
at the authorities, why they did so and what kind of response this generated.  Those 
acts which displayed some kind of public facet not only shed more light on the nature 
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of interaction between the regime and society but also represented a more immediate 
and visceral challenge to authority that was fundamentally new for the post-Stalin era.       
 
0.3 PARAMETERS OF THE STUDY 
 
The acts of political dissent that are addressed in this thesis constitute only a part of 
the dissenting behaviour that took place between 1956 and 1964.  The Khrushchev era 
was also a time of burgeoning nationalist and religious dissent.  In the Baltic States, 
Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia there were numerous instances of citizens undertaking 
acts of protest on the basis of hurt national sentiment.29  Similarly, large numbers of 
Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Pentecostalists along with members of many other 
religious faiths were involved in acts of protest at the Soviet authorities and defiance 
of the stringent limits placed upon religious observance.  While all three genres of 
dissent – nationalist, religious and political – had a commonality of conflict with the 
authorities, they also had much that separated them: in their themes, forms and aims 
religious, nationalist and political dissent differed from each other notably at times.  It 
was actually not until well into the Brezhnev era that there was any significant degree 
of interaction and co-operation between the three.30     
 
Although important and interesting themes of activity, this thesis does not seek to 
address the issues of nationalist or religious dissent.  While there are undoubtedly 
some advantages to be drawn from looking at all forms of dissenting behaviour 
                                                 
29 These might include displaying long-suppressed national flags and emblems on windows and walls 
or forming underground groups to struggle against perceived Russian domination. 
30 There were exceptions to this trend, such as Petr Grigorenko’s long-standing interest in the fate of 
the Crimean Tatars, but the pattern remains essentially valid.  In some cases dissenting groups, most 
notably the Jewish Refuseniks, deliberately avoided the themes and individuals involved in other 
dissident struggles so as not to bring further persecution upon their own cause. 
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collectively there are also benefits in studying each individually, especially since this 
is a field of research that is still in its infancy. Although by no means the only reason 
for omitting nationalist and religious activity, there are also issues of scope to be 
considered in a work of this length.  One could not hope to say something meaningful 
about nationalist dissent without looking at how it was manifested differently in the 
three Baltic States, Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia for example or to discuss 
religious dissent without looking at Orthodox Believers, Jews, Muslims and many 
other faiths besides.  Attempting to address all of these within one thesis would in fact 
do a disservice to each and render nuanced discussion all but impossible. 
 
More importantly for the present work, nationalist and religious dissent were 
generally less likely to be caused by contemporary issues to the same extent as the 
behaviours addressed herein.  For example, the aims of nationalists in the Baltic States 
or members of Baptist and Adventist religious groups were essentially little different 
under Khrushchev than they had been under Stalin and would later be under 
Brezhnev.  Political dissent, however, was more likely to be prompted directly by the 
contemporary political environment.  This can be seen in events and themes such as 
reactions to the Hungarian rising, attitudes to Khrushchev, support for the regime’s 
opponents at any given time or responses to the raft of price increases that occurred in 
the summer of 1962.   
 
Of course, one could not say that any given act of criticism or protest was apolitical 
simply because it had nationalist overtones or called for religious freedom, for 
example.  With the USSR being a state where so many aspects of everyday life were 
heavily politicised and dictated by the communist regime one could perhaps argue 
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that almost any kind of complaint was, by definition, political dissent.  This would, 
however, be an excessive over-simplification.  As this thesis consistently 
demonstrates, the Soviet Union was not a totalitarian society in the Khrushchev era 
and one ought not to view every facet of life as being ‘political’.  Politics continued to 
be an unavoidable aspect of everyday life but, just as all happiness was not politically-
based, neither was all discontent.     
 
There were naturally a few ‘grey areas’ where nationalist, religious and political 
dissent overlapped to some extent, though they appear to have been surprisingly few.  
In the vast majority of instances it is immediately evident from the details held in a 
particular case file whether an act of protest ought to be classified as ‘political’, 
‘nationalist’ or ‘religious’.  With thousands of case files available, those which have 
been selected and discussed in this thesis are ones in which acts have given no overt 
reason to suspect any nationalist or religious sentiment.   
 
One occasionally encounters KGB reports providing condensed summaries of 
dissenting activity around the country that tell of how many anti-Soviet leaflets had 
been discovered in the preceding weeks and months and how many authors of such 
leaflets had been uncovered without giving any detail on their locations or 
motivations.  While the more detailed reports show that a significant majority of these 
materials were indeed dedicated to political themes, rather than nationalist or religious 
ones, this was not the case in every instance.  However, these figures are still 
presented to the reader in order to help give some idea of the overall scale of 
dissenting behaviour – a problem that has long dogged those who study the subject 
and on which some tentative outlines can now be drawn.          
 19
It is also worthwhile briefly to speak about the place of ‘thaw era’ literature in this 
thesis.  Unlike dissent, the cultural developments of the era in question have already 
been addressed in some detail elsewhere.  A number of the most important literary 
works of the Khrushchev years, such as Vladimir Dudintsev’s Not by Bread Alone 
(1956) and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (1962) 
are discussed herein yet, for the most part, the literary thaw is a peripheral issue in the 
present work.  How far one can consider such works to be acts of dissent is somewhat 
debatable – they did offer a degree of criticism yet they were officially sanctioned and 
published, and even encouraged to criticise ‘from on high’ on occasion.31  Dina 
Spechler’s use of the term ‘permitted dissent’ is perhaps the most useful way of 
relating the liberal literature of the Khrushchev era to the present study.32 
 
Indeed, when one reads Spechler’s account of the liberal literary journal Novyi Mir 
during the Khrushchev years, it soon becomes apparent that this was a field that did 
not necessarily reflect public moods and contemporary issues quite as much as it 
reflected ongoing power struggles within the top leadership and the cultural 
establishment.  As such, officially sanctioned literature is predominantly regarded as 
an aspect of state policy and of the intra-regime struggle between liberals and 
conservatives rather than as political dissent.          
 
 
    
                                                 
31 Perhaps the most notable example of this was a speech delivered to the XXII CPSU Congress in 
1961 by Novyi Mir editor Aleksandr Tvardovsky.  He called for writers to start sending in more 
challenging works for publication.  This prompted Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn to submit a manuscript that 
had remained hidden for several years and would become one of the defining points of deStalinisation, 
One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.   
32 See D. Spechler, Permitted Dissent in the USSR: Novy Mir and the Soviet Regime, New York: 
Praeger, 1982. 
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0.4 SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Aside from the published sources that have already been discussed above, much of 
this thesis is based upon unpublished primary source research.  This material has been 
drawn from a number of archives, mainly in Moscow but also in New York and 
Budapest.  This has also been supplemented by information drawn from a handful of 
interviews with former dissenters and leading experts on dissent, carried out in the 
UK, US and Russia.  Although the process remains far from complete, the opening up 
of former Soviet archives has provided new materials that have undoubtedly advanced 
our understanding of dissenting behaviour and official responses.  With the vast 
majority of dissenting activity from the period having attracted neither international 
nor domestic attention, what one finds in these files is an invaluable body of evidence 
on acts and individuals that are recorded nowhere else and would otherwise have been 
effectively lost to history.     
 
The most useful of these sources were the files of the Soviet Procurator on individuals 
who were sentenced for anti-Soviet activity and propaganda, held at GARF (The State 
Archive of the Russian Federation) in Moscow.  These contain relevant 
communications between the KGB and Procurator’s office, investigation protocols 
and various other forms of evidence relating to cases in which individuals or groups 
were sentenced for anti-Soviet activity.  Varying in size from a handful of sheets to 
several hundred pages in more complex cases, a typical file might begin with a letter 
from an oblast’ Procurator’s office to the central Procuracy in Moscow announcing 
that the KGB had started an investigation against an individual as a result of a 
particular occurrence.  From there it would outline the events and activities being 
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investigated, any significant evidence that was revealed, a court judgement 
(sometimes, though not often, with a transcript of the hearing) and any subsequent 
appeals or offences relating to the person who had been sentenced. 
 
With the archives of the KGB still effectively inaccessible to researchers and access to 
the Presidential Archive similarly restricted, the holdings of the state Procurator 
(numbering approximately 6,000 convictions for anti-Soviet activity and propaganda 
between 1956 and 1964) are a particularly valuable source.  They not only provide 
useful detail on specific cases but, because of the size of the sample, also give some 
indication of prevailing themes in dissenting behaviour and of the authorities’ general 
attitude toward dissent at any specific point in the period. 
 
The case files that have been used in this study were selected on the basis of an 
annotated catalogue of individuals who were sentenced under article 58-10 during the 
post-Stalin era.33  One of the first criteria was to present a range of cases that 
accurately reflected all of the major forms of dissenting behaviour such as sending 
anti-Soviet letters, forming underground groups and engaging in public outbursts 
against the authorities.  Once this had been achieved, the range of sources was then 
widened to ensure that it represented the evolving demographic and chronological 
trends that can be witnessed when one looks at the era as a whole.34   
 
                                                 
33 See V. Kozlov et al eds, 58-10 Nadzornye proizvodstva prokuratury SSSR po delam ob antisovetskoi 
agitatsii i propaganda: annotirovannyi katalog Mart 1953 – 1991, Moskva: Mezhdunarodnyi Fond 
‘Demokratiya’, 1999.  Presenting a chronological list of sentences for anti-Soviet activity, the catalogue 
provides basic biographical data on the individuals who were jailed and a brief description of what they 
had done.  These short descriptions were then used to select the full case files that were ordered at 
GARF.  
34 One of the ways of drawing out these trends was by producing a chronological database of 
individuals convicted under article 58-10.  With this panoramic view of all political convictions it 
became possible to draw out the most prevalent trends of the era.   
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A considerable volume of the materials that were gathered from the Procurator 
archive have not been included in the thesis because there was simply too much 
evidence to fit everything into one volume.  Most of those cases which have been 
included are generally ones that reflect wider trends of dissenting behaviour rather 
than extreme examples.  Others have been used because they present telling insights 
into the activities of dissenters and the authorities.  In regard to dissenters this might 
mean that a given case file included copies of witness statements that had been 
gathered during an investigation or details of previous and subsequent arrests.  
Insights into the authorities’ activity could include case files which contained court 
transcripts or details of appeals against sentences.             
 
Also of great use for the present work were the archives of the General Department – 
a body that can be regarded as the ‘engine room’ of the Central Committee because it 
was to here that information flowed in from all directions and where the finer details 
of policies were worked out.  The majority of relevant files in this archive are made 
up of one or two page communiqués from the KGB to the Central Committee in 
regard to individual acts of dissent or in the form of summaries of recent dissenting 
activity, over state holidays or election days, for example.  These often include 
information on many acts that did not reach the Procurator, either because the culprits 
could not be traced or because repression via legal channels was deemed 
inappropriate.  Again this gives some idea of the scale and trends of dissenting 
behaviour but also gives further insight into the work of the KGB and of the extent to 
which the leadership was cognisant of protest and criticism. 
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Unfortunately, the General Department files do not contain any reciprocal 
correspondence from the Central Committee to the security organs.  Such documents 
presumably remain inaccessible in the KGB archives.  Unlike the files of the 
Procurator’s office, one of the great strengths of the General Department material is 
that it actually holds reproductions of at least some of the anti-Soviet documents that 
are discussed (several of which are reproduced in the thesis), though the amount of 
detail on individual cases is somewhat less than that in the Procurator files.35  Perhaps 
the main value of this source therefore was in giving some insight into the activity of 
the KGB at this time, a subject that still remains rather difficult for the Khrushchev 
period in many respects. 
 
The records of the Department of Party Organs and of the Komsomol secretariat, held 
at RGANI (The Russian State Archive of Recent History) and RGASPI (The Russian 
State Archive of Social and Political History) respectively, yielded some useful 
statistical information about expulsions from both the CPSU and Komsomol on the 
grounds of dissenting behaviour though their scope was generally rather limited.  Also 
at RGANI, Fond 89 (consisting primarily of evidence used in the 1992 Trial of the 
Communist Party) held a number of interesting documents relating to specific 
breaches of human rights and abuses of power by the regime in the Khrushchev 
period but was far too limited in content to be of much use other than in several 
specific cases. 
 
In Budapest the archives of Radio Liberty – held as part of the Open Society Archives 
– were both rewarding in what they held and frustrating in what was absent.  The 
                                                 
35 One of the main reasons why such examples are not often found in the Procurator files is that a 
decision was taken in 1959 to restrict access to such ‘subversive’ documents even among members of 
the legal establishment.  Kozlov and Mironenko eds,  Kramola, p. 24.  
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intention had been to look at transcripts of Radio Liberty broadcasts to the USSR, yet 
these were no longer held in Budapest (they are currently at the Hoover Institute in 
San Francisco).  Instead, the most useful source of information held there were the 
files of the Radio Liberty press monitoring service that included many highly 
informative cuttings and analyses drawn from the Soviet print media (both national 
and local), and a few from foreign media sources, in regard to various manifestations 
of discontent and the authorities’ struggle against dissent.  Without looking through 
countless editions of a great many newspapers it would have been impossible to gain 
as good an understanding of issues relating to the Soviet media in this context were it 
not for the holdings of the Open Society Archives. 
 
It is worthwhile at this stage briefly to discuss the nature of the archival sources 
employed in this work.  The bulk of the archival materials cited herein have been 
drawn from officially generated sources; in particular from KGB investigation 
protocols or from official communications between the presiding KGB chairman and 
the Central Committee.  This raises two immediate questions: how reliable are the 
materials contained in the files and how comprehensive are they? 
 
It is important to highlight the fact that the majority of these documents were for 
strictly internal purposes.  They had no directly propagandistic feature and were not 
intended to misinform or present a distorted image.  On the contrary, they were 
principally a bare factual record, and one that the centre wished to be accurate.  
Furthermore, although the Soviet legal system remained far from perfect, it did at 
least dispense with much of the falsification and abuse that had characterised it in the 
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Stalin era, arrest quotas were no longer issued for the security organs and confessions 
obtained by violence ceased to be a feature of investigation proceedings.  
 
Of course, none of this is to suggest that such documents can be used unquestioningly 
but it does mean that they are much more useful for attempting to recreate a 
reasonably accurate depiction of the past than corresponding documents from the 
Stalin period, for example.36  Furthermore, this is not a problem confined to officially 
generated sources.  Documents such as Radio Liberty analyses of Soviet activity and 
some dissident memoirs also occasionally take on a highly politicised colouring that 
one must be careful not to take at face value.  This was, at times, a particularly 
adversarial situation and, therefore, one that requires the exercise of some 
considerable caution.  
 
Although highly illuminating, the information held in the archives in regard to 
dissenting behaviour is by no means comprehensive, and nor could it be.  
Undoubtedly there were many acts of dissent that never even came to the attention of 
the authorities and have gone entirely unrecorded.  The lack of access to the archives 
of the KGB and to materials held in the Presidential Archive unfortunately means that 
this is a theme on which there is a considerable volume of material that will most 
likely remain unavailable for some time to come, particularly in regard to official 
activity in the later part of the Khrushchev era.  Nonetheless, it is usually possible to 
piece together information from a variety of other sources where the official files 
remain closed.  
                                                 
36 See, for example, H. Kuromiya, The Voices of the Dead: Stalin’s Terror in the 1930s, London: Yale 
University Press, 2007. Kuromiya analyses numerous investigation protocols on individuals sentenced 
for anti-Soviet activity in the Stalin era.  He demonstrates repeated inconsistencies, evidence of forced 
confessions and omissions of crucial details in case files to show how countless political convictions 
during the period were based on either incredibly flimsy evidence or no evidence at all.    
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In addition to the above archival research, a number of interviews and other 
correspondences were conducted as part of the research for this thesis.  Although 
always intended to be a supplementary source rather than a key facet of the thesis, 
several of these interviews proved to be particularly illuminating and undoubtedly 
added a great deal to the study.  Typically of oral sources, they were most valuable in 
the way that they added vital contextual details and anecdotes of the kind that are 
rarely found in official documents or even memoirs.       
 
These interviews were carried out in Russia, the US and UK, among former dissenters 
who were exiled or emigrated from the USSR during the Brezhnev period.37  Owing 
to the small number of interviewees and the diversity of their individual experiences it 
was decided that the most profitable approach would be to conduct ‘open’ rather than 
‘structured’ interviews.  In most cases this meant exploring one specific event in some 
detail with the interviewee but a few ‘stock’ questions were also asked, such as ‘what 
was your attitude toward Khrushchev at the time?’ or ‘what was your reaction to the 
Secret Speech?’   
 
The interviewees who were approached to take part in this study were chosen 
primarily because each had been involved in one or more of the most important areas 
of dissenting behaviour raised in this thesis.  Andrei Grigorenko, for example, had 
been a member of an underground group, Yuri Orlov had openly criticised the regime 
at a Party meeting following the Secret Speech and Aleksandr Esenin-Volpin had 
been instrumental in persuading dissenters to abandon clandestine acts of protest in 
favour of legalist forms of struggle.  Of course, one is also constrained by the 
                                                 
37 See appendix for a full list of interviewees with attached short biographies. Aside from recorded and 
cited interviews this thesis has also benefited from consultations and advice on the theme of dissent 
with specialists such as Edward Kline and Joshua Rubinstein. 
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availability of interviewees.  With the Khrushchev period more than four decades in 
the past, there is by no means an unlimited supply of people with whom it is possible 
to meet.  Furthermore, because interview evidence was always intended to play a 
supplementary role in this project it was decided that time spent in Moscow ought to 
be focussed on archival research.  The majority of discussions with dissenters, 
therefore, were conducted with émigrés both in the UK and US where archival 
evidence was less widely available.           
 
Practically all of those who were interviewed in the course of this research project 
showed excellent recollection of the period and were both forthcoming and candid on 
any subject that was raised.  In many senses former dissidents make ‘good 
interviewees’: they are almost universally well educated, have no reason to fear 
incriminating themselves in some way and for the most part remain both interested 
and passionate about the issues on which they previously protested and campaigned.  
The risk of over-dramatising or over-inflating the importance of events in question 
also seems to have been minimised by virtue of their having lived in the USSR for 
many years subsequently, meaning that they were to a large extent ‘insulated’ from 
the impact that their activities had in the West and among the wider Soviet population.  
 
0.5 STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
 
The main body of thesis is divided into two chronological periods, each of which 
consists of two chapters.  The first and second chapters address the subjects of 
dissenting behaviour and official responses respectively in the period of 1956 to 1958.  
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The third and fourth chapters then tackle the same subjects for the later period of 1959 
to 1964.   
 
This chronological division of the Khrushchev period has been employed largely in 
order to emphasise the process of evolution that took place in regard to dissent and 
official responses.  Although the periodisation that has been employed does not 
indicate any sudden change in the dynamics of dissent, neither has it been chosen at 
random.  It is notable, for example, that a 1977 internal history textbook produced by 
the KGB also employed a periodisation that bisected the Khrushchev era at this same 
point.38   
 
This division largely reflects the fact that it was official policy rather than dissent 
which changed most notably at this point, yet the two were, to a large extent, 
inextricably linked.  The earlier period was characterised by a sense of great change 
and uncertainty as the boundaries of the relationship between the regime and society 
had begun to be redrawn following Stalin’s death.  The authorities were rarely 
proactive in tackling their critics at this point and instead relied upon what could be 
termed a ‘fire-fighting’ approach to dissent.  The later part of the era was 
characterised by stability and growing cynicism as the outlines of the post-Stalin 
Soviet regime became more solidly established.  One can see a similar theme among 
dissenters of the period; at first instances of criticism and protest tended to be highly 
ephemeral and linked to very specific grievances but, by around the turn of the 
                                                 
38 See V. Chebrikov et al, Istoriya sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti: uchebnik, 
Moskva: Vysshaya krasnoznamenskaya shkola komiteta gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti pri sovete 
ministerov SSSR, 1977.  In this case the KGB divided its own history into the following periods: 1953-
1958 and 1959-1971.  The fact that the later period extends well into the Brezhnev era can be taken as a 
further reflection of the continuities between the regime’s responses to dissent under Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev.   
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decade, critics increasingly became better organised and demonstrated a more 
fundamental sense of disenchantment at the incumbent regime.        
 
This division into what could be termed ‘dynamic’ and ‘stable’ periods is reflected in 
the way that the four chapters have been conceptualised.  The first two chapters, 
which deal with the earlier years of the Khrushchev era, have been written with a 
particularly strong sense of chronology in order to reflect the way that different 
processes and events impacted upon each other.  Although still predominantly 
chronological in nature, chapters 3 and 4 do contain a slightly more thematic aspect in 
order to more fully explore the most salient issues.   
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CHAPTER 1 
PROTEST AND DISSENT: 1956-1958 
 
 
 
The first half of the Khrushchev era saw protest and criticism of the authorities on a 
scale that had not been witnessed for many years, or had, perhaps, never been 
witnessed since the end of the civil war, in the Soviet Union.  Dissenting behaviour 
was not the preserve of a small section of the Moscow intelligentsia at this time, as it 
largely came to be in later years, but could be seen at practically all levels of society 
and in every region of the country.  This was, however, a period in which the majority 
of critics were essentially loyal to the overall communist regime and to the ideology 
of Marxism-Leninism.  Although often quite impassioned and strident in their 
remarks, genuine desire for revolution was at a minimum among dissenters around 
this time.   
 
The Stalin era too had featured occasional outbursts of protest and criticism aimed at 
the authorities, yet it seems clear that the Secret Speech marked the beginning of a 
new stage in the evolution of dissenting behaviour in the Soviet Union, particularly 
among the intelligentsia.  Public forums such as Communist Party meetings and 
debates briefly became the setting for quite sharp criticism before official responses 
ensured that most dissent shifted underground, resulting in a growth of activities such 
as distributing hostile leaflets and forming clandestine groups.                 
 
Importantly, this was a period in which the relationship between state and society was 
going through a vital transitional stage.  The rules of the new era were still being 
established as people learned what had and had not changed since Stalin’s death and, 
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particularly, since the upheavals of the XX CPSU Congress.  Fear of the authorities 
began to decline and hopes of liberalisation were aroused by the XX Party Congress 
that would ultimately be dashed.  The sense of enthusiasm that the Secret Speech 
temporarily engendered soon began to decline and loyal criticism increasingly turned 
to disenchantment and cynicism as the end of the 1950s approached.   
 
One can discern two broad categories of dissenting behaviour that existed during the 
Khrushchev era.  The first category can be classified as ‘worker dissent’: this had 
practically always existed to some extent and primarily involved spontaneous and 
crude forms of protest that, although often manifested in political language and 
imagery, were usually rooted in material discontent.  The second category, labelled 
herein as ‘intelligentsia dissent’, tended to be characterised at this stage by belief in a 
more liberal form of communism, and was generally manifested in planned and 
considered acts of dissent that more accurately reflected some genuine degree of 
dissatisfaction at the prevailing political situation.  Geoffrey Hosking has written of 
the period that ‘…there was no contact whatsoever between workers and intellectuals: 
they lived in different intellectual and moral universes’.39  As such, it should come as 
no great surprise that these two groups had quite distinct grievances and often 
undertook different forms of protest.   
 
The labels ‘worker dissent’ and ‘intelligentsia dissent’ do not indicate that these 
behaviours were necessarily exclusive to members of these two bodies; merely that 
these were the most prevalent social classes involved in each form of dissent 
                                                 
39 G. Hosking, Rulers and Victims: The Russians in the Soviet Union, Cambridge: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2006, p. 297. 
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respectively.40  These are, nonetheless, useful categories by which to view the 
phenomena of dissent, particularly in regard to demonstrating the way that it evolved 
throughout the Khrushchev period and beyond. 
 
As with the major peasant rebellions of Tsarist times, worker dissent did not 
necessarily represent any kind of opposition to the political status quo or defence of 
those who were downtrodden by the regime.41  For the most part, these were not 
idealistic and principled criticisms but expressions of anger at the hardships of life in 
the USSR.  In some ways their themes were universal, such as anger at low living 
standards or resentment at the privileges enjoyed by elites, but they were also 
coloured by Soviet conditions and took on a superficially politicised character.  
Intelligentsia dissent, on the other hand, was more specific to the contemporary 
political situation and more dynamic in nature.  These were usually acts of protest and 
criticism that were based upon genuine political grievances rather than material 
stimuli.  Less volatile than worker dissent, it was, nonetheless, more enduring and can 
be seen to have played a major role in the ‘pre-history’ of the subsequent dissident 
movement. 
 
1.1 DISSENT PRIOR TO THE SECRET SPEECH 
 
Although outside of the main chronological focus of this thesis, it is worthwhile for 
purposes of context briefly to look at dissenting activity in the years prior to the Secret 
Speech.  Furthermore, since it is one of the main themes of the present work to 
                                                 
40 For purposes of clarity it is worthwhile to point out that in the present framework the term 
‘intelligentsia’ also encompasses the student body while the term ‘workers’ also refers to the peasantry. 
41 This is a conclusion that was also reached by Marshall Shatz in Soviet Dissent in Historical 
Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
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establish that dissent was more prevalent under Khrushchev than has been commonly 
recognised thus far, it is also vital to point out that 1956 did not represent any kind of 
‘year zero’ in terms of protest and criticism aimed at the Soviet regime.  In fact, some 
degree of dissent necessarily pervades all regimes; what marks out each case as being 
different are the causes, practicalities and consequences of such protest activity. 
 
1.1.1 THE STALIN YEARS 
 
The Stalin years appear to be something of an unknown quantity in regard to 
dissenting behaviour.  The sheer volume of repression under the umbrella of ‘counter-
revolutionary activity’ has, perhaps, ensured that most genuine acts of protest and 
criticism have been buried under a great mass of entirely fabricated cases.  This is, 
however, a field of study that has been gaining some ground in recent years.42    
Sarah Davies has used NKVD reports from the late 1930s to demonstrate that 
dissenting behaviour was not quite as rare as one might have supposed, even during 
the regime’s most repressive years.  A diverse range of themes, such as the 
subscription campaigns to provide material assistance for the Republican effort in the 
Spanish Civil War, the assassination of Kirov and the 1940 Labour Decree, provoked 
a flurry of critical and hostile remarks, for example. NKVD reports occasionally also 
showed election ballots filled out in the name of ‘Trotsky’ or ‘the Tsar’ and 
mentioned instances of swastikas daubed onto walls in paint.43 
 
                                                 
42 Works specifically addressing this theme in the last few years include L. Viola ed., Contending With 
Stalinism: Soviet Power and Resistance in the 1930s, London: Cornell University Press, 2002; J. 
Rossman, Worker Resistance Under Stalin: Class and Revolution on the Shop Floor, London: Harvard 
University Press, 2005.  
43 See S. Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda and Dissent 1934-1941, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.   
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Julianne Fürst has written about the youth opposition group ‘The Communist Party of 
Youth’ that existed in Voronezh in the 1940s, and Veniamin Iofe (former head of the 
St Petersburg branch of Memorial) has listed numerous other groups that existed 
during the period, such as ‘The Organisation of Young Revolutionaries’ in Saratov, 
‘The Union of Revolutionary Struggle’ in Taishet and the ‘Union of Struggle for the 
Cause of the Revolution’ in Moscow.44  Additionally, Yuri Orlov recalled that while 
waiting to be demobilised at the end of the Second World War he had been invited to 
join a clandestine anti-Stalin group that existed among army officers in his regiment – 
an invitation he turned down.45  Evidently, as stifling as the Stalin years were for the 
expression of discontent, there were still elements of resistance to authority. 
 
Furthermore, looking at the spate of disorders and risings in the Gulag network of the 
1950s, Kozlov has suggested that what he termed ‘the era of camp rebellions’ can 
actually be traced back to the late 1940s when the camp population was increasingly 
composed of hardened war veterans and genuine opponents of the Soviet regime.46  
The country that Stalin left behind at his death, therefore, was one already beset by 
early signs of discontent, with social tensions beginning to rise closer to the surface.47  
According to Alex Inkeles, even before Stalin’s death society had begun to 
                                                 
44 See J. Fürst, ‘Prisoners of the Soviet Self? : Political Youth Opposition in Late Stalinism’, Europe-
Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No.3, May 2002, pp. 353-375.  Also V. Iofe, Granitsy smysla: stat’i, 
vystupleniya, esse, Sankt-Peterburg: Nauchno-informatsionnyi tsentr ‘Memorial’, 2002.  It is also 
worthwhile to flag up for the reader the fact that Fürst’s article prompted a critical response from 
Hiroaki Kuomiya: ‘‘Political Youth Opposition in Late Stalinism’: Evidence and Conjecture’’, Europe-
Asia Studies, Vol. 55, No. 4, June 2003, pp. 631-638.  This was in turn followed by a counter-response 
from Furst and a further reply from Kuromiya.  See J. Fürst, ‘Re-examining Opposition Under Stalin: 
Evidence and Context: A Reply to Kuromiya’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 55, No. 5, July 2003, pp. 789-
803 and H. Kuromiya, ‘Re-Examining Opposition Under Stalin: Further Thoughts’, Europe-Asia 
Studies, Vol. 56, No. 2, March 2004, pp. 309-314.     
45 Interview with Yuri Orlov, Ithaca, New York, December 2006. 
46 In particular these included imprisoned nationalist guerrillas from the Ukraine and the Baltic States.  
See V. Kozlov, Neizvestnyi SSSR: Protivostoyanie naroda i vlasti 1953-1985, Moskva: Olma-Press, 
2006. 
47 See also E. Zubkova, Obshchestvo i reformy 1945-1964, Moskva: Izdatel’skii tsentr ‘Rossiya 
molodaya’, 1993. 
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demonstrate that the deprivations of low living standards and state terror would not be 
so easily accepted again.48 
 
1.1.2 THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP 
 
Reviewing the case files of individuals convicted under article 58-10, for ‘anti-Soviet 
activity and propaganda’, during the years of collective leadership, one can quickly 
see that nationalist and religious activity made up the considerable bulk of convictions 
at that time.  The former largely represented the conclusion of repressions against 
citizens of the Ukraine and the Baltic States that had been ongoing since the later 
stages of the Second World War and the latter was largely a result of the brief but 
widespread anti-religious campaign of 1954.49 
 
In regard to those acts that come under the category of political dissent during the 
period of collective leadership that followed Stalin’s death, the general tone had 
changed only a little since the previous era.  Typical examples included I.N. Pisarev’s 
December 1953 conviction after writing ‘Down with the Soviet regime! Long live 
Truman!’ and drawing swastikas on a wall in Chelyabinsk oblast’.50  Similarly, I.N. 
Rodin, a war invalid, was jailed in June 1955 after cursing members of the 
Communist Party leadership while on a trolleybus in Moscow.51  What one can also 
see, however, is that an increasing number of people were sentenced for ‘obscene’ 
(netsenzurnye) public outbursts against members of the militia and various political 
                                                 
48 A. Inkeles, Social Change in Soviet Russia, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 28. 
49 Some of the best coverage of the authorities’ repression of nationalist resistance in Ukraine and the 
Baltic States can be found in Yu. Aksyutin, Khrushchevskaya ‘ottepel’ i obshchestvennye nastroenniya 
v SSSR v 1953 – 1964, Moskva: Rosspen, 2004. In regard to the anti-religious campaign during the 
years of collective leadership, see J. Delaney-Grossman, ‘Khrushchev’s Anti-Religious Policy and the 
Campaign of 1954’, Soviet Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3, January 1973, pp. 374-386. 
50 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 77681, ll. 1-3. 
51 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 67444, l. 1. 
 36
figures as well as individuals being jailed after sending letters containing threats or 
anti-Soviet expressions to newspapers and political figures. 
 
Up until the Secret Speech this kind of crude and often spontaneous worker dissent 
continued to predominate.  Where the relevant documentation is available it seems 
that those who were arrested and sentenced for such acts were most often poorly 
educated males from the Slavic republics of the USSR.52  Quite frequently they were 
also either intoxicated at the time of the event or were actually serving prisoners.  One 
can see that criticism and frustration were increasingly beginning to appear in the 
public sphere, though still in very limited numbers and often manifested in quite a 
crude fashion.  These behaviours did not disappear after the Secret Speech, and in fact 
seem to have become more common for a time (they are addressed again later in the 
present chapter), but were also supplemented with more planned and cerebral activity 
that saw Soviet dissent enter a fundamentally new stage in its evolution. 
 
With the field of study still relatively narrow, one must remain circumspect in 
drawing conclusions about dissent prior to the Secret Speech.  However, with the 
price to be paid for disobedience and non-conformism set prohibitively high in the 
Stalin years, it should perhaps come as no surprise that one generally does not 
encounter the kinds of reasoned and persistent criticism that began to occur later 
under Khrushchev.  Instead what one does see from the above evidence is a degree of 
worker protest and dissent that was predominantly spontaneous and without 
consideration of the potential consequences.  What this perhaps reflected was the 
extent to which approximately two and a half decades of Stalinism had stifled almost 
                                                 
52 Procurator files on individuals sentenced for anti-Soviet activity included a survey of basic 
biographical data such as age, profession, nationality and place of residence.  In many case files 
education levels were also included, though this was not always the case.   
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all outward signs of genuine ideological heterodoxy and ensured that the only acts of 
political protest and dissent that did occur resembled a kind of primal ‘lashing out’ at 
the regime.     
 
1.2 THE XX CONGRESS AND ITS AFTERMATH 
 
 
Khrushchev’s five-hour long indictment of Stalin, delivered to a closed session of the 
XX CPSU Congress on the night of 24 February 1956, was one of the pivotal 
moments in Soviet history.  Furthermore, it was undoubtedly one of the most 
significant factors underpinning protest and criticism throughout the entire post-Stalin 
era.  Many dissenters of even much later periods have cited the speech as a key 
turning point in their attitude toward the regime.53   
 
With the exception of the riots that flared in Tbilisi on 8 and 9 March 1956, however, 
the exposure of Stalin’s crimes did not provoke an immediately volatile response.  
What one can see on reading accounts of individuals’ immediate responses to the 
Secret Speech is that the general reaction was one of shock and stunned silence rather 
than anger.54  Although it is undoubtedly true to assert that the Secret Speech often 
prompted re-evaluations of the regime that remained at a very personal level, there is 
also considerable evidence to suggest that, in fact, it sparked a revival of enthusiasm 
for the communist project, especially among young people and members of the 
intelligentsia.  
 
                                                 
53 Examples of this include Petr Grigorenko and Leonid Plyushch. See P. Grigorenko, Memoirs, New 
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1982, p.222 and L.Plyushch, History’s Carnival: A Dissident’s 
Autobiography, London: Harvill Press, 1979, p. 12.  
54 See for example L. Lur’e and I. Malyarova eds, 1956 god. Seredina veka, Sankt-Peterburg: Neva, 
2007.  
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Fedor Burlatsky, for example, described a ‘rush of young blood’ into the Party around 
this time and a heightened sense of idealism among young people in particular.55  
Burlatsky himself was no ‘ordinary’ chronicler of this surge of idealistic youth but, as 
a high-ranking representative of what could be termed the Communist Party’s liberal 
wing, he was directly involved in it.  Nonetheless, other recollections from the time 
support his assertion.  Revolt Pimenov, for example, wrote in his memoirs that, upon 
hearing of Khrushchev’s speech in March 1956, he began to consider joining the 
Communist Party.56  Raisa Orlova described the atmosphere of the post-congress 
period as ‘echoing the mass-meeting type of democracy’ that had followed October 
1917.57  It is worth pointing out, however, that Orlova was not born until 1918, 
suggesting that her conception of events in 1917 may have been heavily shaped by 
subsequent state propaganda.  Nonetheless, this does not detract from the broad theme 
of Orlova’s assertion; that the Secret Speech roused great enthusiasm and, as some 
commentators have argued, a sense of spiritual and moral renewal, particularly among 
the intelligentsia.58 
 
1.2.1 DISCUSSIONS OF THE SECRET SPEECH 
 
This atmosphere of ‘renewal’ or ‘re-awakening’ produced a burgeoning sense of 
communist utopianism which raised hopes and expectations that subsequently proved 
incompatible with the regime’s intentions.  Often, though not always, emerging within 
                                                 
55 F. Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring: The Era of Khrushchev Through the Eyes of 
his Adviser, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991, p. 13. 
56 R. Pimenov, Vospominaniya, Moskva: Informatsionno-ekspertnaya gruppa ‘Panorama’, 1996.  
Pimenov was soon to become the founder of one of the period’s most notable underground groups, 
discussed later in the present chapter, and remained one of the regime’s most enduring critics for many 
years. In 1990 he was elected to the Congress of Peoples’ Deputies.   
57 R. Orlova, An End to Silence: Memoirs, New York: Random House, 1983, p. 112.     
58 See, for example, F. Barghoorn, Détente and the Democratic Movement in the USSR, London: 
Collier Macmillan, 1976, p. 11 and C. Gerstenmaier, The Voices of the Silent, New York: Hart 
Publishing Company, 1972, p. 42. 
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the ranks of the Party and Komsomol, it is from this point that one can begin to 
discern a quite clear strand of ‘intelligentsia dissent’ developing in addition to the 
kinds of spontaneous and crude worker dissent that had existed under Stalin.  What 
generally began as honest and essentially loyal criticism directed at specific flaws was 
consistently frustrated, suppressed and punished by the authorities, eventually leading 
to far more fundamental critiques of the wider system.    
 
Overlaying this theme of enthusiasm for the communist project was a general 
atmosphere of confusion, referred to by Michael Scammell as a ‘chasm of 
uncertainty’.59  It was made clear not just by the Speech but also by articles in the 
national and regional press that the official approach to Stalin had changed, yet 
initially there was little indication as to exactly where the new boundaries of 
acceptable and unacceptable comment and behaviour lay.60  This prompted numerous 
misjudgements on the part of individuals as to what constituted permissible behaviour 
in the wake of Khrushchev’s revelations.  Consequently, many citizens unwittingly 
overstepped this boundary in the weeks and months that followed the XX Party 
Congress.  
 
One of the most useful testimonies to this atmosphere of uncertainty and loyal 
questioning could be seen in a memorandum sent to the General Department of the 
Central Committee from the Department of Party Organs, which provided a summary 
of questions that had been submitted at the thousands of meetings held all across the 
                                                 
59 M. Scammell, Solzhenitsyn: A Biography, New York: WW Norton and Company, 1984, p. 404. 
60 Probably the most widely circulated of these articles was ‘Why the Cult of the Individual is Alien to 
the Spirit of Marxism-Leninism’, Pravda, 28 March 1956.  Among other things, the article stated that 
Stalin had encouraged, rather then prevented, glorification of himself and referred to ‘grave errors’ that 
had resulted from his cult. 
 40
USSR to discuss the Secret Speech.61  The three most common questions it listed 
were: ‘why was Khrushchev’s report so limited in its contents?’, ‘why was there no 
self-criticism or open discussion of the report?’ and ‘what guarantees are there that 
there will not be another cult?’  Among other frequently asked questions were: ‘are 
not other Presidium members also guilty? They must have known (what was 
happening) but will not admit it’, ‘is there not a cult around Lenin too?’ and ‘how 
could the newspapers lie for so long and now change so easily?’62  These were 
exactly the kind of questions that members of the leadership had hoped would not be 
raised as a result of Khrushchev’s report.    
                                                
 
These discussions of the Secret Speech witnessed a wave of critical questioning and 
comment on a scale that had not been seen for many years.  In both the Party and the 
Komsomol there were sharp attacks on individual leaders and on the climate of 
subservience that had developed in the country.  Anastas Mikoyan, for example, was 
labelled a hypocrite after people compared his fawning remarks on Stalin at the XIX 
CPSU Congress (1952) with his criticism of him at the XX CPSU Congress in 1956.63  
At Moscow State University (MGU), a student meeting demanded that the Komsomol 
be freed from the corrupting influence of Communist Party control.64  Nonetheless, 
the legitimacy of the regime and the ideology on which it was based appears to have 
remained largely unchallenged at this time and the majority of those who made 
 
61 These meetings primarily involved CPSU and Komsomol members but some non-communists were 
able to attend in many places. 
62 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 139, l. 5.  
63 See A. Pyzhikov, Opyt modernizatsiya Sovetskogo obshchestva v 1953-1964 godakh: obshchestveno-
politicheskii aspect, Moskva: Izdatel’skii dom Gamma, 1998, p57.  Although not on the scale of 
Khrushchev’s revelations in the Secret Speech, Mikoyan too had been mildly critical of Stalin during 
his own speech to the congress.  
64 L. Silina, Nastroeniya sovetskogo studenchestva 1945-1964, Moskva: Russkii mir, 2004, p. 108.  
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critical remarks were actually idealistic communists hoping for improvements in the 
system.   
 
Karl Aimermakher’s collected volume of official documents relating to the Secret 
Speech shows that critical remarks occurred in every union republic.65  Similarly, 
Boris Firsov has stated that by 26 August – almost exactly six months after the end of 
the XX CPSU Congress – the Central Committee had received over 2,000 letters 
regarding the Secret Speech, over 200 of which demanded that Stalin be removed 
from the mausoleum that he shared with Lenin on Red Square.66  In this connection it 
is important to point out that questioning and criticism do not appear to have spread to 
Lenin in any noticeable way.  In fact the recurring theme of letters demanding Stalin’s 
removal from the mausoleum on Red Square was that Lenin should no longer have to 
suffer the presence of Stalin.67  As Igor Volgin recalled of the time: ‘all of my 
generation of students were anti-Stalinists, but they were not anti-Soviet’.68 
 
It is worthwhile to pause and consider briefly the sources on which our understanding 
of events at this time is based.  In the period that followed the XX Party Congress the 
most sizeable body of evidence on dissenting responses to the Secret Speech is to be 
found in reports filed by Party and Komsomol branches.  One must, therefore, be 
aware that such reports may not necessarily reflect the responses of people who were 
not members of those two bodies.  However, there is nothing in the primary or 
secondary literature on the period to suggest that there was any notable trend of 
                                                 
65 See K. Aimermakher, et al, eds.  Doklad N.S. Khrushcheva o kul’te lichnosti Stalina na XX s’ezde 
KPSS: Dokumenty, Moskva: Rosspen, 2002.  
66 B. Firsov, Raznomyslie v SSSR 1940-1960 gody: Istoriya, teoriya i praktika, Sankt Peterburg: 
Izdatel’stvo Evropeiskogo universiteta v Sankt Peterburge, 2008, p. 258. 
67 Firsov, Raznomyslie v SSSR, p. 258. 
68 Interview with Igor Volgin in L. Polikovskaya, ‘My predchuvstvie…predtecha’: ploshchad 
Mayakovskogo 1958-1965, Moskva: Obshchestvo ‘Memorial’, 1997, p. 44. 
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different responses to the Secret Speech on the part of communists and non-
communists.  With CPSU and Komsomol members attending official meetings held to 
discuss the Speech, it was surely they that knew most about its content and were 
therefore most likely to provide the first wave of responses.  It is also important to 
remember that Khrushchev’s ‘revelations’ about the Stalin era had focused primarily 
upon the sufferings inflicted upon members of the Communist Party rather than the 
country as a whole.    
 
The sense of confusion and frustration that the Secret Speech triggered was 
exacerbated by Khrushchev’s infrequent backtracking on the Stalin question.  This 
can be seen in a letter sent to the Central Committee Presidium by M. Petrygin of 
Tuaps after Khrushchev had spoken about Stalin in glowing terms at the Chinese 
embassy in January 1957.  The letter began sarcastically: ‘Dear Comrades! It appears 
that there are two Khrushchevs: one who defends Stalin and one who attacks him’.  
Petrygin went on to ask, ‘Who can believe in a Party that so naively explains the 
criminal activities of Stalin?’  He then claimed that Khrushchev’s speeches were 
‘causing disorder in our minds and creating uncertainty about whether the 
consequences of the cult will be overcome’.  Tellingly, Petrygin ended the letter by 
saying ‘sorry for being so direct but I think that this is the best way’.69  The pointed 
but ultimately respectful tone of these remarks was characteristic of most criticism at 
that time and, as with many other examples, it represented something akin to loyal 
                                                 
69 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 189, ll. 29-32.   At the Chinese embassy Khrushchev had declared that being 
a communist was inseparable from being a Stalinist and stated: ‘may god grant that every communist 
will be able to fight for the interests of the working class as Stalin fought’. Khrushchev had also spoken 
positively about Stalin at an official function to celebrate New Year’s Eve a few weeks earlier when he 
had declared that he and all his colleagues were Stalinists in their uncompromising fight against the 
class enemy.  In regard to both of these instances see W. Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era, 
p. 301. 
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criticism that, nonetheless, went some way beyond what the authorities considered 
permissible.   
 
1.2.2 THE THERMO-TECHNICAL INSTITUTE 
 
Probably the best example that combined these themes of uncertainty and essentially 
loyal criticism can be seen in the events at the meeting held to discuss the Secret 
Speech at Moscow’s Thermo-Technical Institute.70  Upon being requested to arrange 
a meeting of the Party cell for a discussion of the XX Congress’ report on Stalin, Yuri 
Orlov and three colleagues (R.G. Arvalov, V.E. Nesterov and G.I. Shedrin) took it 
upon themselves to give their honest and complete opinions on the matters that 
Khrushchev had addressed. 
 
In his own remarks, Orlov spoke of a prevailing sense of moral decay within the Party 
and society at large.  He argued that, contrary to official pronouncements, Marxism-
Leninism was not truly scientific and stated the need for greater democratisation in 
order to protect against further abuses of power in the future.  Orlov then claimed that 
people at every level of society were still forced to compromise their moral 
conscience and to ‘hold their fingers in the wind’ in order to judge the atmosphere and 
adjust their behaviour to potentially dangerous changes in the political sphere.71  His 
three colleagues gave broadly analogous and strident opinions on Stalin and the 
present state of the Soviet Union, with one member, Arvalov, even going so far as to 
                                                 
70 At the time this was the second most prestigious scientific institute in the USSR and the Party cell 
was attached to the Soviet Academy of Sciences.  The only institute that could claim seniority was the 
Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics (ITEP), headed by the pioneer of the Soviet atom 
bomb, Igor Kurchatov.    
71 Interview with Yuri Orlov, Ithaca, December 2006. 
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insist that the working classes ought to be armed in order to protect against the 
regime’s more authoritarian tendencies in the future.72 
 
The fact that Orlov later went on to play a major role in the establishment of the 
Soviet chapter of Amnesty International in 1973 and subsequently founded the 
Moscow Helsinki Watch Committee in 1976 (arguably the most important of all the 
dissident organisations) makes the event significant as the point of his own break with 
the regime but does not necessarily indicate that he was one of its opponents.  In fact, 
as he himself pointed out fifty years later: ‘it would probably look good for me now to 
say that I really was an anti-communist but that is not true at all.  I was still very much 
a communist then’.73  When the head of the institute, Abram Alikhanov, informed the 
quartet that he had been ordered to fire them he said ‘you are either heroes or fools for 
what you did’.  When questioned whether heroism or foolishness had prompted their 
actions, Orlov conceded candidly that both had probably played a role.74 
 
There were a few noteworthy consequences of the meeting at the Thermo-Technical 
Institute.  Firstly, a motion put forward to condemn the quartet’s remarks as having 
been immature and mistaken received very little support within the Party cell.  The 
majority of those present chose to abstain or to reject the proposal.  Secondly, 
aggrieved at the way the quartet had been treated, a number of fellow scientists from 
around the USSR collaborated in donating money to support the dismissed physicists 
until they were able to find work.  The third notable consequence was that, after the 
four were attacked in the media, their case became known nationally and inspired 
considerable sympathy, in later years being cited as an inspiration by various 
                                                 
72 RGANI, f. 3, op. 14, d. 13, l. 78. 
73 Interview with Yuri Orlov, Ithaca, December 2006. 
74 Interview with Yuri Orlov, Ithaca, December 2006. 
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subsequent dissenters.75  Unable to find scientific work any closer than Yerevan, 
Orlov arrived in Armenia a year later to discover that many people there were 
immediately well disposed toward him as a result of the media attack on the group.76  
One need only to contrast this state of affairs with stories from the Stalin era where 
people did not dare to speak of long-standing friends or even family members who 
had been taken away by the security organs.77 
 
Perhaps the most important and enduring factor that proved tangential to the events of 
the XX Congress was the realisation that it had become increasingly possible to give 
an honest and critical opinion about the political situation without ultimately risking 
personal disaster.  The Secret Speech gave final confirmation of a trend that was 
already becoming evident: that the price to be paid for criticism had lowered 
sufficiently that it need not be entirely prohibitive for those who might anticipate the 
consequences of their behaviour.  As Moshe Lewin has written: ‘When in 1956, 
Nikita Khrushchev launched his sensational attack on Stalin at the Twentieth Party 
Congress, Soviet society, and especially the intelligentsia, understood that the days of 
Stalinist show trials and arbitrary arrests and executions had gone for good’.78  
Responses to dissent could still be harsh but not on the same scale as before.   
 
What this meant was that protest and criticism were no longer the preserve of those 
who acted impulsively or without consideration of the potential consequences.  
However, in regard to Lewin’s assertion, it is worth adding the caveat that Stalinism 
                                                 
75 In conversation, Orlov stated that Petr Grigorenko had been one such individual.  The memoirs of 
Revolt Pimenov show him to have been similarly influenced by Orlov’s speech.  See Pimenov, 
Vospominaniya.     
76 Interview with Yuri Orlov, Ithaca, December 2006. 
77 See, for example, A. Applebaum, Gulag: A History of the Soviet Camps, London: Allen Lane, 2003 
and O.Figes, The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin’s Russia, London: Allen Lane, 2007.   
78 M. Lewin, The Soviet Century, London: Verso, 2005, p. 156. 
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had left a deep and lasting impression on many.  Young people would probably have 
found it much easier to accept that show trials and arbitrary arrests had ended than 
would many people old enough to have been touched by those events or even to 
remember them.   
 
This decline in fear of the authorities could also be seen in people’s attitudes toward 
dissenters around this time.  It has already been mentioned, for example, that Yuri 
Orlov received financial assistance from fellow scientists and found that his criticism 
of the regime had granted him a considerable degree of credibility in Armenia.  
Similarly, recalling his father Petr’s break with the regime (of which he had 
previously been a particularly committed adherent) after making a speech critical of 
Khrushchev at a Moscow Party congress in 1962, Andrei Grigorenko said that ‘yes, a 
few people began to avoid us after that but we also made new acquaintances because 
of it.  I think maybe our social circle actually grew overall’.79  Vladimir Shlapentokh 
also claimed that ‘…if publicly a majority of Soviet people continued to behave 
toward heretics in almost the same way as they had under Stalin, their private 
behaviour was very different.  Unlike in the past, a significant number of people 
defied the authorities and continued to entertain relations with people denounced as 
foes of the Soviet system’.80     
 
This appears to have been a time when many of the regime’s critics could potentially 
have been ‘brought back into the fold’ but were not.  As Boris Firsov has argued: ‘it 
was at this stage that the regime chose not to enter into a dialogue with its critics and 
                                                 
79 Interview with Andrei Grigorenko, New York, October 2006. 
80 V. Shlapentokh, Public and Private Life of the Soviet People: Changing Values in Post-Stalin 
Russia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 123. 
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passed up the historical chance to stabilise the developing crisis’.81  Instead, the 
regime only compounded many critics’ frustrations over the following weeks and 
months.  Already both sides of the regime-dissenter confrontation that would persist 
for much of the next three decades were beginning to take shape.  What one can see 
from this time onward are the early stages of a process whereby loyal criticism began 
to shift toward cynicism and outright rejection of the regime, partly because of the 
ongoing personal ‘re-evaluations’ and partly because of the way that the authorities 
ostracised those who had engaged in even relatively mild criticism.  
 
1.2.3 MARXISM-LENINISM 
 
Not all of those who undertook dissenting activities in the wake of the Secret Speech 
attempted to do so in a constructive and loyal manner, however.  In Arkhangel’ 
oblast’, for example, Boris Generozov was arrested in April 1956 after producing six 
political leaflets and reading them to fellow workers at a forestry enterprise.  Included 
in Generozov’s leaflets were the following statements: 
 
The Stalinist Communist Party has nothing to do with Lenin’s Party.  It is now 
criminal and against the people.  The Party hides Stalin’s crimes from the country 
and is now run by cowards and degenerates.  The Soviets and Trade Unions are 
used only to terrorise the people. 
 
Do the people need such a Party? Or a Party at all? No! It is not needed! 
 
All of the country is striving for communism, we do not need exploiters.  The Party 
is not creating the conditions for this transition. 
 
Is it possible to believe in this government? No! Never! 
 
For three years the Party has hidden Stalin’s crimes and now exposes them only 
because they are under pressure from public opinion.82 
 
                                                 
81 Firsov, Raznomyslie v SSSR, p. 263. 
82 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 83224, ll. 1-12. 
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Generozov was certainly not alone in viewing the Secret Speech as little more than 
eyewash.  Leningrad geo-physicist N.N. Smirnov was one of many who wrote to the 
Central Committee demanding that Stalin’s crimes be examined and exposed in a 
more rigorous and open fashion with punishment for those around him who were 
found to be responsible.  Smirnov was subsequently confined to a psychiatric hospital 
as a result of his letter. 
 
Although a far more bitter attack on the authorities than previous examples cited in 
this work, it is again possible to see clearly that the ideological basis of Generozov’s 
comments remained within a fundamentally Marxist-Leninist structure.  Whether this 
trend existed primarily because years of Stalin-imposed isolation left the Soviet 
people with little capacity to envisage alternative political philosophies, as Jochen 
Hellbeck has suggested, or whether genuine communist utopianism had been re-
ignited by Khrushchev is impossible to state definitively.83  A broad range of 
contemporary and secondary sources do suggest that there was a renewed sense of 
communist idealism around this time, yet it was also the case that as the isolation of 
the Stalin years receded further into the past, fervent communist faith also seems to 
have declined and new political belief systems accordingly arose.  However, these 
two arguments – that Marxist-Leninist ideology predominated because people were 
genuinely enthused about communism at the time or because competing ideologies 
had been so successfully wiped from the popular mindset by years of Stalinist 
isolation and indoctrination – are by no means mutually exclusive and the two may 
even have exacerbated one another.   
 
                                                 
83 See J. Hellbeck, Revolution on my Mind: Writing a Diary Under Stalin, London: Harvard University 
Press, 2006.  
 49
It seems that Khrushchev’s revelations about Stalin did not fatally undermine the 
regime but did impact significantly upon the relationship between state and society.  
Many of those who later became critics and enemies of the Soviet regime became 
alienated from it largely because the promises that the XX Party Congress seemed to 
offer were not carried out.  One can see this in a large numbers of speeches, leaflets 
and letters that condemned the authorities for ‘betraying the spirit of the XX 
Congress’.  Additionally, the Secret Speech facilitated the voicing of discontent and 
disagreement by demonstrating that criticism and protest no longer cost as high a 
price as previously and by decisively undermining the regime’s claim to political 
infallibility.   
 
1.2.4 PRO-STALIN DISSENT 
 
One also encounters a sharply contrasting theme of dissenting behaviour resulting 
from the attack on the ‘Cult of Personality’: that of protest and criticism on the 
grounds of defending Stalin.  The mass disorders in Georgia on 8 and 9 March 1956 
were the most famous instance of pro-Stalin dissent yet their origins remain somewhat 
unclear.  Kozlov has suggested that they were essentially a Georgian nationalist 
phenomenon, while Jeremy Smith has argued that they genuinely were motivated by 
support for Stalin. 84  Events in Tbilisi are discussed at greater length in chapter 3, 
though it is worthwhile to point out here that there appears to be no evidence that 
communism as an ideology was the target of protesters’ criticism.    
 
                                                 
84 See V. Kozlov, Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and Rebellion in the Post-Stalin Years, 
London: M.E. Sharpe, 2002 and J. Smith, Beria, Stalin, Khrushchev and Georgian Nationalism: The 
March 1956 Tbilisi Events in Context,  Unpublished conference paper presented to September 2008 
Manchester University Workshop on Networks and Hierarchies in the Soviet Provinces.    
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As the period progressed, two reasonably distinct trends of pro-Stalin dissent could be 
witnessed.  The first was driven by genuine support for Stalin and Stalinism while the 
second was employed primarily as a means of attacking Khrushchev because Stalin 
was seen as his enemy.  The first trend was particularly notable after the Secret 
Speech but also in the wake of the June 1957 expulsion of the ‘anti-Party group’ that 
saw prominent arch-Stalinists such as Vyacheslav Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich 
removed from the leadership and disgraced.  The subsequent renaming of enterprises 
and towns that had been named in their honour also saw sporadic outbursts of 
dissent.85  In such instances Khrushchev was often attacked as a liar and a usurper 
who was fraudulently seeking to establish his own authority at the expense of Stalin’s 
reputation, and he was accused of weakening the state and causing living standards to 
plummet.  One example of this could be seen in the case of N.N. Sitnikov (a CPSU 
member) who was jailed after sending six anonymous letters to the Central 
Committee in which he branded party policy as anti-Leninist and expressed vigorous 
opposition to the removal of the anti-Party group.86 
 
Interestingly, there were relatively few prosecutions under article 58-10 for behaviour 
that could be categorised as pro-Stalin political dissent, suggesting that it was either 
rare in occurrence or was less likely to draw a punitive response than were other 
themes of dissenting activity.  The two were not necessarily exclusive of one another 
yet the likelihood seems to be that in the ranks of the security organs at least, there 
may well have been a tendency toward indulging those who engaged in pro-Stalin 
protest and dissent provided that matters did not get out of hand as they clearly had 
                                                 
85 See, for example, E. Kulavig, Dissent in the Years of Khrushchev: Nine Stories About Disobedient 
Russians, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 
86 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 80699, ll. 1-4. 
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done in Georgia.  Khrushchev’s attack on Stalin had, after all, brought great shame 
upon the security organs too for their part in the mass repressions.87     
 
Evidently, the Secret Speech produced a complex web of dissenting responses; some 
that were strongly pro-Stalin, but more that were strongly anti-Stalin.  What unified 
most of them was the absence of genuine opposition toward the communist regime as 
a whole.  The Secret Speech’s immediate impact was to cause widespread criticism of 
the authorities yet this did not truly threaten to go beyond the regime’s control.  In 
many ways the Secret Speech should be viewed as the beginning of a much longer 
process in terms of dissenting behaviour.  It not only became clear that it was possible 
to dissent and survive but also roused hopes of liberalisation that were not to be 
fulfilled.       
 
1.3 AMNESTIES AND PRISONERS 
 
One of the major consequences of Khrushchev’s attack on Stalin was that it gave the 
final impetus toward the mass release, and sometimes rehabilitation, of those who 
remained confined in the Gulag.  The process had already begun soon after Stalin’s 
death but up to 1956 had proceeded in a stuttering and largely unenthusiastic fashion, 
apparently often hindered by uncooperative camp bosses and the security organs.88  
The camp network was by no means completely disbanded in the wake of the Secret 
Speech and most who had been sentenced under political articles were actually not 
included in the amnesties of 1956.  The sheer volume of prisoners flowing out of the 
                                                 
87 See J. Elkner, ‘The Changing Face of Repression Under Khrushchev’ in M. Ilic and J. Smith eds, 
Soviet State and Society Under Nikita Khrushchev, London, Routledge, forthcoming (2009). 
88 See N. Adler, Trudnoe vozvrashchenie: sud’by sovetskikh politzeklyuchennykh v 1950-1990 gody, 
Moskva: Izdatel’stvo ‘Zven’ya’, 2005. 
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Gulag and back into society nonetheless made this a highly significant step in regard 
to practically all aspects of Soviet life, not least in terms of dissent. 
 
1.3.1 RELEASED PRISONERS 
 
The effect that these prisoner releases had upon dissenting activity was rather 
complicated.  As Miriam Dobson has shown, there were numerous instances in 1953 
when former prisoners wrote anti-Soviet leaflets and engaged in political outbursts, 
apparently with the sole intention of being sent back into the camp network as a result 
of their limited prospects on the outside.89  Much the same thing happened in the 
amnesties that followed the Secret Speech, with many of those who were sentenced 
under article 58-10 around this time having been apprehended as a result of making 
hostile political statements at train stations or on trains shortly after being released.  
Whether these people had the direct intention of being returned to camps is unclear, 
though the similarities with cases presented by Dobson are striking at times.   
 
One example of this type of behaviour can be seen in the case of the Ukrainian P.N. 
Sobolev of Kirovskaya oblast’ who was sentenced in January 1957 after making what 
his case file referred to only as ‘anti-Soviet remarks’ on a train to Perm after being 
released from camp.90  Similarly, in March 1957 the just-released prisoners I.A. 
Bodinkov and S.A. Kuznetsov were both sentenced under article 58-10 on the same 
day in different parts of the country: the former after making threats against 
                                                 
89 M. Dobson, ‘Show the Bandit Enemies no Mercy!: Amnesty, Criminality and Public Response in 
1953’, in Jones ed.,  The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization. 
90 GARF, f.8131, op. 31, d. 81493, l. 1. 
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communists and approving of life in the US; the latter after engaging in what the KGB 
investigation only referred to as ‘anti-Soviet hooligan behaviour’ at a train station.91 
 
In the light of such oblique terminology as that referred to above, it is important to 
consider the nature of the KGB evidence on which a large part of this study is based.  
Firstly, the timing of the above-cited cases is important, coming as they did during a 
major crackdown on dissent (see chapter 2).  Although disconcertingly vague, terms 
such as ‘anti-Soviet hooligan behaviour’ did not necessarily imply groundless 
persecution.  What they usually involved were drunken outbursts and threats against 
members of the regime or individual communists along with other politically 
indiscreet remarks.  In instances such as those above one usually finds citations from a 
handful of witness testimonies in the investigation protocol and often some 
acknowledgement of repentance on the part of the accused.  While in themselves not 
completely indefatigable evidence, these do allow us to place some confidence in the 
basic facts presented by KGB investigations. 
 
One example of a released prisoner left deeply politicised by his time in the Gulag 
was the Georgian Kh.A. Asadulin, who had been sentenced for ‘betrayal of the 
motherland’ in 1945 and released in February 1955.  Between that time and his arrest 
in 1960, Asadulin produced over 10,000 anti-Soviet leaflets that were distributed in 
Baku, Tbilisi and Kirovabad.  According to the KGB investigation protocol, the 
leaflets in question consisted of calls for citizens to struggle against the Soviet regime, 
slander of the CPSU’s domestic and foreign policy and praise for the American way 
                                                 
91 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 78019, ll. 1-4 and f. 8131, op. 31, d. 81617, ll. 1-7. 
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of life.  Under interrogation Asadulin stated that he had decided to struggle against the 
regime whilst in prison and promptly did so upon his release.92   
 
However, cases of persistent dissent among former prisoners appear to have been 
relatively few. It is, for example, a theme of Nanci Adler’s work on returning 
prisoners that amnesty and rehabilitation effectively bought a prisoner’s silence in 
most cases.93  It is hard to say for certain whether similar acts of defiance actually 
took place among released prisoners on any kind of scale in the Stalin years or not, 
though one assumes that such behaviours would have been less common.  Typically 
of worker dissent, what one finds is that although often quite extreme in tone, these 
outbursts were almost entirely ephemeral, with the individuals in question generally 
not undertaking these kinds of behaviours again.94  
 
1.3.2 THE INFLUENCE OF RETURNEES 
 
Arguably more enduring than the behaviour of released prisoners themselves was the 
impact that their suffering had upon the next generation.  Like many others, Mikhail 
Aksenov (a Brezhnev era dissident) recalled that it was the influence of Gulag 
returnees that destroyed the last of his faith in the regime and eventually turned him 
into a dissident.95  Vladimir Bukovsky too spoke at length about the influence that 
meeting released prisoners and hearing their stories had had upon his own attitude 
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toward the regime.96  This is not a theme that was often manifested in concrete 
dissenting activity, however, suggesting that it was a contributory factor toward 
developing a critical or oppositional mentality rather than a direct catalyst for action.  
Philip Boobbyer’s assertion that ‘existential questions often preceded political 
opposition in the evolution of dissident thought’ surely has some resonance in this 
respect.97  Clearly, there were also a great many people who encountered released 
prisoners without going on to engage in dissenting behaviour, suggesting that for the 
‘average’ Soviet citizen (if such a thing can be said to have existed) this was not a 
subject that would turn them into active dissenters on its own.   
 
This touches upon a rather fundamental question as to why some people engaged in 
dissenting behaviour and others remained passive in their disenchantment.  There is 
probably some validity in pointing to personality characteristics as a factor that made 
certain individuals more inclined to rebel against authority yet this may not give the 
whole picture.  For example, in regard to later years when riots and large 
demonstrations flared, one must surely also look to studies in social psychology on 
the way that people behave in large crowds.  Similarly, with many people being jailed 
in the late 1950s on the basis of statements made whilst intoxicated, it is quite clear 
that there were important variables that should also be taken into account when one 
considers why people engaged in dissenting behaviour.  It should be emphasised, 
however, that ‘mob behaviour’ and alcohol-related dissent are more closely linked to 
protest among workers than members of the intelligentsia, among whom it does seem 
that individual values and personality characteristics were the major driving forces 
behind acts of criticism and protest.    
                                                 
96 Interview with Vladimir Bukovsky, Cambridge, March 2007.  
97 P. Boobbyer, Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 59. 
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 It is also instructive to elucidate briefly some reasons why those with grievances 
against the authorities refrained from engaging in acts of protest and criticism.  
Vladimir Bukovsky cited a list of reasons that he heard from people for their 
continued passivity.  These included the need to look after the interests of one’s own 
family, belief that protest only played into the hands of hardliners within the regime, 
belief that protest could achieve nothing other than to incite trouble and that the only 
way to achieve change was from within the system, which firstly involved displaying 
outward loyalty.98  Although all of these arguments probably had some degree of 
validity, it seems eminently sensible to suggest that the main cause for inactivity was 
simply fear, or what the dissident thinker Valentin Turchin labelled ‘the inertia of 
fear’.99  It is one of the central themes of this thesis that fear of the authorities 
declined markedly during the Khrushchev years but this in no way suggests that it 
disappeared entirely.  On the contrary, fear seems to have remained a significant 
impulse in Soviet society throughout the Khrushchev era and beyond.  Only a few 
years after the abuses of the Stalin years, this was entirely understandable.  The 
difference was that people now had a better chance of calculating the consequences of 
their actions. 
 
It has been suggested by some commentators that because many dissidents were close 
relatives of victims of the Stalin era, this must have been the key stimulus for their 
criticism of the authorities: an eminently logical conclusion.100  The most commonly 
cited examples of this trend are the dissidents Roy and Zhores Medvedev, whose 
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father was repressed as an enemy of the people during the Great Terror.101  However, 
Zhores Medvedev himself stated this was not the reason he found himself becoming a 
critic of the regime.102  Aleksandr Esenin-Volpin lost a brother in the repressions of 
the late 1930s but did not see it as the cause of his own non-conformism, Boris Vail’ 
did not meet his father until he was already a teenager because he was jailed before 
Vail’ was even born, yet he too did not suggest this to have been a conscious 
motivation for his own political activity.103 
 
While there may well have been a link between Stalin era repression and dissenting 
behaviour in a number of cases, it would appear that the grounds for such a causal 
relationship have been overstated.  In fact, it does not seem improbable to suggest that 
the proportion of victims’ relatives among dissident circles may not have been 
significantly different to the overall proportion of victims’ relatives within society as a 
whole.  While some dissenters were related to those who were persecuted in the Stalin 
era, there were also a considerable number of others, such as Andrei Sakharov, 
Vladimir Bukovsky, Yuri Orlov and Petr Grigorenko, who had little or no familial 
link to the mass repressions of the Stalin era. 
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1.3.3 SERVING PRISONERS 
 
It is also instructive to look at the kinds of dissenting behaviour that were taking place 
in the surviving camps and prisons around this time, not least because approximately 
ten per cent of those who were sentenced for anti-Soviet activity and propaganda 
during the early Khrushchev years were already serving prisoners.  For the most part 
those serving prisoners who were sentenced under 58-10 were not originally 
‘politicals’ but had been initially convicted, and in some cases repeatedly convicted, 
for ‘criminal’ acts such as theft, assault or worse.104  The kinds of dissenting acts that 
these people generally engaged in were particularly unsophisticated and frequently 
represented little more than hooliganism or anti-state protest under a political façade: 
the most base form of worker dissent. 
 
One example of this crude form of protest could be seen in the case of the Chuvash 
I.E. Kryshkin.  Already serving a criminal sentence in Chelyabinsk oblast’, he was 
convicted in May 1957 under article 58-10 after being caught drawing swastikas on a 
wall in the camp compound.105  Later that same month the Russian N.A. Saparov was 
re-sentenced in Kemerova oblast’ as a result of writing anti-Soviet slogans on walls 
and on his own clothes which called for struggle against the regime.106  Another case, 
from 1964, involving the prisoner V.A. Vasil’ev in the Mordova camp network, stated 
only that he had been sentenced for anti-Soviet activity after etching a ‘politically 
                                                 
104 There were exceptions to this rule.  One was Boris Vail’, discussed later in the present chapter, who 
was re-sentenced after forming an underground group while serving a camp term for underground 
activity on the outside.  See GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 73957, l. 37 and B. Vail’, Osobo opasnyi, 
London: Overseas Publications Interchange, 1980.  
105 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 80497, ll.1-2. In fact, swastikas were the most common item of camp 
graffiti according to Vladimir Kozlov.  See Kozlov, Neizvestnyi SSSR, p. 119. 
106 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 83874, ll. 1-2. 
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offensive’ tattoo across his own face.107  The investigation protocol did not state 
exactly what Vasil’ev had inscribed on his face but Anatoly Marchenko’s eyewitness 
account of the Khrushchev era camps cited some of the most common slogans of self-
made tattoos as ‘Khrushchev’s whore’ and ‘Slave of the CPSU’.108 
 
One of the most common themes of dissent among prisoners has been referred to as 
‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’.109  What this meant in this context was that 
anyone deemed to be an enemy of Khrushchev was liable to be championed by camp 
and prison inmates.  One, therefore, encounters examples of figures such as 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, Hitler and Stalin all being hailed as hero figures among the 
camp population on the basis that they were seen as enemies of Khrushchev.  
Furthermore, one can also see that the corpus of those deemed to be enemies of 
Khrushchev kept pace with political developments.  Members of the anti-Party group 
and later Mao Tse-tung came to feature prominently in such statements and graffiti for 
a time around their respective clashes with the ruling clique.110 
 
            At first glance the aim of these behaviours would appear to have been nothing more 
than to offend the political sensibilities of the Soviet authorities.  Undoubtedly for 
some prisoners this was the primary reason for undertaking such forms of behaviour.  
In many cases these were people who essentially had nothing more to lose and 
nothing to gain from submission to the authorities.  However, for others there was a 
more rational reason for these acts of self-mutilation and crude abuse of authority. 
 
                                                 
107 GARF, f. 8131, op. 36, d. 1015, ll. 1-3.  This case file reveals that Vasil’ev was sentenced again for 
the same offence in 1966. 
108 A. Marchenko, My Testimony, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1969, p. 97. 
109 See Kozlov, Neizvestnyi SSSR, p. 119.  
110 See Kozlov, Neizvestnyi SSSR, p. 121. 
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Incorrectly believing rumours that political prisoners were held in better conditions 
and subject to lower work norms, many ‘criminals’ attempted to have themselves 
reclassified as ‘politicals’ by making anti-Soviet statements and drawing political 
slogans around the camp complex.111  A 1958 Supreme Court resolution warned 
procurators that this was going on and that such individuals should no longer be 
classified as ‘anti-Soviet’.112  From that point onwards the frequency with which one 
encounters serving prisoners among those convicted under article 58-10 drops 
markedly.  This would suggest that in this case what we are observing is the masking 
or non-recording of this kind of dissent rather than genuinely low levels of political 
criticism among serving prisoners.  
 
What one can see, therefore, is that people who were either released from the Gulag 
or who were serving terms in camps and prisons tended to engage in acts of protest 
that did not entail any prolonged or considered political criticism.  They may well 
have considered themselves genuine opponents of the Soviet regime but it seems that 
in many cases their resistance to authority was not ideologically based but crude 
resentment of authority.  Instances of protest and criticism among serving and 
released prisoners can mostly be considered in the same light as the kind of worker 
dissent that had existed for years and could be seen in various countries and contexts 
around the globe.113  
 
It seems that the impact that released prisoners had upon young people and members 
of the intelligentsia was particularly important.  Roy and Zhores Medvedev have 
                                                 
111 Marchenko, My Testimony, and GARF, f. 8131, op. 30, d. 5080, l. 8.  
112 GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5080, l. 33. 
113 See, for example, K. McDermott and M. Stibbe eds, M. Revolution and Resistance in Eastern 
Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule, Oxford: Berg, 2006. 
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argued that: ‘the mass rehabilitation of Stalin’s victims had an inestimable impact 
upon the psychological outlook of every thinking person in the Soviet Union’.114  The 
Medvedev brothers most likely exaggerated in suggesting that ‘every’ thinking Soviet 
citizen was affected – one ought not to forget that the pair were outspoken critics of 
the regime – though it is quite clear that this was true of many people.  Nonetheless, it 
was still a relatively small proportion of those ‘thinking people’ who went on to 
engage in overt acts of criticism and protest.  
 
1.4 THE HUNGARIAN RISING 
 
 
 
As we have already seen, the Secret Speech gave rise to countless outbursts of 
criticism and pointed questions, particularly within the Party and Komsomol, but for 
the most part did not generate widespread and truly embittered dissenting behaviour.  
Within a few months, however, the ‘chasm of uncertainty’ that was opened up by the 
Speech had been closed and liberalisation stalled in the face of conservative 
resistance.  As 1956 progressed, events in Hungary and to a lesser extent in Poland 
too, began to have a major impact upon dissent, particularly among those young 
people and members of the intelligentsia who had been enthused by the Secret 
Speech. 
 
The feeling of hope and enthusiasm that had followed the Secret Speech contrasted 
sharply with the immediate and visceral anger with which many people reacted to the 
Soviet invasion of Hungary.115  Even several decades later, in response to the question 
                                                 
114 R. Medvedev and Zh. Medvedev, Khrushchev: The Years in Power, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1976, p. 20. 
115 See Lur’e and Malyarova eds,  1956 god. 
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of whether they remembered the Hungarian rising, almost all of the attendees at the 
Mayakovsky Square poetry readings (see chapter 3) gave an emphatic ‘very clearly!’ 
and described the general sense of resentment that it had provoked in them.116  As 
Vladimir Bukovsky recalled: ‘after all the exposures, denunciations and posthumous 
rehabilitations, after all the reassurances about the impossibility of repeating the past, 
we were now presented with corpses, tanks, brute force and lies all over again.  Just 
one more convincing proof that nothing had changed at all’.117  It is important to note 
that Bukovsky was one of the Soviet regime’s most strident critics, and, moreover, 
wrote his memoirs shortly after being sent directly from prison into exile, yet in this 
case his sentiments seem to have been widely shared among other dissenters in 
particular.  
 
As with the events of the 1968 Prague Spring, many of those who fervently hoped for 
genuine liberalisation inside the USSR had viewed the developing reforms in Hungary 
with hope for the Soviet system.  They believed that if some degree of flexibility and 
plurality had been proven successful elsewhere then the Soviet regime may eventually 
accept a similar scenario.  With the Secret Speech only recently engendering a sense 
of optimism and ‘rebirth’, the brief process of liberalisation in Hungary during the 
summer and early autumn of 1956 can only have heightened this sense of optimism. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
116 See Polikovskaya, ‘My predchuvstvie…predtecha’, p. 214. Discussed at more length in chapter 3, 
these were a series of unsanctioned poetry readings held in the centre of Moscow during the late 1950s 
and early 1960s. 
117 Bukovsky, To Build a Castle, p. 89. 
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1.4.1 STUDENT PROTEST 
 
Cornelia Gerstenmaier has given some insight into the volume of critical remarks 
among young people on this theme by stating that in Leningrad alone the Komsomol 
recommended that over 4,000 students be expelled from high school on the basis of 
comments made in relation to the Soviet invasion of Hungary.118  Among those who 
found themselves reprimanded at school – in Moscow rather than Leningrad – after 
talking about events in Hungary were Eduard Kuznetsov and Viktor Khaustov, both 
of whom were later involved in the dissident movement for many years.119  However, 
among high school students it seems that one could expect to find that, in fact, many 
did not possess strong opinions on the invasion of Hungary and had unknowingly 
transgressed the borders of acceptable behaviour in a relatively innocent fashion.  
 
A Daily Mail report from 5 December 1956 gave further details, claiming that over 
1,000 students had been expelled from Moscow State University alone on the basis of 
criticism and demonstrations against the regime, most of them in the earliest days of 
the Hungarian rising.120  Unfortunately neither Gerstenmaier nor the Daily Mail report 
have provided any kind of verifiable evidence in regard to their respective figures, 
meaning that they ought to be regarded with a considerable degree of caution.  
Nonetheless, these numbers do not seem at all implausible.   
 
                                                 
118 Gerstenmaier, The Voices of the Silent, p. 92.     
119 Interview with Eduard Kuznetsov in Polikovskaya, ‘My predchuvstvie…predtecha’, p. 214.  
120 Daily Mail, 5 December 1956. Although the Daily Mail report failed to provide any kind of 
verifiable source for this figure, there undoubtedly was a purge of ‘unreliable elements’ taking place 
across the Soviet higher education system (both staff and students) at this time.  See G. Kuzovkin, 
‘Partiino-Komsomol’skie presledovaniya po politicheskim motivam v period rannei ‘ottepel’’, in L. 
Eremina and E. Zhemkova eds,  Korni Travy: Sbornik statei molodykh istorikov, Moskva: Zven’ya, 
1996.   
 64
Collective student and youth protests sporadically flared for a time in late 1956 at a 
number of universities including Moscow State University, Leningrad State 
University, Gorky University, Sverdlovsk University, Kuibyshev University and 
elsewhere.121  In Yaroslavl riot police had to be drafted in to disperse protesters 
before order was fully restored and there were also cases of Polish and Hungarian 
students in Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad banding together and forming groups to 
agitate amongst Russian students in an attempt to stir up further protests.122  With 
newspapers from People’s Democracies including Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and 
Poland having recently gone on sale in a number of major Soviet cities, it became 
possible to find less heavily censored information on events in Hungary.  The Soviet 
authorities were therefore faced with one of the first major breaches in their monopoly 
of information on the outside world – a key factor in the evolution of dissent 
throughout the entire post-Stalin period. 
                                                
 
A meeting at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs club that subsequently aroused the 
interest of the KGB had seen students of the Moscow State Historical Archive 
Institute raise toasts to the Polish and Hungarian revolutions and to the ‘impending 
fourth Russian revolution’.123  According to Erik Kulavig, KGB monitoring of the 
Nobel Prize winning physicist Lev Landau – who had even been willing to incur the 
wrath of Stalin by refusing to work on military projects – showed that he had openly 
supported the Hungarian rising and branded the CPSU ‘fascists’ on the basis of Soviet 
 
121 M. Kramer, ‘The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary ad Poland: Reassessments and New 
Findings’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 33, No. 2, April 1998, p. 196.  In addition to the 
institutes listed above, Kramer also cited protests at the Ural Pedagogical Institute, Moscow Aviation-
Technical Institute, Potemkin State Pedagogical Institute, Herzen Pedagogical Institute, the Bashkirian 
Pedagogical Institute and Smolensk Pedagogical Institute.  It is entirely unclear why so many of the 
universities that witnessed disturbances were pedagogical institutes. 
122 See Kramer, ‘The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland’, p. 196.  
123Iu. Aksiutin, ‘Popular Responses to Khrushchev’, in W. Taubman, S. Khrushchev, A. Gleason eds.,  
Nikita Khrushchev, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, p. 193.  
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intervention there.  In private conversations recorded by the KGB Landau was 
reported to have said that ‘our people are literally waist-deep in blood.  What the 
Hungarians have done is a magnificent achievement. They are the first to have dealt a 
blow to the Jesuitical ideas of our time. And what a blow.’ 124 
 
There were also numerous protest activities around the 7 November 1956 Revolution 
Day holiday. One example included several Leningrad University students joining the 
main rally in the city and shouting anti-Khrushchev slogans and declaring their 
opposition to the Soviet action in Budapest.125  In Yaroslavl the student Vitaly 
Lazaryants and two friends interrupted the parade there by marching toward the 
tribune with a banner demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.126  
On 4 November two sculptures of Stalin were vandalised at a park in Kherson and in 
Sebastopol 14 posters of Party and government leaders were vandalized. In addition, a 
total of over 1,000 anti-Soviet leaflets were distributed in the street or dropped from 
hot air balloons in regions including Leningrad, Transcarpathian oblast’, Barnaul and 
Riga.127  The focus of protest and criticism continued to be restricted to specific 
events, individuals and policies rather than the regime as a whole.   
 
It seems extremely doubtful that Lazaryants or the Leningrad students would have 
behaved the way they did on Revolution Day if the same situation had presented itself 
five years earlier, while Stalin was alive.  Similarly, a dozen years later the Soviet-led 
invasion of Czechoslovakia also provoked consternation in parts of society but led to 
only one especially notable instance of public protest that has come to light – the 
                                                 
124 Kulavig, Dissent in the Years of Khrushchev, p. 103.  Lev Landau was awarded the Nobel Prize for 
Physics in 1962. 
125 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 89522, ll. 1-4. 
126 GARF, f. A-461, op. 2, d. 10996, l. 17. 
127 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 141, ll. 54-56.  
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famous ‘demonstration on Red Square’.128  One can point to a whole range of reasons 
why things were different in late 1956 but two factors stand out most of all.  Firstly, 
the reaction to events in Hungary was all the more impassioned because it dashed 
hopes that had recently been raised by the Secret Speech.  Secondly, the new 
relationship between the state and society was not yet fully settled by 1956.  Fear, and 
perhaps also respect, had diminished but this had not yet been compensated by the 
relative material prosperity and deeply embedded social control mechanisms that 
existed in the Brezhnev years. 
 
1.4.2 OPEN CRITICISM WITHIN THE CPSU 
 
It was also around this time that the Communist Party witnessed some of the last 
notable stirrings of open dissent within its ranks before iron discipline and conformity 
were restored among Party members for most of the next three decades.  The specific 
catalyst for this spate of strident criticism within the Party was, ironically, a letter sent 
out to Party organisations that signalled the beginning of a crackdown on dissenters 
that had been prompted by events in Hungary.   
 
At a Party meeting in Cherkasskaya oblast’ for example, candidate CPSU member 
A.I. Zem’sha declared that the CPSU was ‘no longer a party of communists but one of 
fascists’ – for which he was subsequently jailed.129  A report filed by the head of the 
RSFSR Department of Party Organs, V. M. Churaev, on 21 February 1957 outlined a 
                                                 
128 On 25 August 1968 a group of eight dissenters (Larisa Bogoraz, Konstantin Babitskii, Tat’yana 
Baeva,Vadim Delaunay, Vladimir Dremlyuga, Viktor Fainberg, Natal’ya Gorbanevskaya and Pavel 
Litvinov) gathered at the Kremlin’s Spassky Gate and unfurled banners protesting the invasion 
including ‘For your Freedom and Ours’ and ‘Hands off Czechoslovakia’.  See N. Gorbanevskaya, 
Polden’: delo o demonstratsii na Krasnoi Ploshchadi 25 avgusta 1968 goda, Moskva: Novoe 
izdatel’stvo, 2007.  
129 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 80330, ll. 1-4. 
 67
series of ‘anti-Party speeches’ around the country.  In Yaroslavl the builder Kiselev 
attacked the media coverage of events in Hungary and other People’s Democracies 
and students at a forestry institute in Bryansk stated that the Soviet regime had not 
improved the life of the ordinary Russians and made unfavourable comparisons with 
the standard of living in the US.130   
 
Material shortages were at the root of many outbursts around this time.  At a meeting 
of the Levoberezhnyi raion Party organization of Kuibyshev a report from the 
Department of Party Organs stated that CPSU candidate member Dubrovin had 
declared that the Party leadership was holding back poorer kolkhozes and only helped 
those which were more successful.  Dubrovin was followed by Zelenov who attacked 
the Party leadership for eulogising Stalin for so many years and then by Politov who 
stated that the only people who lived well in the USSR were those who did no real 
work, namely bureaucrats and officials.  An electrician named Denyakin then posed 
the ‘provocative’ question as to what was considered the minimum subsistence wage 
for Soviet citizens.131  As with the earlier meeting at the Thermo-Technical Institute, 
there was loud support for people who criticised the official Party line and heckling 
aimed at those who attempted to cut short the dissenters.  Evidently, there was some 
considerable sympathy within the Party for even quite pointed criticism of the 
authorities, arguably implying, therefore, that there may have been some considerable 
resentment too. 
 
As will be shown in the following chapter, the authorities’ attempts to restore 
discipline within the ranks of the Party were bearing fruit by the end of 1956.  Critics 
                                                 
130 RGANI, f. 89, op. 6, d. 6, ll. 1-5. 
131 RGANI, f. 89, op. 6, d. 5, l. 1.  The term ‘provocative’ is taken from the official report on the 
meeting. 
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were either ‘weeded out’ or intimidated into silence and discipline was thoroughly 
restored.  What this meant, however, was that the most discontented elements within 
the Party tended to engage in underground dissenting behaviour instead.  Among 
young people this could mean forming groups and distributing leaflets, while older 
dissenters were more liable to send hostile letters.  Presumably this distinction had its 
roots in the older generation’s experiences during the Stalin years.  Around this time 
the Komsomol also became the object of a major drive to re-establish conformity and 
obedience in its ranks but continued to be the setting for open criticism of the 
authorities beyond the end of 1956. 
 
1.4.3 DISSENT IN THE KOMSOMOL 
 
The records of the Department of Komsomol Organs and the Komsomol Department 
of Agitation and Propaganda from around this time show that open criticism was still 
occurring among members of the Communist Party’s youth wing.  A report sent to 
Vladimir Semichastnyi (at the time, a member of the Komsomol Central Committee 
but later to become KGB chairman) on 10 December 1956 stated that ‘Komsomol 
organisations have not drawn the correct conclusions from the XX Party Congress and 
need to strengthen their work amongst young people.  As a result, in some Komsomol 
branches an unhealthy atmosphere has appeared with mistaken views on life, speeches 
alien to Marxist-Leninist views and a tendency to think in bourgeois terms’.132   
 
The same report also stated that there had been numerous calls to limit CPSU control 
over the Komsomol, that students had criticised the lack of freedom in the country, 
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attacked the privileges of the political elite and regularly listened to the BBC.  Among 
the concluding remarks of the report it was stated that ‘…as a rule such demagogic 
speeches receive the necessary rebuff, but some Komsomoltsy do support them…’133  
Knowing the ‘sugar coating’ that was generally employed in official reports on such 
matters, one could perhaps surmise that it was not necessarily a small proportion of 
Komsomol members that supported these ‘demagogic speeches’.134 
 
Perhaps even more so than the Communist Party, the Komsomol echoed with criticism 
of the authorities.  Again though, this dissatisfaction was not always ideologically 
based.  As the Kursk student I. Rykov stated at a meeting in 1956 ‘the Komsomol is 
boring and if I had the option to join it now, I would refuse.  All it expects from us is 
work and study instead of happiness’.135  Radio Liberty analyses of the Soviet press 
suggested that Rykov was voicing a widely held view and that an increasing number 
of Komsomol members were voicing disenchantment at the organisation by writing to 
newspapers and making strongly critical speeches, attempting to evade their duties as 
members and more generally feeling resentful toward the Communist Party.136     
 
This resentment by Komsomol members toward the Communist Party was indicative 
of a generational divide that had begun to emerge since the XX Congress: a kind of 
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134 For example, almost every report on dissenting speeches that were made at Party meetings or in 
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‘fathers and sons’ debate for Soviet times.137  Idealistic young people were 
increasingly scornful of the generation before them that had either participated in the 
abuses of the Stalin years or had remained silent in order to protect themselves.  
Valery Ronkin, a dedicated and active Komsomol member at the time, recalled that he 
was bitterly disappointed at his own father’s refusal to speak out in the Stalin years 
and told him so.138  The fact that speaking out would have led to almost certain 
annihilation suggests that there was some considerable romanticism, rather than sound 
reasoning, informing this particular debate.    
 
This divide was in itself reflective of the wider situation: Ronkin was able to criticise 
and reject Stalin and the generation that had lived under him but continued to be a 
dedicated believer in communism himself.  That Ronkin subsequently became 
involved in underground struggle against the authorities (he was a member of the so-
called Kolokol group in the mid 1960s – see chapter 4) is indicative of the trend 
whereby many political dissenters tended to begin as close adherents of the regime 
and its ideology before becoming increasingly alienated from it.139    
 
 
The eighteen months that followed the Hungarian rising witnessed a notable high-
water mark in convictions for anti-Soviet activity and propaganda.  KGB reports to 
the Central Committee and case files from the Procurator’s office indicate a 
                                                 
137 The original ‘fathers and sons’ debate had taken place in Russia around the middle of the 19th 
Century when a young generation of political radicals began to disavow the liberal romanticism of the 
previous generation.  The name comes from Ivan Turgenev’s literary depiction of the subject in 
Fathers and Sons (1862). On this theme see M. Fainsod, ‘Soviet Youth and the Problem of 
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25. 
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substantial growth in what the authorities referred to as ‘anti-Soviet phenomena’, such 
as people sending anonymous and threatening letters to Party officials, publicly 
declaring hatred for specific members of the leadership and forming underground 
groups.  As it became increasingly clear just how limited the scope for loyal criticism 
continued to be, the dynamics of dissent altered somewhat. 
 
Considered political criticism came to be less frequently voiced in public, and instead 
began to move underground.  Worker dissent, on the other had, seems to have 
increased in the public sphere around this time, with hundreds of citizens being 
arrested after spontaneous declarations of hatred for communists or threats of violence 
against members of the leadership.  This most likely reflected the extent to which fear 
of the authorities had declined in recent times, though one should also be aware of the 
possibility that such behaviour may actually have been happening for some time but 
had previously been met with a less formal response. 
 
Although the volume of dissent around the country appears to have increased 
markedly – largely because of the combined impacts of the Secret Speech and 
Hungarian rising – one still encounters very few genuine opponents of the regime or 
of communism.  This reflected the fact that most dissenters seem to have believed that 
the system should be fixed rather than destroyed.   
 
Nonetheless, after a several-month long tour of the USSR in 1957, Zinaida 
Schakovsky wrote of an ‘all-pervading atmosphere of discontent’ and an ‘immense 
discontent which is rumbling through the Soviet Union today’.140  As a White Émigré 
                                                 
140 Z. Schakovsky, The Privilege Was Mine, London: Jonathon Cape, 1959, pp. 30, 47. 
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princess whose family was ruined by the October Revolution, one should not be 
surprised to see that Schakovsky gave such a withering assessment of the communist 
regime’s fortunes, but even far less politically motivated accounts by well-informed 
visitors to the USSR at that time suggest that Schakovsky’s remarks were not at all 
unrealistic.  After a lengthy visit to the USSR around the same time, Maurice Hindus 
argued that the Soviet people were entirely loyal to the regime and to communism but 
did concede that the young generation in particular was brimming over with questions 
and frustrations. 141    
 
1.4.4 FORMS OF DISSENTING ACTIVITY 
 
Owing to the fact that the Soviet authorities were paying close attention to the 
problem of dissent throughout 1957 and 1958, this is a period on which a considerable 
volume of official documentation exists on the matter.  A 1958 Procurator review of 
sentences for anti-Soviet activity gives some useful statistical data on the prevailing 
forms of dissent around this time.  From the 2,498 sentences for counter-revolutionary 
activity in 1957 (of which 1,964 were for anti-Soviet activity and propaganda) the 
following statistics were presented:  91.3% of those sentenced had acted alone, 6.1% 
in groups of 2-3 people and a further 2.6% in groups of 3 or more people.  Isolated 
acts constituted 62.6% of all sentences while repeated acts made up 37.4%.142  
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crimes such as terrorism too.  Nonetheless, well over three quarters of conviction for counter-
revolutionary crimes were for anti-Soviet activity and propaganda. 
 73
The predominant trend at this stage was, therefore, for lone individuals to engage in 
single instances of dissenting behaviour.  It is worth remembering, however, that these 
people may have undertaken more acts of dissent that the KGB remained unaware of.  
The review also discerned four forms of dissenting activity: oral expressions of a 
counter-revolutionary nature (57.3% of sentences), anonymous anti-Soviet letters, 
diaries and songs (22%), anti-Soviet leaflets (13%) and possession of anti-Soviet 
literature (7.7%).143   
This same document also provided a basic demographic breakdown of convictions 
under article 58-10 in 1957.  It showed that workers accounted for 46.8% of all 
sentences, followed by white-collar workers (18.3%), collective farm workers (9.9%) 
and miscellaneous – such as pensioners and invalids – (25.0%).144  In regard to age, 
the review showed only that 17.4% of those convicted were less than 24 years of age, 
67.2% were between 24 and 40 years of age and the remaining 15.4% were over 40 
years old.145  By some way the greatest number of those sentenced were Russians 
(957 convictions), followed in numerical order by Ukrainians (443), Lithuanians (68) 
and Belarusian’s (65).146 
Although not mentioned in the document, it is also worth pointing out that well over 
90% of those convicted were men.  Whether this reflected that women were less likely 
to be involved in dissenting behaviour or were simply less likely to be sent to jail for 
‘anti-Soviet activity and propaganda’ is unclear, though it seems likely that both 
would have been true to a considerable extent. 
                                                 
143 GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5080, ll. 17-18. 
144 GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5080, l. 6. 
145 GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5080, l. 6. 
146 GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5080, l. 5.  A complete breakdown of sentences by union republic is 
provided in chapter 2. 
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In some ways these statistics undoubtedly reflect the priorities of the campaign 
against dissent that was underway at the time rather than presenting an accurate 
snapshot of which elements of society were the most likely to be involved in protest 
and criticism.  For example, the breakdown of convictions by age seems to imply that 
people under 24 years old were no more inclined toward dissenting behaviour than 
were other age groups, but what it actually shows is that the authorities usually 
resisted using custodial sentences against young people in all but the most serious 
cases.147  The question of how far these figures represented a true picture of increased 
dissenting behaviour or one that was distorted by the ongoing campaign is discussed 
at more length in the following chapter.  However, with a reasonably large sample of 
cases, one can put some faith in the general trends that the report demonstrated: 
arguably the most notable of which was that, unlike in later years, dissent was a 
surprisingly diverse social phenomenon.  
1.4.5 SPONTANEOUS OUTBURSTS 
If one were to draw a composite picture of a ‘typical’ act of dissent in light of the 
above statistics it would reveal a lone individual engaging in a single, oral outburst 
against the regime.  In the vast majority of cases these ‘oral expressions of a counter-
revolutionary nature’ were not made in the form of considered and critical remarks at 
Party meetings like those in the aftermath of the Secret Speech, but can better be 
described as hooligan-type outbursts.  They were practically always spontaneous and 
were usually fuelled by one or more of the following three factors: clashes with the 
individual representatives of the regime (most commonly the militia), difficult 
personal circumstances and drunkenness.  
                                                 
147 See G. Kuzovkin, ‘Partiino-Komsomol’skie presledovaniya po politicheskim motivam v period 
rannei ‘ottepeli’’ in Eremina and Zhemkova eds, Korni travy, pp. 88-126. 
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These clashes often contained quite sharp political expressions such as threats to kill 
communists or members of the government but in fact seem to have belied little or no 
deep-seated dissatisfaction at the political situation, or at least did not reflect any 
genuine intention to act on such dissatisfaction.  Such outbursts can essentially be 
seen as a continuation of the kinds of crude dissenting behaviour that Sarah Davies 
and others have shown existed during the Stalin era.  As far as the Soviet authorities 
were concerned, this kind of protest proved to be the more easily manageable.   
 
In late 1956 and early 1957 these spontaneous outbursts often cited the uprising in 
Hungary as an example to be copied in the USSR.  Yu. L. Rozman’s outburst in a 
shop in the Transcarpathian oblast’, in which he demanded that people should ‘beat 
communists like in Hungary’148 and I.V. Yaniv’s declaration, in a Drogobych bus 
station café, that ‘communists should be attacked and overthrown as they are being in 
Hungary’, are just two examples from a great many in which individuals were 
sentenced for remarks referring to the Hungarian rising.149  However, it seems that in 
many cases events in Hungary were merely a timely point of reference rather than the 
root of deep-seated anger among those who engaged in this kind of public attack on 
the authorities.  Like many others, there is no evidence in the respective case files of 
Rozman and Yaniv to suggest that either actually showed any genuine support for the 
revolution in Hungary. 150  The statements that were made by both of them celebrated 
violence and protest more than they did the cause of the Hungarian rebels.   
                                                 
148 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 88957, l. 1.  The Transcarpathian oblast’ was a region where tensions 
were extraordinarily high owing to its proximity to Hungary. 
149 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 87486, ll. 1-2. 
150 In fact, it is probable that most Soviet citizens either supported the suppression of the Hungarian 
rising or were ambivalent about it.  This was not just because of the impact of state propaganda 
branding the events a ‘counter-revolutionary uprising’ but also, according to Zhores Medvedev, 
because it was only a little over a decade previously that Hungary had been one of Nazi Germany’s 
staunchest allies and fighting there had resulted in the death of countless Soviet soldiers.  As such they 
were not regarded in the same manner as ‘real friends’ such as Czechoslovakia, for example.    
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Public eruptions of anger that did not refer to Hungary around this time often included 
themes such as threatening to side with the US in the ‘forthcoming’ war that was 
widely rumoured to be on the horizon in the late 1950s, criticism of privileges enjoyed 
by political elites, unfavourable comparisons between the standard of living in the 
Soviet Union and the West, branding members of the militia as ‘fascists’ and 
‘Beriaites’ or more general slogans such as ‘down with the Soviet regime’ or threats 
and abuse aimed at communists. 
 
One quite typical example was the case against Aleksei Lepekhin, an invalid from 
Astrakhan oblast’, who was arrested in August 1957 after stealing a shirt, trousers and 
a pair of shoes from a man who had passed out in the street whilst drunk.  Upon being 
confronted by a member of the militia, and later whilst in detention at the militia 
station, Lepekhin made a series of highly political statements that led to him being 
convicted for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.  The testimony of fellow 
prisoners, members of the public and militia staff attributed the following remarks to 
Lepekhin:  ‘I lived better under the (Nazi) occupation’, ‘Communists do not give us 
the freedom to live’, ‘Khrushchev and Bulganin are strangling the working class’ and 
‘Down with the Soviet Union, long live Eisenhower’: the last statement being shouted 
out of an open window at the militia station.151 
 
These public outbursts occupy an interesting place in the wider spectrum of dissenting 
behaviour and it is worthwhile to consider what can be deduced from such 
occurrences.  They were clearly not the kind of purposive and persistent acts of 
dissent that would usually indicate genuine opposition to the regime.  Nor were they 
                                                 
151 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 84518, ll. 4-6. 
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anything like the principled and brave defence of others that characterised human 
rights dissent during the Brezhnev era.  Nonetheless, declaring a hatred of 
communists or publicly calling for the overthrow of the leadership clearly was a 
serious act of dissent in its own right, whether there was any real desire for such an 
occurrence or not.  For people to have made such outspoken, and ultimately 
dangerous, remarks apparently in the absence of genuine opposition to the regime 
seems rather surprising.  Again, it is hard to avoid reaching the conclusion that this 
was partly a reflection of declining fear and respect for authority.  
 
That socio-economic issues such as poverty and unemployment could become so 
sharply politicised probably indicated more than anything else the extent to which 
politics, in the form of language, rituals and symbols, was so entrenched and 
inescapable in everyday life that it quickly became a target for criticism and abuse in 
hard times.  To a considerable extent it was, therefore, the Soviet system itself that 
caused grievances which were, in certain respects, typical all around the world (such 
as unemployment or poor housing conditions) to take on such a politicised form at 
this time.  In later years the authorities’ were far more successful at ensuring that 
passive discontent did not translate into this kind of public activity.        
 
The frequency with which drunkenness was reported in such instances is clearly not 
without significance.  However, alcohol had been a feature of Soviet and Russian life 
for many years before Khrushchev came to power.  Numerous sources suggest that 
drunkenness and alcoholism were phenomena which actually became more acute in 
the Brezhnev years, yet they do not seem to have led to similar behaviours on any 
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comparable scale.152  Again, it is important to look to the changing dynamics of the 
relationship between society and the regime at this point.  Neither the widespread 
physical repression of the Stalin era nor the relative material prosperity of the 
Brezhnev years existed at this point.  Once the utopianism that had been engendered 
by the Secret Speech faded, it left something of a hole in the authorities’ means of 
social control.  By the end of the 1950s, however, a new system was being put into 
place that helped to re-establish popular compliance and minimise dissenting 
behaviour that lasted throughout the Brezhnev era and beyond.      
 
Drunkenness does not in itself automatically imply that there was no genuine political 
disenchantment underlying such outbursts, however.  In the words of the Russian 
proverb: chto u trezvoga v golove, to u p’yanogo na yazyke (approximately – ‘what a 
sober man thinks, a drunk man says’).  One’s intuition and experience would suggest 
that there is probably some credibility in this proverb but one can say little more than 
that with any confidence.  What we do know from the case files of such individuals, 
however, is that very few of those who were arrested and sentenced on the basis of 
these kinds of outbursts were found to be involved in any other kind of dissenting 
activity at that time or later, suggesting that these were acts of protest inspired by 
temporary factors rather than a more fundamental sense of political discontent.  
Alcohol and anger may have helped to turn passive discontent into active dissent, yet 
in most cases this was very much a temporary transformation. 
 
                                                 
152 See, for example, Shlapentokh,  Public and Private Life.  It is possible that such instances did 
continue to occur in the Brezhnev years but have not yet come to the attention of historians.  As and 
when detailed information on the application of prophylactic measures (see chapter 4) becomes 
available it will be possible to give a more definitive assessment on this question. 
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Despite the fact that such acts of criticism and abuse were often only superficially 
political they were not entirely without danger for the authorities.  Had the growth of 
public outbursts been allowed to go unchecked it is entirely possible that the problem 
could have taken on serious proportions and begun to erode the still predominantly 
submissive social order inside the USSR.  This was a fact that the highest authorities 
privately acknowledged according to Mark Kramer.153  As the Hungarian rising had 
demonstrated, matters could spiral out of control very quickly where so many pent-up 
frustrations were present. 
 
1.5 UNDERGROUND DISSENTING ACTIVITY 
 
Underground activity represented what could be seen as a more purposive form of 
political dissent and, despite the latter’s insistence on open activity, also the genre 
from which one can trace many connections to the Brezhnev era dissident movement.  
On the whole it was carried out by individuals and groups consciously acting on 
ideological grievances against the authorities or certain of their policies.    
Anonymous dissent was far more likely to be repeated in occurrence (partly because 
of the generally more hostile nature of its participants but also because of the 
protection offered by anonymity) and, therefore, more dangerous in the eyes of the 
authorities because of that.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
153 Kramer, ‘The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland’, p. 195.  
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1.5.1 ANTI-SOVIET LEAFLETS 
 
Anti-Soviet leaflets (listovki) were probably the most consistently widespread 
manifestations of political dissent under Khrushchev.154  The total number that were 
produced and distributed undoubtedly ran into hundreds of thousands and possible 
even millions over the course of the entire period.  They were discovered by the KGB 
in practically every large and medium sized town throughout the Soviet Union, 
sometimes pasted up on the walls and windows of public buildings or scattered on 
public transport, furtively left in mailboxes, or simply handed out in the street.  Some 
were manifestos of underground political groups, information on strikes and disorders 
around the country, appeals to the people to rise up against the regime, transcriptions 
of foreign radio broadcasts or simply slogans and crude attacks against the regime and 
certain of its representatives.155 
 
After 1956, state holidays and official events continued to witness an increased level 
of dissenting activity, yet open acts of protest – such as Lazaryants’ interruption of the 
7 November parade in Yaroslavl – were notably absent.  The 1957 anniversary of the 
revolution, for example, saw significant numbers of leaflets discovered in numerous 
major cities around the Soviet Union.  In Moscow, anti-Soviet leaflets were found in 
the Luzhniki sports stadium, on a police car bonnet and pasted to the wall of a militia 
station.  Further cases of anti-Soviet leaflets being uncovered that day were reported 
                                                 
154 Whether the phenomena existed on any kind of scale under Stalin and Brezhnev is as yet unclear.  It 
seems likely that the boom in political samizdat literature would have supplanted the format in later 
years, however. 
155 It is worthwhile here to refer back to the leaflets produced by Boris Generozov, cited on page 18.  
Further examples of anti-Soviet leaflets are cited at some length in chapter 3. 
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in Leningrad, Riga, Kaliningrad, Minsk, Brest, Kiev, Donetsk, Poltava Vilnius and 
Stanislav.156   
 
Elections for the Councils of Workers’ Deputies in March 1957 gave an early 
indication of this trend toward clandestine protest, with posters attacking the Soviet 
leadership and ‘fraudulent’ elections being found attached to buildings in Sumy and at 
the library of Kiev State University among other places.157  Several Ministry of 
Internal Affairs reports spoke of voters openly tearing up and burning ballot cards, 
refusing to vote and publicly insulting or threatening the candidates.158  Similarly, 
KGB reports show that elections to the ‘People’s Courts’ in December 1957 led to 
minor disturbances in Moscow, threats against candidates in Kiev and anti-Soviet 
leaflets being stuffed into a ballot box in Perm.159 
 
The main reason that state anniversaries and elections witnessed a notable rise in the 
level of dissenting activity seems to have been that these were the few occasions when 
Soviet citizens were expected to perform the basic rituals that demonstrated their 
outward support for the regime.  This was, therefore, the time when dissent was most 
visible and would most offend the authorities’ sensibilities. 
 
After assessing a sample of 50 cases involving anti-Soviet leaflets during 1956 and 
1957 the Procuracy categorised their contents in the following way: 
 
 
                                                 
156 Aksiutin, ‘Popular Responses to Khrushchev’, p. 198. 
157 RGANI, f. 89, op. 18, d. 37, ll. 1-3. 
158 RGANI, f. 89, op. 18, d. 37, ll. 1-3. 
159 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 231, ll. 122-124. 
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Leaflets containing calls to overthrow the regime or attempting to provoke uprisings 
and strikes. 
 
Leaflets containing slander against the leaders of the Party and government. 
 
Leaflets containing slander against the democratic principles of Soviet society, the 
rights and freedoms of the Soviet people and calls not to believe Soviet radio and 
press.160 
 
At this early stage of the Khrushchev era it is notable that leaflets tended to be hand 
written and reproduced in quite small quantities of around half a dozen copies or less.  
Although often few in number, the contents of such leaflets tended to be particularly 
sharp.  On 30 December 1956 Semen Atamanenko was jailed in Leningrad after 
producing and pasting up a leaflet which read ‘Comrade Workers! The Hungarian 
people are calling on you to follow their example!’161  In Riga, A.V. Kanakhin was 
arrested in May 1956 after distributing 17 leaflets that said ‘Down with Soviet 
imperialism! Down with communist propaganda and terror!’162  In Zhitomir oblast’ 
V.A. Demchenko pasted 19 leaflets onto the walls of public buildings that read ‘Down 
with the Soviet regime! Down with Communists!’163   
 
1.5.2 ANONYMOUS LETTERS 
 
Anonymous anti-Soviet letters (anonimiki) were another phenomenon that 
characterised dissenting activity during the Khrushchev years.  Most frequently these 
letters were addressed to political organisations such as the Central Committee, 
individual representatives of the regime, editors of newspapers and journals or 
managers of industrial enterprises.  In later years they were also sent abroad, either to 
                                                 
160 GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5080, l. 26.  Unfortunately, the review in question did not give any details 
on which of these trends were the most prevalent.   
161 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 76946, l. 1. 
162 GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5080, l. 26. 
163 GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5080, ll. 27-29. 
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the ‘safe’ addresses in Germany and Holland that were broadcast by stations such as 
Radio Liberty or to foreign political figures, embassies and organisations.  Numerous 
case files of individuals convicted for this offence clearly demonstrate that the 
dissenters responsible often sent such letters repeatedly, and sometimes over several 
years, until they were tracked down. 
 
One typical anonymous letter, sent to Aleksandr Shelepin (the First Secretary of the 
Komsomol) at the end of 1956, included a vehement attack on official propaganda.  It 
read: ‘…you say black is white.  Prices are supposed to be coming down but you are 
skinning people’, ‘it is no surprise that there has been trouble in Poland, Hungary and 
Germany, we have suffered even longer’ and ‘stop writing and talking about the 
happiness of the people.  It is insulting that we know the opposite is true.  Nowhere in 
the world do people live worse’.164 
 
Another particularly interesting case was reported to the Central Committee on 12 
December 1957.  The letters editor of the newspaper Trud, Dmitrii Kiselev, was 
arrested after sending a series of anonymous anti-Soviet letters that, according to the 
KGB, ‘slandered government activity and policy, said the people were starving and 
the Party does not care’.  He also called for the entire leadership to resign and for 
them to be expelled from the Party.  Kiselev wrote and sent 22 such letters in total 
between February and August 1957, addressing them to government bodies, industrial 
enterprises and delegations from capitalist countries at the 1957 World Youth 
Festival.165 
 
                                                 
164 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 141, ll. 81-84. 
165 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 141, ll. 106-107. 
 84
On the whole one can view anti-Soviet letters as an inherently less hostile form of 
dissent than leaflets – the goal of which was usually to provoke a response from 
among the wider population.  That letters were usually intended for private audiences 
whereas leaflets were intended for public consumption is a key distinction.  The risks 
involved in producing and distributing leaflets must also have been considerably 
greater than those of simply writing and posting a letter, again showing that the 
former represented a more resolute form of dissenting activity.  Nonetheless, the fact 
that many of those sentenced had sent multiple letters, sometimes over a period of 
several years, highlights the fact that this was still a considered and planned act of 
protest. 
 
It is useful to explore briefly the question of what the people who wrote such letters 
hoped to achieve by doing so.  For those writing to political figures and organisations 
outside of the Soviet Union or to bodies such as the Central Committee Presidium it 
seems unlikely that they could have realistically expected their letters to reach the 
target destination, even less so to change anything at all if they did get there.  Those 
who wrote letters to newspapers and journals attacking Soviet policy or abusing 
Khrushchev would most likely have known that their letters would never be printed.  
Why send a letter calling for struggle against the regime to the address of what must 
surely be one of the least receptive audiences for such an appeal?  The answer seems 
to be that such letters were essentially a means of registering protest and attempting to 
embarrass the authorities rather than anything more purposive.   
 
Not all critical letters were anonymous, however.  One interesting example from this 
time was written by eleven Lithuanian workers and sent to Khrushchev in mid-1958.  
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It began by stating that ‘we wanted to be part of the Soviet Union but it is terrible’, it 
explained that several years had gone by in Kaunas without sugar or meat and 
declared that ‘he who works is hungry, while he who steals is able to live’.166  
According to Kozlov and Mironenko, young people were more likely to affix their 
names to such letters than were older people – something that was certainly true in 
this instance.167  This may well have been related to the fact that people of around 30 
years or older had lived through such extensive state repression and naturally 
remained cautious of the state’s repressive apparatus.  It may also have said 
something about the naivety and impetuousness of youth.   
 
This distinction between generations has already been touched upon in reference to 
the emerging ‘fathers and sons debate’. As will be shown in chapter 2, the authorities 
feared that young people were becoming disconnected from the Soviet system and 
lacked ‘revolutionary commitment’.  In actual fact, it seems that young people and 
others were not growing disillusioned with the ideals of communism but were 
growing disenchanted by the conservatism and hypocrisy of the authorities in the late 
1950s.  In later years this did begin to spread to flagging enthusiasm for communism 
in general but, as the massive number of young people who volunteered to work on 
the Virgin Lands campaign and the predominance of Marxist-Leninism among young 
dissenters testified, the idealistic appeal of the communist project was still a powerful 
force at this point.   
 
One of the most important developments that can be seen in regard to the relationship 
between society and the state at this time is a growth in the mistrust and cynicism with 
                                                 
166 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 141, ll. 62-63. 
167 V. Kozlov and S. Mironenko eds, Kramola: Inakomyslie v SSSR pri Khrushcheve i Brezhneve 1953-
1982, Moskva: ‘Materik’, 2005, p. 229. 
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which people viewed the activities and pronouncements of the authorities.  One can 
see that this process was at least partly fuelled by Soviet society’s growing interaction 
with the outside world, whether in the form of meeting foreign visitors (mostly 
restricted to a few major cities), reading newspapers from the People’s Democracies 
or listening to Western radio broadcasts.  The 1957 World Youth Festival appears to 
have been a particularly notable turning point in this respect.  What all of this meant 
was that doubts about the rightness of the Soviet course or about the truthfulness of 
official propaganda were increasingly confirmed and crystallised – a process that the 
authorities proved singularly unable to reverse. 
 
1.5.3 UNDERGROUND GROUPS 
 
At the most extreme end of this cynicism and resistance to authority were those who 
engaged in underground group activity.  As Shlapentokh has written: ‘The people 
know from birth that any attempt to create an unofficial organisation is considered by 
the authorities as a direct threat to the regime and those participating in meetings 
convened by such an organisation take a serious risk’.168  Nonetheless, dozens of 
underground groups were uncovered by the KGB in the second half of the 1950s.  
However, although they offered strident criticism of the authorities on a range of 
themes, few groups were calling for revolution at this stage.   
 
In most cases the activities and achievements of such groups were extremely limited.  
Usually they consisted of only three or four members and were uncovered by the 
KGB within a few months of being formed, during which time they had often 
                                                 
168 Shlapentokh, Public and Private Life, p. 124. 
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managed only to agree upon a manifesto and to distribute leaflets on a handful of 
occasions.169  In all but a few cases they did not tend to have formal organizational 
structures or regulations of membership because of their small size and generally 
informal nature – reflecting the fact that many of these groups were founded on the 
basis of already existing friendships circles. 
 
Still, there was little indication of genuinely anti-communist sentiment behind such 
groups.  Most considered that the regime had become stagnant and sought to create, or 
recreate, a form of ‘true communism’ sometimes called neo-Leninism or neo-
Bolshevism.  The names of several such groups are a testament of their political 
leanings: ‘the Worker-Peasant Underground Party’, ‘the Socialist Party of the Soviet 
Union’ and ‘the Party of Struggle for the Realisation of Leninist Ideas’.170  Although 
a particularly dangerous form of activity for those who participated, one still ought to 
be cautious in viewing such people as determined, revolutionary-type figures.  For 
example, Valery Ronkin recalled the case of some friends who planned to form their 
own group in the late 1950s: ‘They definitely believed that any kind of anti-Party 
position would, in the first instance, lead to girls and Western music’.171  One gets the 
impression that there was also a certain joie de vivre as well as political dissatisfaction 
among young dissenters.   
 
This actually raises an important point in regard to dissenters during the period, 
particularly in regard to establishing a distinction with the well-known dissidents of 
the Brezhnev era, such as Andrei Sakharov, whose lives were, to a considerable 
                                                 
169 L. Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and Human Rights, 
Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1987, p. 295. 
170  Kozlov and Mironenko eds, Kramola, p. 326. 
171 Ronkin, Na smenu dekabryam, p. 152. 
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extent, defined by the fact that they were dissidents.  Like Ronkin, Eduard Kuznetsov 
also recalled that although he was angered by events in Hungary, politics came second 
to sports and socialising for him at that time.172  In other words, dissent was not yet a 
‘lifestyle choice’ at this stage.             
 
Two of the early Khrushchev period’s most notable underground groups were based 
around Revolt Pimenov and Lev Krasnopevtsev in Leningrad and Moscow 
respectively.  The Pimenov group was founded in Leningrad in December of 1956 as 
a result of anger at the suppression of the Hungarian rising.  Pimenov, a 
mathematician at Leningrad State University, had previously prepared and distributed 
samizdat copies of the Secret Speech and sent letters to deputies of the Supreme 
Soviet demanding the withdrawal of troops from Hungary and criticising the 
authorities among friends.  He then made the acquaintance of Boris Vail’, a student at 
the Leningrad Bibliotechnical Institute, who had been preparing and distributing anti-
Soviet leaflets since 1955. 
 
On Pimenov’s initiative the pair formed a group including several of Vail’s student 
colleagues from the Leningrad Bibliotechnical Institute and Pimenov’s common-law 
wife Tat’yana Verblovskaya.  All but Pimenov were members of either the CPSU or 
Komsomol and were idealistic communists.173  Vail’ arranged three group meetings, 
two at the Bibliotechnical Institute in December 1956 and a third at Mars Field in 
Leningrad during January 1957. At the first meeting Pimenov declared that Stalinist 
policies were still in place in the Soviet Union, that there was neither freedom of 
speech nor of the press and that the workers were not the true masters in the Soviet 
                                                 
172 Interview with Eduard Kuznetsov in Polikovskaya, ‘My predchuvstvie…predtecha’, p. 214. 
173 It has already been mentioned earlier in the present chapter that Pimenov had begun to consider 
joining the Communist Party in the wake of the Secret Speech.  
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system.  He then attacked the kolkhoz system and stated that the Yugoslav method of 
agricultural development was superior to the Soviet system.174 
 
Where this group differed from others was that they briefly succeeded in establishing 
a secondary cell in Kursk, Boris Vail’s hometown.  Vail’ had visited in January 1957 
and persuaded his friend Konstantin Danilov to create an organisation along the same 
lines as his own in Leningrad.  According to the KGB investigation protocol, 
subsequent correspondence between the pair showed that Vail’ urged Danilov to study 
Marx, to learn ‘Bolshevik methods of struggle and conspiracy’ and to gather fake 
documents such as passports, tickets and licenses.  
 
Further letters from Vail’ included leaflets for Danilov’s group to distribute, with the 
slogan ‘land to the peasants, factories to the workers and culture to the intelligentsia’ 
and a request for the group there to work out a programme of anti-Soviet activity.175  
According to Vail’s letters, the overall aim was to create as many cells as possible and 
eventually to hold a conference in order to plan a wide programme of anti-Soviet 
activity.176  As it transpired, one of the group members, Vladimir Vishnyakov, had 
been ‘turned’ by the KGB and both the Leningrad and Kursk cells were quickly 
uncovered and neutralised.  
 
The Krasnopevtsev group was based around Moscow State University; its members 
were teachers, students and recent graduates (six of whom were Komsomol members 
and one a full CPSU member).  Like the Pimenov group, they were inspired by events 
in Hungary.  They prepared materials on the ‘true history of the CPSU’ and 
                                                 
174 GARF, f. 8131 op. 31, d. 73957, ll. 32-41. 
175 Pimenov, Vospominaniya, p. 85. 
176 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 73957, l. 66. 
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distributed leaflets around the city and scattered them on buses, in the latter case 
approximately 300 that called for reform ‘in the spirit of the XX Congress’, and held a 
meeting at Izmailovskii Park in Moscow. 
 
The most significant activity of this group as far as the authorities were concerned 
was in its attempt to establish contacts with several foreigners ‘in order to further their 
aims of changing the present system’.177  In April of 1957 Krasnopevtsev met with a 
Pole named Lyasotoi for a discussion of how the pair could work together against 
their respective governments, according to the KGB investigation protocol.178  In 
August 1957 group member Vadim Kozovoi established contact with the Englishman 
Julian Watts – a British intelligence officer according to the KGB – at the World 
Youth Festival and attempted to pass him damaging information about the USSR.179  
Soon after Watts, contact was made with a Frenchman named Lerasno, to whom they 
apparently passed ‘sensitive information’ about the ‘anti-Party affair’ at the 1957 June 
plenum (obtained by group member Kozovoi, whose father was a Party 
functionary).180 
 
In both of the above cases and many others like them at the time, the group members 
did not fashion themselves as alternative political parties, and did not speak of 
overthrowing the regime but instead sought to strive for democratisation and to 
expose its shortcomings and lies.  Speaking at his trial, Lev Krasnopevtsev admitted 
that the group had done everything they were accused of but denied that they had ever 
                                                 
177 It is unclear from the case file whether the phrase ‘in order to further their aims of changing the 
present system’ was a direct quote from the testimony of a group member or a KGB summary of their 
activity.  As such it should be regarded with some caution. 
178 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 73957, l. 49. 
179 The KGB reports do not specify what was in this ‘harmful information’ though it seems likely that it 
was the same information that was subsequently passed to Lerasno. 
180 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 79866, ll. 1-110. 
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been ‘anti-Soviet’ in their intent.181  This was to be a line of defence that was 
employed by many dissenters during the Khrushchev period and after.  In 
Krasnopevtsev’s case, and most others, it proved to be entirely unsuccessful in 
averting a harsh punitive response.182 
 
These traits were quite common among intelligentsia dissenters of this time in 
particular.  By the second half of the Khrushchev period, underground groups 
increasingly spoke of violence and revolution but this was rarely the case in the late 
1950s.  Maurice Hindus illustrated this point when, after a lengthy visit to Russia in 
1957, he concluded that ‘The intellectual underground into which the student or any 
inquiring youth moves produces only talk; protests, parodies, anecdotes, songs for the 
relief of his frustration; it hides no guns, manufactures no bombs’.183 
 
1.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The most notable theme that can be drawn from dissent in the first half of the 
Khrushchev period is that there was very little anti-communist sentiment or desire for 
revolution even among the regime’s critics.  Worker dissent tended to be based upon 
anger at hard material conditions while intelligentsia dissent was characterised by a 
desire to ‘fix’ the system rather than to overthrow it.  The sense of utopianism that the 
Secret Speech had re-ignited not only evaporated after the Hungarian rising but 
exacerbated the sense of disenchantment that it created.  Those critics who were not 
intimidated into silence by the authorities increasingly began to move further and 
                                                 
181 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 79865, ll. 1-34.   
182 For example, this was a defence similar to that employed by the writers Sinyavsky and Daniel 
almost a decade later. 
183 Hindus, House Without a Roof, p. 383. 
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further away from a position of loyal support and questioned more fundamental 
aspects of the regime and its ideology. 
 
What underpinned the majority of strident criticism and protest, especially among the 
intelligentsia but also among workers, was the realisation that it had become possible 
to dissent and still survive.  The XX Party Congress had been the single most 
important factor in demonstrating this to be the case yet the fitful liberalisation that 
followed it left many doubly disenchanted.  What this shows is that Khrushchev’s 
exposure of Stalin did not by itself fatally undermine the system, nor was the painful 
legacy of the Gulag an entirely insurmountable obstacle.   Many dissenters at that 
time wanted to tackle these problems and move forward rather than condemn the 
Soviet project to failure.  It was the unwillingness to fulfil the tacit promise of 
liberalisation offered by the Secret Speech that pushed anti-Stalinists into acts of 
protest and dissent, from where they steadily moved further and further away from the 
regime. 
 
The influence that the Secret Speech had upon dissenting behaviour is one of the most 
informative aspects of the period, particularly when viewed in the context of the 
subsequent Hungarian rising.  It is interesting to note that it was the Soviet invasion of 
Hungary rather than the exposure of Stalin that provoked the most widespread and 
vociferous criticism.  The two were, of course, inextricably linked.  It was the Secret 
Speech that clearly lowered the price to be paid for acts of criticism and 
simultaneously raised hopes of liberalisation but it was the events in Hungary that 
caused frustrations to crystallise and spill over into impassioned dissent.   
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Active dissenters constituted a small minority within the overall Soviet population yet 
the biographical data held in the files of the Procurator’s office shows that acts of 
protest and criticism were by no means dominated by the Moscow intelligentsia, as 
they later seem to have become.  All areas of the country and all social classes 
witnessed some degree of dissent.  Nonetheless, workers and the intelligentsia showed 
practically no inclination to work together either during this period or later.  
 
There is also an interesting point to be raised in the fact that elements of society 
sometimes responded positively in support of the regime’s critics in the early 
Khrushchev period.  Reports from the Department of Party Organs and the Komsomol 
show that in many instances audience members met dissenting speeches with great 
enthusiasm.  Evidently, there was some considerable discontent among many of those 
who had some interest in political life.  Fear of the authorities had declined notably 
over the previous half-decade, though it probably still remained one of the more 
important factors that constrained people’s behaviour in this respect. 
 
One can also see that the first half of the Khrushchev era was a time in which the 
parameters of the new relationship between society and the regime were being set out. 
Dissenters were at the vanguard in establishing where these new boundaries of 
permissible and impermissible lay.  With the confusion and uncertainty caused by the 
Secret Speech this was a process that was at its most dynamic in 1956 but then 
became ever less so as the extent to which the political environment had changed 
since Stalin’s death became clearer with the passing months.  
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
OFFICIAL RESPONSES TO DISSENT: 1956-1958 
 
As Elena Papovyan has asserted: ‘for people who are not normally interested in the 
subject, repression in the second half of the 1950s causes amazement’.
1  As has already been stated, political persecution under Khrushchev is a theme that 
has attracted rather limited attention, especially in comparison to the preceding and 
succeeding periods of Soviet history.  In fact, the total of 3,764 sentences for anti-
Soviet activity and propaganda that were handed out between 1956 and 1958 far 
exceeded that of any other period of the post-Stalin era.  Unsurprisingly then, it is one 
of the central arguments of the present chapter that depictions of the Khrushchev era 
as one of ‘thaw’ are not entirely applicable in this respect.   
 
Official responses to infractions of acceptable comment had undoubtedly become 
markedly less draconian but the scope for criticism remained almost as narrow.  
Entirely groundless state violence had been largely reined in but a considerable 
volume of repressive activity remained.  William Henry Chamberlain’s assessment 
that the Soviet Union had changed ‘from a terror state to a strict police state’ is 
perhaps the most applicable.2   
 
Policy against dissent was a dynamic field of activity in the first half of the 
Khrushchev era as solutions were sought for behaviours that, to a large extent, 
                                                 
1 E. Papovyan, ‘Primenenie stat’i 58-10 UK RSFSR v 1957-1958 gg. po materialam Verkhovnogo 
Suda SSSR i Prokuratury SSSR v GARF’, in L.S. Eremina and E.B. Zhemkova eds, Korni travy: 
sbornik statei molodykh istorikov, Moskva: Obshchestvo ‘Memorial’, 1996, p. 73. 
2 W. Chamberlain, ‘USSR: How Much Change Since Stalin?’, Russian Review, Vol. 22, No. 3, July 
1963, p. 228. 
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constituted fundamentally new challenges for a regime in the process of adapting to 
the new post-Stalin, post-terror environment.  What one can see during the second 
half of the 1950s is essentially a process of experimentation by trial and error in 
regard to the policing of dissent.  Different approaches were employed and mistakes 
learned from before an effective corpus of policy began to crystallise from around the 
end of the decade. 
 
Inside the regime one can clearly see that, although the leadership were rarely 
involved in responding to specific cases of protest and criticism, they were 
consistently well informed about such occurrences and continued to set the general 
tone of repressive policy.  This is not a field in which one encounters the clear-cut 
divisions between ‘conservatives’ and ‘liberals’ within the leadership as was 
sometimes the case with cultural policy, for example.  Even quite mild political 
criticism was still equated with opposition at this stage in particular.   
 
It is also clear that the second half of the 1950s in particular witnessed a degree of 
inter-institutional competition – specifically between the KGB and the legal 
establishment – that had a direct impact on the way in which a corpus of policy 
against dissent was constructed over the course of this short period.  At the grassroots 
level, where the leadership initially demanded that dissenting behaviour receive an 
appropriate response, there was some confusion in regard to how to police dissent in 
the new, post-Stalin and post-Secret Speech environment, leading to numerous 
inconsistencies.   
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Preserving domestic stability remained the one priority that stood above all others, 
suggesting that the tone of official responses to acts of protest and criticism gives an 
insight into how concerned the authorities were in regard to the threat posed by 
dissent at any given time.  Nonetheless, the authorities had begun striving to reduce 
and control dissenting behaviour rather than to attempt its complete eradication by 
force – something that would have demanded a great deal of effort and repression.  In 
this, one can see not only that pragmatism dominated over ideological considerations 
in terms of responses to dissent but also that this was a key part of a fundamentally 
new social contract that was being established between the state and the people it 
ruled over.  The authorities were keen to avoid provoking resentment within society 
and tacitly came to accept that they were no longer able to impose their will with 
virtual impunity.   
 
Many of the basic assumptions that the leadership made in regard to dissent were 
either essentially correct or can at least be viewed as eminently logical.  However, 
they were also frequently unsophisticated and inappropriate in their application, often 
pushing the authorities into exaggerated and unhelpful responses to dissenting 
behaviour.  Nonetheless, the evidence shows that the policies against dissent that were 
pursued under Khrushchev ultimately paid dividends by reining in the growth of both 
intelligentsia and worker dissent.  What this meant, however, was that the grievances 
that existed within society were stifled rather than remedied.  
 
One of the most important themes to be noted is that of change and continuity.  One 
can see this period as a time in which Soviet repressive policy was in the later stages 
of the transition away from Stalinism, with its reliance on crude methods of social 
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control such as labour camps and prisons.  Looking to the succeeding Brezhnev 
period, it is also possible to draw a number of fundamental continuities in regard to 
official attitudes and responses to dissent that were put forward already in the early 
Khrushchev years and lasted for most of the following three decades.     
 
2.1 RESPONSES TO DISSENT PRIOR TO THE XX CONGRESS 
 
One need only look to the imprisonment of Alexander Radishchev after the 
publication of A Journey from St Petersburg to Moscow in 1790 or Nicholas I’s 
infamous Third Department to see that intolerance toward criticism of the ruling 
authorities was by no means a specific product of the October Revolution.  Nor, for 
that matter, was it a phenomenon restricted to the Russian Empire and the USSR.  
Suppression of dissenting opinion has always been the bedrock of even far less 
authoritarian regimes than the USSR under Khrushchev.  Nonetheless, to 
contemporary Western observers, and to many historians who study the post-Soviet 
states, the stifling of protest and criticism is one of the most prominent features of the 
Soviet regime.   
 
2.1.1 THE PUBLIC FACE OF POLITICAL PERSECUTION 
 
Before entering into a discussion of official responses to dissent, it is firstly 
instructive to elaborate upon the public facet of the authorities’ attitudes toward 
dissenters throughout the Soviet period.  Here the regime consistently strove to 
maintain an image of the USSR as a progressive and tolerant state.  Most notably for 
the period at hand, there were numerous instances during his time as leader of the 
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Soviet Union when Khrushchev insisted that there were no longer any political 
prisoners in the USSR; something that he almost unquestionably knew not to be the 
case.3 
 
Even more strikingly, on 27 January 1964 the Soviet representative to the UN on 
human rights issues, Boris Ivanov, voted in favour of two motions that proclaimed 
‘every citizen’s right to freedom of expression and opinion; the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and association’ and ‘every citizen’s right to leave any country, 
including his own, and to return to that country’.4  These were, of course, complete 
fallacies that were not to materialise until decades after Khrushchev’s ouster. 
 
This was entirely in keeping with a long history of disinformation and propaganda on 
the theme of the regime’s attitudes toward its critics.  In a gesture loaded with even 
more irony than that of Boris Ivanov, the Stalin regime had refused to ratify the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the grounds that it ‘did not go far 
enough’.5  Similarly, in the Brezhnev years the Soviet Union signed the 1975 Helsinki 
Accords with little or no intention of fulfilling the numerous human rights clauses of 
the so-called ‘Third Basket’.6  Gorbachev too, initially engaged in the same process of 
misinformation, like Khrushchev insisting that there were no longer any political 
prisoners in the USSR until Anatoly Marchenko’s death in Chistopol prison, in 
                                                 
3 See W. Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era, London: Free Press, 2003, p. 303.  Perhaps the 
most notable instance in which he made this statement was from the rostrum at the XXI CPSU 
Congress in January 1959. 
4 HU OSA, 300-80-1, Box 688.  
5 HU OSA, 300-80-1, Box 688.  
6 The contents of the Helsinki Accords were divided into three ‘baskets’.  The first basket was 
concerned with the post-Second World War national borders throughout Europe, the second with 
various aspects of co-operation between East and West and the third with human rights issues.  
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December 1986, prompted an international scandal.7  Clearly then, the public 
pronouncements of the Soviet regime over the years on this matter shared a common 
thread of audacious levels of deception. 
 
Successive Soviet leaders engaged in this practice of ritual dishonesty for a variety of 
reasons.  Occasionally intended for a domestic audience but more commonly used to 
impress the outside world, in order to help win client states in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America.  There were clear benefits for the regime in lying about what was a 
consistently woeful record on civil liberties and domestic repression.  Clearly, 
pragmatism had always been, and would always be, the key factor in the regime’s 
public attitude toward protest and criticism. 
 
2.1.2 FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE SECRET SPEECH 
 
One of the best known examples of the way in which the new Bolshevik regime had 
originally sought to deal with its critics could be seen in the deportation of academic 
and cultural figures, the most notable of which was the renowned philosopher Nikolai 
Berdyaev, on what came to be known as the ‘philosopher’s boat’ in 1922.8  As Robert 
Service has pointed out, from the very beginning ‘The deportations taught the 
intelligentsia that no overt criticisms of the regime would be tolerated’.9  Contrary to 
                                                 
7 Marchenko had been a member of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group and had spent many years in 
labour camps, jails and exile settlements.  He achieved his most lasting impact as a dissident by writing 
the samizdat book ‘My Testimony’, an account of his time spent in the Khrushchev era Gulag.  The 
exact cause of his death was not officially announced, but Marchenko had been engaged in a lengthy 
hunger strike and been badly beaten by prison guards shortly prior to his death.   
8 See L. Chamberlain, Lenin’s Private War: The Voyage of the Philosophy Steamer, London: St 
Martin’s Press, 2007, and G. Arbatov, et al. eds, ‘Ochistim Rossiyu nadolgo…’: Repressii protiv 
inakomyslyashchikh, konets 1921 – nachalo 1923, Moskva: Mezhdunarodnyi fond ‘Demokratiya’, 
2008.  
9 R. Service, A History of Modern Russia from Nicholas II to Putin, London: Penguin Books, 2003, p. 
137. 
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what the Khrushchev era’s neo-Bolshevik dissenters seem to have believed, the Lenin 
years were certainly not free of political persecution.  However, those who were 
considered essentially loyal but ‘misguided’ were often responded to in a different 
fashion.  For example, it was generally the case that dissenting Bolsheviks were 
subjected to admonition rather than punishment, with mitigating factors taken into 
account.10  Those who were seen as enemies, on the other hand, were still liable to 
face ‘revolutionary justice’.     
 
From the late 1920s onwards, official attitudes toward dissenters became markedly 
more severe, with terms such as ‘enemies of the people’ increasingly bandied about in 
official rhetoric.  Characteristic of the crude and Manichean legal processes of the 
time, even off-the-cuff remarks such as ‘I wish Stalin were dead’ could be deemed the 
equivalent of an attempted assassination and accordingly punished as terrorism while 
practically any kind of protest or criticism was branded as the work of Trotskyists, 
SRs or anarchists.11 
 
Debates about how many people were executed, jailed or otherwise repressed in the 
Stalin years fall outside of the scope of the present work but what is important is the 
fact that a large proportion of such cases were entirely baseless and apparently at 
random.  Unsurprisingly, the number of annual convictions for political crimes was 
high, especially in the immediate post-war years as the authorities pursued reprisals 
against real or supposed former collaborators and nationalist guerrillas in the Ukraine 
and the Baltic States, often handing out sentences of twenty-five years in such cases.   
                                                 
10 See, for example, O. Kharkhodin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices, 
London: University of California Press, 1999, p. 37. 
11 See S. Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda and Dissent 1934-1941, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 5. 
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However, the number of sentences for counter-revolutionary crimes was actually in 
quite pronounced decline during Stalin’s last years, dropping from 129,826 
convictions in 1946 to 69,233 in 1948 to 53,179 in 1950 and finally 27,098 
convictions in 1952.12  Knowing that Stalin took a close personal interest in the work 
of the security organs, it seems doubtful that such a marked drop in sentences could 
have occurred without his assent yet there seems to be no evidence that his last years 
were characterised by a more liberal side to his thinking; quite the opposite in fact.  
Most likely this decline in convictions for anti-Soviet activity and propaganda could 
be attributed to the fact that the campaign against Baltic and Ukrainian guerrillas and 
collaborators was winding down as the number left at liberty declined.  There is also a 
possibility that fabricated political cases were simply being replaced by fabricated 
criminal cases.   
 
That the high-profile and entirely invented ‘Doctors’ Plot’ was immediately 
disbanded by Stalin’s successors and the first few Gulag inmates were soon released 
augured well for the future, as did the break up of Beria’s powerful MVD apparatus.  
From approximately this point onwards the volume of entirely groundless convictions 
declined greatly.  Basic improvements were made to the legal system whereby the 
notorious troikas were abolished, the accused were allowed access to a lawyer and the 
state’s reliance on free Gulag labour (which had necessitated a steady supply of 
convictions) was ended.13  This is not to say that investigations and trials became 
unbiased or that the authorities’ responses to dissent were reasonable but that the 
process at least became more predictable and did not tend to touch upon those who 
                                                 
12 Y. Gorlizki and O. Khlevniuk, Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1953, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 125.    
13 Some of the best coverage on the breaking up of the MVD and on reforms to the Soviet legal system 
after Stalin’s death can be found in M. Lewin, The Soviet Century, London: Verso, 2005. 
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kept silent.  Many problems remained though, most notably in the way that the legal 
apparatus enjoyed practically no independence from the dictates of the Communist 
Party leadership.     
 
The years of collective leadership continued to witness a consistent and marked drop 
in annual sentences under article 58 for counter-revolutionary crimes, from 2,124 in 
1954 to 1,069 in 1955 and 623 in 1956.14  What this demonstrates is that the practice 
of showing greater restraint in punishing dissent was not simply a product of the XX 
CPSU Congress or of Khrushchev’s apparently liberal political leanings but that it had 
actually been in progress virtually since Stalin’s death and certainly before 
Khrushchev had risen to dominance over his rivals.  
 
This suggests that the declining level of repression on the basis of anti-Soviet activity 
during the years of collective leadership, with numerous arch-Stalinists at the apex of 
power, was not a product of a more liberal atmosphere in the wake of the Secret 
Speech.  As Gorlizki and Khlevnyuk have shown, the authorities were well aware of 
the threat posed by looming economic and demographic crises arising from the mass 
repression of the Stalin era.15  However, the refusal of successive amnesties to release 
those jailed on political charges, the brutal suppression of the camp rebellion at 
Kengir in 1954 and the anti-religious drive of the same year demonstrated that the 
                                                 
14 GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5080, l. 3.  Article 58-10 was the name employed only in the RSFSR 
criminal code since no overall Soviet code existed.  Other union republics had different code numbers 
for the same article but for reasons of clarity and consistency the titlw ’58-10’ is used throughout this 
thesis. 
15 See Gorlizki and Khlevnyuk, Cold Peace.   
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regime remained intolerant and capable of resorting to violence in order to enforce its 
will.16 
 
Furthermore, Stalin’s successors were from the very start aware that the relationship 
between state and society had changed following his death.  While ‘scared’ may well 
be too strong a word, one could at least say that the new leaders were highly 
apprehensive about society’s mood on coming to power.  As Leonard Schapiro 
pointed out: ‘the leaders of the Party had graphically summed up their own view on 
the state of popular feeling towards the Party when, immediately after Stalin’s death, 
they spoke of the need for measures to prevent disorder and panic’.17   
 
2.2 AFTER THE XX CONGRESS 
 
Surprisingly, no concrete plans were established before or immediately after the 
Secret Speech in regard of how to police popular responses to it.  Ekaterina Furtseva – 
at the time a member of the Central Committee Secretariat and later a full Presidium 
member – admitted to this lack of planning when she said that: ‘after the XX 
Congress we were not ready to give a response when the remarks began to come’.18  
In all likelihood this lack of pre-planning was a result of the short timescale that 
existed between the decision for Khrushchev to deliver Pospelov’s report on Stalin to 
the Congress and the actual event taking place.  It also demonstrated one of the central 
characteristics of policy against dissent in the early Khrushchev years: the authorities 
                                                 
16 The most detailed account of the Kengir camp rising can be found in A. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag 
Archipelago, Vol. 3, London: Collins/Fontana, 1978. 
17 L. Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1970, p. 608. 
18 E. Zubkova, Obshchestvo i reformy 1945-1964, Moskva: Izdatel’skii tsentr ‘Rossiya molodaya’, 
1993, p. 136.  Zubkova cites her source for this as RTsKhIDNI, f. 556, op. 1, d. 693.  Furtseva is 
probably best known for being one of very few women to rise to the very highest levels of political 
power and for occupying the position of Culture Minister, which she did between 1960 and 1974.  
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were rarely proactive in seeking to forestall outbursts of criticism and protest but 
instead responded to them afterwards.  In later years there would be a more 
sophisticated and integrated approach to preventing and punishing dissent but the 
early Khrushchev period was essentially characterised by ‘fire-fighting’. 
       
Khrushchev’s memoirs – not always the most reliable source but in this instance 
supported by other accounts – tell us that fellow members of the collective leadership, 
particularly Lazar Kaganovich and Kliment Voroshilov, had strongly resisted his 
proposal to deliver the report on Stalin at the XX Congress.  They reportedly claimed 
that it would do untold damage to the regime and said that, ‘We will be called to 
account.  The Party will assume the right to call us to account…we’ll be held 
responsible for it all’.19  With at least a few of its members already in a state of some 
trepidation over the potential consequences of the report, it is entirely unsurprising 
that the Politburo took an active interest in monitoring the lists of comments and 
questions that arose at the meetings held to discuss the Secret Speech around the 
country.20 
 
2.2.1 RESPONDING TO DISCUSSIONS OF THE SECRET SPEECH 
 
It is interesting to note that when reports of dissenting remarks that took place at 
meetings held to discuss the Secret Speech reached the centre, the response was, in 
Soviet terms, still rather measured.  This vindicates Elena Papovyan’s assertion that 
                                                 
19 See S. Khrushchev ed. Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev Volume 2: Reformer, 1945-1964, 
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006, pp. 209-10.  Among other sources, 
Khrushchev’s account is supported by Aleksandr Pyzhikov in Khrushchevskaya ottepel’, Moskva: 
Olma Press, 2002.   
20 See E. Kulavig, Dissent in the Years of Khrushchev: Nine Stories About Disobedient Russians, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.  The list of questions submitted at meetings held to discuss the 
Secret Speech, cited in chapter 1, demonstrates this point. 
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1956 was characterised by ‘an unusual liberalism in the punitive organs’.21  This was 
largely true yet, as mentioned earlier in the present chapter, political repression had 
already been dropping markedly since Stalin’s death.  The restraint was, therefore, 
indicative of a trend that had already been in place for some time, even though the 
problem of critical speeches in particular was essentially a new one. 
 
At the lower levels of the Party there were a number of factors that dictated these 
restrained responses to dissent.  Firstly, according to Polly Jones, Party activists and 
officials were usually too deeply embroiled in the rituals of criticism and self-
criticism to act decisively and promptly.22   Secondly, the ‘chasm of uncertainty’ that 
had facilitated some of the dissenting behaviour of the time also took hold in local 
Party organisations.  If, as Yuri Orlov asserted, people everywhere were still ‘holding 
their fingers in the wind’, then it was evident that the wind was blowing against the 
Stalinists and to pursue vigorous repression at this stage would clearly not have been a 
sensible move. 
 
In later months and years the KGB was consistently at the vanguard of the struggle 
against dissent, yet for the most part they remained inactive in the wake of the Secret 
Speech.  Although very much a client of Khrushchev (the pair had worked together in 
wartime Ukraine) the presiding KGB chairman, Ivan Serov, was by no means a liberal 
and was in fact one of the louder voices insisting that a hard line had to be taken 
against dissenters.23  That the newly constituted KGB had been charged with leading 
the struggle against protest and criticism could be seen in the 15 February 1954 
                                                 
21 Papovyan, ‘Primenenie stati 58-10’ in Eremina and Zhemkova eds. Korni travy, p. 73.  
22 P. Jones, ‘From the Secret Speech to the Burial of Stalin’ in P. Jones ed.  The Dilemmas of De-
Stalinization: Negotiating Social Change in the Khrushchev Era, London: Routledge, 2006, p. 46. 
23 See, for example, N. Petrov, Ivan Serov: Pervyi predsedatel’ KGB, Moskva: Materik, 2005; Y. 
Albats, KGB: State Within a State, London: I.B. Tauris, 1995.  
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Central Committee resolution ‘On the Formation of the Committee for State Security 
(KGB) under the Council of Ministers’ which defined one of the organisation’s 
principal roles as being ‘struggle against the enemy activity of any kind of anti-Soviet 
elements inside the USSR’.24  One can point to the ongoing aim of the Party, and 
Khrushchev in particular, to bring the security organs to heel as the reason for their 
relative inactivity at this time.  Until sanctioned by the Party to take action, the KGB 
were forced to wait. 
 
Summaries of discussions that took place in all union republics were compiled and 
sent to the Central Committee by the Department of Party Organs.25  The leadership 
cannot have been unconcerned by the negative reports reaching them after such a long 
period of conformism within the Party ranks. According to Erik Kulavig, reports from 
local Party branches quickly convinced the top leadership that even the limited 
liberalisation that had taken place had already shaken the foundations of the system.26  
This seems like an exaggeration, however, as later events would show that when the 
authorities perceived any potential threat to the regime’s stability they were far 
quicker to act decisively than was the case at this point in time.  Nonetheless, it is 
evident from this interest in monitoring the public mood that, unlike in previous 
times, popular opinion had come to matter more to the Soviet leadership and that it 
was ultimately to have a major impact on policy formulation. 
 
One of the first attempts by the authorities to silence critics was a letter sent out to 
Party organisations in response to events at the Thermo-Technical Institute discussed 
                                                 
24 RGANI, f. 3, op. 8, d. 84, l. 18. 
25 See K. Aimermakher et al eds.  Doklad N.S. Khrushcheva o kul’te lichnosti Stalina na XX s’ezde 
KPSS: Dokumenty, Moskva: Rosspen, 2002.   
26 Kulavig, Dissent in the Years of Khrushchev, p. 16. 
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in chapter 1.  However, having gone into some detail in describing the events that 
took place at the meeting in question, it is worthwhile to return briefly to the subject 
in order to describe the official response that followed. 
 
2.2.2 THE THERMO-TECHNICAL INSTITUTE: REVISITED 
 
It has already been mentioned in the previous chapter that members of the Party cell at 
the Thermo-Technical Institute were presented with a motion to censure the critical 
speeches that had been made by Orlov, Arvalov, Nesterov and Shedrin, but most 
refused to condemn the quartet.  In this Party cell, and others like it at the time, the 
vote on whether to condemn the dissenters’ remarks was deemed insufficiently 
supportive of the motion and the entire cell was subsequently disbanded.  A raft of 
similar instances around the country showed that the Party leadership feared the 
existence of genuinely sizeable resistance within certain Party cells.27  Those deemed 
to be ‘harmful elements’ were then expelled from the Party and the remaining 
‘healthy’ elements would be re-registered with other local groups.  This last point 
serves to flag up the kind of imagery that the regime often used to characterise 
dissenters: ‘unhealthy’ and ‘contagious’ elements in an otherwise healthy society. 
 
One of the more unique aspects of the authorities’ response to the meeting at the 
Thermo-Technical Institute was that the fate of the four speakers was decided at the 
very top of the political hierarchy.  According to Orlov, the head of the institute, 
Abram Alikhanov, informed the quartet that, 'I telephoned Khrushchev on your behalf 
but he said that he was not the only member of the Politburo.  Other members 
                                                 
27 Jones, ‘From the Secret Speech’, in Jones ed.  The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization, p. 47. 
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demanded your arrest.  He told me “they should be glad that they got off with 
dismissals”’.28  It is entirely likely that the wave of critical responses to the Secret 
Speech had left Khrushchev in a weakened position within the leadership yet it seems 
disingenuous to suggest that he was entirely powerless on the matter.   
 
The foursome undoubtedly did gain a measure of protection from the fact that they 
were talented physicists, and therefore particularly useful to the regime, rather than 
ordinary members of the public.29  Furthermore, for the regime to launch a harsh 
response would have risked alienating the wider scientific community just as the 
nuclear arms race was gathering momentum.  It is quite clear that this was a case in 
which both liberalisation and rationalisation played an important part.   
 
Fedor Burlatsky has gone on record as stating that Mikhail Suslov, the ultra-
conservative ideologue, was the driving force behind putative moves to have the four 
arrested.30  Although there was a degree of personal animosity between Burlatsky and 
Suslov, there is little doubt that the latter may well have taken it upon himself to play 
a personal role in responding to dissent.  A further example of this kind of behaviour 
on Suslov’s part was demonstrated by his personal involvement in conducting an 
investigation into uncovering the authors of a December 1956 article in a university 
newspaper on students who had been expelled from their institute.31 
                                                 
28 Yu. Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts: Memoirs of a Russian Life, New York: William Morrow and 
Company, 1991, p. 121. 
29 Yuri Orlov denied the rumour that Igor Kurchatov, ‘the father of the Soviet atom bomb’, also 
intervened on behalf of the four, threatening to retire from all scientific work if they were jailed. 
Interview with Yuri Orlov, Ithaca, December 2006.   
30 F. Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring: The Era of Khrushchev Through the Eyes of 
his Adviser, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991 p. 72.  Suslov and Burlatsky had particularly 
different ideological beliefs – in the Soviet context – and this led to a series of clashes during the 
Khrushchev years before Burlatsky was sidelined under the Brezhnev regime.     
31 V. Ronkin, Na smenu dekabryam prikhodit yanvari…, Moskva: Izdatel’stvo Zven’ya, 2003, p. 98.  It 
is also worth noting here that recent works have pinpointed Suslov as the figure whose intrigues led to 
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Members of the Party and state leadership generally did not involve themselves in 
such affairs, however.  This was perhaps a result of the leadership wanting to avoid 
getting ‘blood on their hands’ again: something that Khrushchev had employed to 
powerful effect in his rivalry with those more deeply implicated in Stalin’s crimes, 
such as Molotov and Malenkov.  It should also be pointed out that members of the 
leadership had many of their own ministerial and Party concerns and tended not to 
encroach upon other fields of responsibility without invitation.  Nonetheless, as 
matters in December of 1956 would subsequently demonstrate, it was the Central 
Committee Presidium that continued to prescribe the broad tone of political repression 
in spite of their minimal day-to-day involvement in the matter. 
 
On 5 April 1956, Pravda carried an editorial attacking the quartet of young physicists, 
claiming that they had ‘sung with the voices of Mensheviks and Socialist 
Revolutionaries’.32  With both of those political groups having been effectively wiped 
out in the USSR over two decades previously, this would probably have meant little to 
much of the population but it did betray more than a hint of the language that had 
been used in the Stalin years.33  More significantly, as stated in chapter 1, the media 
attack largely failed to provoke public indignation at the four and instead gave rise to 
approving comments.  The lesson was soon learned by the authorities and media 
references to dissenters vanished for a time before later re-appearing with a tone of 
moral rather than ideological condemnation.34 
                                                                                                                                            
Khrushchev’s notorious attack on non-conformist artists at the Manezh gallery in December 1962, 
mentioned in chapter 3.  See, for example, M. Zezina, Sovetskaya khudozhestvennaya intelligentsiya i 
vlast’ v 1950-1960 xx, Moskva: Dialog MGU, 1999; Yu. Gerchuk, Krovoizliyanie v MOSKh, ili 
Khrushcheve v Manezhe 1 dekabrya 1962 goda, Moskva: NLO, 2008.  
32 Pravda, 5 April 1956. 
33 Orlov himself wrote that he knew very little about either the Mensheviks or Socialist 
Revolutionaries.  See Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts, p. 121. 
34 This remained the case throughout the Brezhnev years.  For example, Aleksandr Ginzburg was 
characterised as a drunkard and Yuri Orlov as an uncaring father.  Elena Bonner, in particular, was 
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2.2.3 THE BOUNDARIES OF PERMISSIBLE AND IMPERMISSIBLE 
 
What then lay inside, outside and on the edges of these new boundaries of permitted 
behaviour?  S.V. Mironenko has argued that scope for the expression of alternative 
views had actually ‘not changed one iota’ after the Secret Speech.  He has asserted 
that the most significant impact of the XX Congress was that those who did not 
transgress the boundaries of acceptable comment and behaviour were no longer in 
danger of repression.35  Mironenko’s assertion is not without some validity, though it 
seems that a better argument would go beyond the question of repression no longer 
touching upon innocent citizens and suggest that, although the scope for expressing 
criticism had not changed, what the authorities deemed an appropriate response to 
these criticisms had clearly become far less severe.  Still though, the matter was one 
of rationalisation just as much as it was about liberalisation. 
 
In fact there was a limited degree of acceptable criticism in the Khrushchev years that 
had not existed under Stalin.  Most famously there were numerous examples of 
authors such as Vladimir Dudintsev, Lev Pomerantsev and Ilya Ehrenburg who 
published work in the first half of the Khrushchev period that presented a degree of 
criticism on themes including poor living conditions among the peasantry, 
bureaucratic abuse of power and the stifling influence of Socialist Realism on Soviet 
cultural life.  However, this was an avenue of criticism that could be somewhat 
unpredictable, as shown by the publication of Dudintsev’s Not by Bread Alone in 
autumn 1956 which initially met an enthusiastic popular response only to be followed 
                                                                                                                                            
subjected to a long running and vicious smear campaign in the 1970s and 1980s that depicted her as 
leading her husband, Andrei Sakharov, astray. 
35 V. Kozlov and S. Mironenko eds, Kramola: Inakomyslie v SSSR pri Khrushcheve i Brezhneve 1953-
1982, Moskva: ‘Materik’, 2005, p. 29. 
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by the author’s subsequent mauling at the hands of conservatives and later by 
Khrushchev himself. 
 
Often viewed by scholars as having had the function of a safety valve intended to vent 
the frustrations of the liberal intelligentsia, this was one area where it clearly was 
possible to point to an ongoing internecine struggle between liberals and 
conservatives within the corridors of power.36  Whether the publication of a few 
liberal works had in fact helped to appease the frustrated intelligentsia cannot be 
proved for certain, yet some memoirs from the period do suggest this to have been the 
case.37  It is also noteworthy that as the authorities stemmed the flow of critical works 
being published in journals such as Novyi Mir dissent became an increasingly 
intelligentsia-dominated phenomenon.   
 
This was not an avenue in which the ordinary citizen was able to participate in any 
active capacity, however.  Broadly speaking, there were two spheres of acceptable 
criticism open to the general public.  The first of which was mild criticism of 
proposed policies that were not yet in force (once in force, there was to be no further 
debate on their merits or otherwise).  The second avenue was censure of specific 
abuses of power by individuals at the lower levels of the political spectrum.38  One 
could see the former in the public consultation campaigns of the period and the latter 
occasionally appearing in the letters sections of newspapers and journals, for example.  
The most important point was that such letters and comments were not to be aimed at 
                                                 
36 The literature on this theme is particularly voluminous in both English and Russian.  Two of the best 
works are P. Johnson, Khrushchev and the Arts: The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962-1964, Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1965 and Zezina, Sovetskaya khudozhestvennaya intelligentsiya i vlast’.  
37 See, for example, L. Alexeyeva and P. Goldberg, The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-
Stalin Era, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990. 
38 See C. Kenney, ‘The Twentieth CPSU Congress and the ‘New’ Soviet Union’, The Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 1956, pp. 570-606. 
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the top leadership nor seen to be directed at undermining the foundations of the Party 
or its decisions, but must be ‘businesslike in character’ according to Voprosy partiinoi 
raboty – an authoritative collection of official articles and editorials on ideological 
developments.39 
 
The political and social order, along with the economic system, were the most 
explicitly forbidden themes of criticism.40  What these subjects instantly implied to 
the authorities was the presence of deep-seated hostility toward the fundamental 
principles of Soviet rule: a not entirely unfounded, though undoubtedly extreme, 
viewpoint.  In addition to these three subjects, one can also add the broad theme of 
‘the West’ as a subject that could only be broached in a negative manner.  Because the 
authorities saw citizens’ attitudes toward the West as a key indicator of their political 
loyalty, it naturally followed that any kind of dissenting behaviour involving the 
West, such as negative comparisons between the standard of living in the Soviet 
Union and the US or attempts to communicate with foreign organisations, instantly 
made any transgression more dangerous. 
 
There were also certain ‘grey areas’ to these new boundaries.  For example, Kozlov 
has cited the fact that there was no legal definition of what constituted a ‘counter-
revolutionary organisation’ as proof that in fact the authorities purposely did not 
establish complete clarity of the rules.41  The main reason for this was that a degree of 
uncertainty often prompts caution.  This could also be seen in later years when 
psychiatric confinement was employed against dissenters apparently at random, 
                                                 
39 Voprosy partiinoi raboty, Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stov politicheskoi literatury,1957, p. 48.   
40 V. Shlapentokh, Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power: The Post-Stalin Era, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990, p. 78. 
41 Kozlov and Mironenko eds Kramola, p. 31. 
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meaning that all acts of dissent theoretically carried the risk of indefinite detention: 
undoubtedly a powerful deterrent. 
 
2.2.4 RESTORING DISCIPLINE IN THE PARTY 
 
On 5 April the Central Committee Presidium issued a secret resolution to be 
circulated among Party organisations entitled ‘On the harmful attacks at the meeting 
of the Thermo-Technical laboratory of the USSR Academy of Sciences Party 
organisation’.  It said that although the majority of meetings had passed in the desired 
manner ‘the Central Committee has noted that there have been individual cases of 
harmful speeches by anti-Party elements that have tried to employ criticism and self-
criticism for their own aims’.  It accused the quartet of trying to use the discussion 
session to discredit the Party and Soviet state, acknowledged that the majority of those 
present had refused to condemn their remarks and criticised the leadership of the Party 
cell for failing to give a decisive response.42     
 
Another Party letter demanding an end to internal criticism was sent out on 16 June, 
entitled ‘On the results of discussions on the decisions of the XX Party Congress’.  On 
30 June the Central Committee issued a further decree: ‘On the overcoming of the 
Cult of Personality and its consequences’.43  According to Susanne Schattenberg, this 
decree in particular was intended as a threat to those who persisted in their 
‘exaggerated’ criticism at Party meetings.44  As Gennadyi Kuzovkin has stated, the 
overall purpose of these letters was to demonstrate the new limits of acceptable 
                                                 
42 RGANI, f. 3, op. 14, d. 13, ll. 76-79. 
43 RGANI, f. 3, op. 14, d. 37, ll. 1-25. 
44 S. Schattenberg, ‘‘Democracy’ or ‘Despotism’? How the Secret Speech Was Translated into 
Everyday Life’, in Jones ed. The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization, p. 66. 
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criticism and discussion, to judge proper from improper in the new environment, and 
to establish that punishment would follow any transgression of these boundaries.45   
 
Kulavig has cited figures to show that between 1954 and 1961 a total of 550 CPSU 
members were expelled on the grounds of ‘participation in anti-Party groups’, almost 
1,000 were expelled for ‘anti-Party conversations’ and almost 900 for ‘lack of 
political conviction’.46  Although they do give some idea as to the scale of Party 
expulsions, the timescale covered in Kulavig’s figures is too broad for any detailed 
analysis of responses to discussions of the Secret Speech.  Very few CPSU and 
Komsomol members were jailed as a result of remarks made at Party meetings and 
discussions.  This does not indicate that inner-Party criticism had become more 
acceptable but that the level of response which was deemed appropriate in such 
instances had been lowered considerably.  Again, it is worth emphasising the contrast 
with the likely responses to public criticism that would have occurred in the Stalin 
years.  That such events were practically unheard of in the later Khrushchev years and 
during the Brezhnev period is a testament to the authorities’ success not just in 
purging the CPSU of ‘undesirable elements’ during this period but also in clearly 
establishing powerful sanctions to dissuade other potential critics.   
 
The case of the Party meeting in Levoberezhnyi raion of Kuibyshev oblast’, 
mentioned in chapter 1, reflected some of the main practices in policing dissent within 
the Party at that time.  The leadership of the Party cell in question was deemed to have 
failed in its duty to provide a sufficiently decisive rebuff against its critics, and the 
Kuibyshev gorkom eventually took control of the matter.  It handed out expulsions or 
                                                 
45 G. Kuzovkin, ‘Partiino-Komsomol’skie presledovaniya po politicheskim,  motivam v period rannei 
‘ottepeli’’ in Eremina and Zhemkova eds, Korni travy, p. 90. 
46 Kulavig, Dissent in the Years of Khrushchev, p. 88. 
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severe reprimands to all of those who had made critical remarks or asked questions 
that were judged ‘provocative’.  Because of their weak response to the original 
incident, the organisation’s buro was also disbanded.47 
 
The above case reflects the fact that the authorities in Moscow were regularly 
dissatisfied with the way that local Party organisations failed to respond to members’ 
critical remarks with sufficient vigour.  As Polly Jones has observed, the leadership in 
Moscow at times seemed more angered by the local authorities’ failure to detect and 
deal with anti-Soviet sentiment than by the dissenting outbursts themselves.48  Clearly 
then, the letters sent out by the Central Committee in the Spring and Summer of 1956 
had been vital in establishing where the new boundaries of permitted behaviour were - 
not just for ordinary Party members but also for those who were charged with policing 
dissent. 
 
The aim was not to uncover those of differing opinions, as in the Stalin era, nor to 
persuade them of the rightness of the Party line, but to enforce silence upon them.  
This was not quite the return to Leninism that Khrushchev had promised but it was 
still a major divergence from the excesses of Stalinism.  The tactic was, to a large 
extent, successful.  From the end of 1956 there were relatively few traces of open 
criticism within the ranks of the CPSU.  With only a handful of exceptions, open 
criticism was not heard within the Party again for many years.  The result was that 
most disgruntled members suppressed their frustration, but a minority chose to move 
toward underground activity instead.   
                                                 
47 RGANI, f. 89, op. 6, d. 5, l. 3. 
48 Jones, ‘From the Secret Speech’ in Jones ed.  The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization, p. 44. 
 116
Already then, one can start to see an implicit acceptance of ‘doublethink’ whereby 
hostile or critical opinions and beliefs were no longer the concern of the authorities 
unless they were manifested in some way.  Even though the state was becoming ever-
more intrusive into the everyday lives of its citizens, it no longer concerned itself with 
their thoughts if they were not manifested in protest activity.  The matter was clearly 
one of managing dissent rather than completely eradicating it.  This does not suggest 
that the authorities felt any more tolerant to alternative views but that there existed 
neither the will nor the means to attempt the physical eradication of all critics. 
 
2.2.5 RESTORING DISCIPLINE IN THE KOMSOMOL 
 
Young people in particular became the subject of the regime’s attention by the second 
half of 1956.  Along with released prisoners and members of the artistic intelligentsia, 
the young generation was seen as being among the most likely sources of domestic 
strife.  The authorities spoke of problems such as insufficient respect for the value of 
labour and for the Soviet revolutionary heritage, particularly looking to the children of 
the burgeoning middle classes as the root of the problem.49  However, in this the 
regime almost entirely failed to engage with the real issues that were causing disquiet 
among Soviet youth, such as the strenuous demands that the Komsomol placed upon 
its members, the generation gap that had been opened up by the Secret Speech and the 
poor living conditions endured by students.50 
 
                                                 
49 See J. Fürst, ‘The Arrival of Spring?’ in Jones ed.  The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization.   
50 Komsomol members were not only expected to attend the organisation’s meetings but also to take 
part in various groups and committees as well as undertaking civic work in the local area.  When added 
to a demanding school or university schedule, many tried to avoid their Komsomol duties. 
 117
This concern was linked to the authorities’ eminently logical fear that it was among 
young people that harmful bourgeois propaganda would have its biggest impact as 
Western fashions and culture began to appear in the USSR.  The 1957 World Youth 
Festival in particular posed a major headache for the regime in this respect: it had the 
potential to generate fantastic propaganda successes but also meant bringing the 
negative influence of thousands of foreigners into the USSR for the first time.  
Frederick Barghoorn has argued that ‘the regime saw itself as the moral shepherd of a 
naïve society’.51  This may well be true.  After years of isolation much of Soviet 
society was indeed naïve about the outside world, but it is also the case that much 
dissent among young and old was entirely organic in origin and adhered to Marxist-
Leninist political philosophy.52  Blaming discontent among young people on the 
influence of the West was an easy solution but it was not entirely the correct one. 
 
The content of a January 1957 report from Komsomol secretary Shelepin to the CPSU 
Central Committee suggested that within the Komsomol there was some trace of 
Khrushchev’s putative ‘return to Leninism’.  According to Shelepin, emphasis was 
being placed on educating those who were ‘misguided’ rather than simply taking 
punitive measures against them.  Noting that a mood of pessimism and ‘apoliticism’ 
had emerged since the XX Congress, he wrote that political-ideological work among 
young people was being strengthened across all union republics, that agitators, 
teachers, workers and veterans of the revolution were being dispatched to work 
                                                 
51 F. Barghoorn, ‘Observations on Contemporary Soviet Political Attitudes’, Soviet Studies, Vol.18, 
No.1, July 1966, p. 68. 
52 The impression of Soviet society as naïve about the true state of affairs in the world comes across 
particularly clear in accounts by Zinaida Schakovsky and Maurice Hindus, both of whom travelled 
around the Soviet Union for several months in the second half of the 1950s.  See Z. Schakovsky, The 
Privilege Was Mine, London: Jonathon Cape, 1959 and M. Hindus, House Without a Roof: Russia 
After Forty Three Years of Revolution, London: Victor Gollancz, 1962.  
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places, student dormitories, canteens and classrooms to explain the Party line and to 
provide a rebuff to bourgeois propaganda.53   
 
Stronger measures were also put in place, however.  Directors of Higher Education 
Institutes were empowered to expel students and to withhold their stipends if they 
were involved in any kind of dissenting behaviour.  Pressure was increased on 
teachers to monitor their students and those deemed ‘unworthy of the title “student”’ 
were to be expelled and assigned productive labour tasks instead of academic studies 
and not permitted to enrol at another higher education institute for two to three 
years.54  Unfortunately, it seems that figures on expulsions from universities and other 
higher education institutes were either not kept at the time or have simply failed to 
come to light for one reason or another.  It is worth referring the reader back to the 
previous chapter, in which a Daily Mail article claiming that around 1,000 MGU 
students were expelled in connection with the Hungarian rising was cited.55  Even a 
very conservative estimate suggests that this would have equated to perhaps 10,000 
students at least across the country as a whole, and potentially a great many more.  
 
The authorities were probably correct in viewing young people as a source of 
potential disquiet and were, in fact, largely successful in stifling the expression of 
discontent in that sector of society.  Moreover, this process was carried out with 
minimal recourse to political sentencing and corrective labour.  It was becoming clear 
to the authorities that they did not always need to ‘use a sledgehammer to crack a 
walnut’: the threat of expulsion from university or from the Komsomol was often 
                                                 
53 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 233, ll. 1-73. 
54 See Kuzovkin, ‘Partiino-Komsomol’skie presledovaniya’ in Eremina and Zhemkova eds,  Korni 
travy, pp. 88-126. 
55 Daily Mail, 5 December 1956.  It is also important to reiterate the reservations that were originally 
expressed about the figures presented in this article. 
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sufficiently powerful to change someone’s behaviour.  In later years this principle was 
to be applied across society as a whole.    
 
Although some labour camps did continue to function, Khrushchev’s denial that there 
were any political prisoners in the USSR effectively took away their function as a 
deterrent from dissenting behaviour.56  Instead, new sanctions were established that 
proved able to constrain people’s behaviour without overt repressive activity, such as 
the loss of a job along with any accrued privileges or expulsion from the Party or 
Komsomol – which invariably entailed losing one’s job and being debarred from all 
but the lowest paid positions in the future.  These new sanctions also demonstrate the 
greater subtlety of the post-Stalin approach to social control that was being 
established.  While this was undoubtedly an effective method of ensuring popular 
compliance in the short and medium term, it was not a genuine cure to the regime’s 
ills. 
 
The threat of expulsion from the Communist Party and the Komsomol were powerful 
stimuli that should not be underestimated.  Furthermore, the threat of imprisonment 
still hung over those who were expelled from the Party and Komsomol.  
Comprehensive statistics on expulsions from the Komsomol relating to dissent have 
yet to be made available, though there are some highly informative scraps of 
information in the archives:  
 
  
                                                 
56 Accounts of the period by the likes of Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn quite clearly 
indicate that people generally believed Khrushchev’s boasts about there being no more political 
prisoners.  See Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, p. 71 and A. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag 
Archipelago, Part 3: London, Collins/Fontana, 1978, p. 476.  
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Table 2.1 Annual expulsions from the Ukrainian Komsomol, 1956-1958. 
 
Oblast’ 
1956 1957 1958
Zaporozhskaya 539 274 57
Khersonskaya 376 161 48
Nikolaevskaya 444 290 66
Krymskaya 978 275 88
Odesskaya 1,057 628 113
Luganskaya 2,532 641 207
Stalinskaya 2,903 1,286 270
Dnepropetrovskaya 1,298 550 128
Kirovogradskaya 307 222 38
Kievskaya 902 451 99
Chernigovskaya 391 364 59
 
Source: Department of Komsomol Organs.  RGASPI, f. 1, op. 33, d. 1690, ll. 32-35  
 
The first trend that one will immediately notice in the above table is the extent to 
which the volume of expulsions decreased significantly from 1956 to 1957 and then 
from 1957 to 1958, suggesting that 1956 was a year in which expulsions were 
unusually high.  This is a pattern that is supported in one of the few other pieces of 
statistical information on Komsomol expulsions. 
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 Table 2.2 Annual expulsions from the Kazakh and Uzbek Komsomol 
organisations, 1955-1957. 
 
Union Republic 1955 1956 1957
Kazakh 2,593 3,001 2,169
Uzbek 1,649 1,875 627
 
Source: Department of Komsomol Organs.  RGASPI, f. 1, op. 33, d. 1690, l. 11 and d. 
1722, l. 81 
.   
Unfortunately, both of the above tables only give data on overall expulsions from the 
Komsomol and there were naturally a variety of grounds on which one could be 
ejected.  However, Kuzovkin’s work on the regime’s struggle against dissent within 
the Komsomol and figures that clearly show a surge of expulsions across three 
separate union republics in 1956 make it safe to conclude that the authorities were 
indeed purging the Komsomol of dissenting voices around this time, even though they 
were not being jailed. 
 
The application of punitive measures against critics was soon about to be expanded 
significantly as the regime moved from a default position of jailing only the most 
strident and subversive critics to launching a wave of political arrests and sentences 
that sought to re-impose discipline throughout wider society.  With its mass power-
bases of the Party and Komsomol already in the process of returning to outward 
compliance by the end of 1956, the regime next turned its attention to the ordinary 
citizenry. 
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2.3 THE DECEMBER LETTER 
 
 
By November 1956 a meeting of the Central Committee Presidium saw the leadership 
taking an increasingly aggressive tone toward ‘unhealthy elements’ in the student 
body and elsewhere.  The series of letters sent out to Party organisations by the 
Central Committee appears to have stemmed the tide of misjudged criticism within 
the CPSU and Komsomol, yet a considerable volume of dissent remained in wider 
society.  Restoring discipline among the Communist Party and its youth wing was 
clearly not going to be enough to safeguard the regime’s stability.  At the end of 1956 
the ‘remarkable liberality’ in responses to criticism that Elena Papovyan referred to 
was replaced by a major clampdown on dissent. 
 
On 10 November, Pravda published a speech that Khrushchev had delivered to a 
meeting of young people in which he explicitly linked the rebellious mood of students 
with the developing events in Hungary: a theme that was soon to become central to 
the policing of dissent.57  With a major uprising in Berlin only three years previously, 
and disturbances in Poland running concurrent with those in Hungary, the Eastern 
Bloc was enduring arguably its most tumultuous period prior to the 1980s.  Stalin’s 
‘buffer zone’ against the West was beginning to look like a major source of political 
instability.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
57 See Kuzovkin, ‘Partiino-Komsomol’skie presledovaniya’ in Eremina and Zhemkova eds,  Korni 
travy, pp. 88-126. 
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2.3.1 FEARS OVER HUNGARY 
 
Mark Kramer has argued that, already well aware of political ferment within the 
USSR, the regime feared that events in Hungary could spill over into neighbouring 
countries and ultimately into the Soviet Union, potentially unravelling the entire 
socialist bloc if they did so.58  The authorities’ judgement in this instance was 
probably sound.  Obviously one cannot say for sure that the entire region would have 
descended into chaos if matters in Hungary had not been taken in hand by the Soviet 
leadership, yet when one considers the way that events in one East European satellite 
impacted on the next as the system rapidly began to collapse at the end of the 1980s it 
gives some support to the regime’s assessment of events. 
 
Khrushchev’s son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei, even suggested that social unrest within 
the USSR itself had been one of the main catalysts for the decision to send Soviet 
armed forces to suppress the Hungarian rising.59  If the Soviet leadership had intended 
their response to events in Hungary to demonstrate that protest and criticism would 
not be tolerated in the USSR, the plan clearly backfired because it stoked even more 
unrest at home.  However, this was not the case everywhere.  Stefani Sonntag, for 
example, has argued that the impact of the Soviet invasion of Hungary played a role 
in bringing an end to ongoing disturbances in Poland in late 1956.60      
 
Adzhubei’s assertion would clearly have major ramifications for the extent to which 
we can consider the Soviet leadership to have been concerned about the level of 
                                                 
58 M. Kramer, ‘The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New 
Findings’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 33, No. 2, April 1998, p. 192. 
59 A. Adzhubei, Te desyat’ let, Moskva: Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1989, p. 97. 
60 S. Sontag, ‘Poland’ in D. Pollack and J. Wielgohs eds, Dissent and Opposition in Communist 
Eastern Europe: Origins of Civil Society and Democratic Transition, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004, p. 6. 
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protest and criticism around the country, yet there seems to be little evidence to 
support this rather bold claim.  His status as an insider in the Khrushchev family by no 
means indicates that Adzhubei would have been privy to such information.  On the 
contrary, Sergei Khrushchev insisted that his father rarely ever spoke about such 
matters at home.61  Memoirs and documents produced by other members of the 
political elite have also failed to offer any support for Adzhubei’s claim.   
 
In his memoir of the era, which he spent working among the Soviet political elite, 
Fedor Burlatsky suggested that Khrushchev had developed a ‘Hungary complex’ after 
seeing the rapidity at which matters had spun entirely out of the authorities’ control 
there.62  Party functionaries too, were apparently in a state of some agitation and panic 
around this time according to Zubkova.63  Indeed, it would be particularly surprising 
if there had not been a great deal of concern at the way events were unfolding in 
Hungary as communists and members of the Hungarian security services were being 
attacked and even killed in the streets by protesters.     
 
It should also be noted that Mikhail Suslov, already shown to be an energetic 
opponent of dissent, had been one of Khrushchev’s emissaries in Budapest and had 
apparently been horrified by the chaos and anti-communist sentiment that he had 
witnessed there.64  KGB chief Ivan Serov too had been dispatched to Budapest for a 
time during the rising.  Key elements of the Soviet leadership, therefore, had tangible 
                                                 
61 Interview with Sergei Khrushchev, Rhode Island, December 2006. 
62 See Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring, p. 85. 
63 Zubkova, Obshchestvo i reformy, p. 153. 
64 V. Sebestyen, Twelve Days: Revolution 1956, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006, p. 121.  
Although not an important figure in the struggle against dissent during the Khrushchev years it is also 
particularly noteworthy that Yuri Andropov, the future KGB chairman of the Brezhnev era, was the 
Soviet ambassador in Hungary at that time and had in fact resurrected what was a seemingly ailing 
career by his handling of the uprising there. 
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experience of a regime on the edge of collapse.  As subsequent developments were to 
show, there may have been division within the leadership on a number of issues, and 
particularly on the subject of whether to send troops into Hungary, but in the autumn 
of 1956 there was undoubtedly a growing consensus among the leadership that dissent 
had to be reined in at home.65 
 
The Soviet Union had been able to maintain its Hungarian satellite regime by force of 
arms, but no power would be able to prop up the Soviet regime if a similar situation 
were to arise inside the USSR: a fact that the leadership must have been painfully 
aware of.  As the superpower rivalry heated up, the Soviet regime could not be seen to 
be in trouble.  As Fursenko and Naftali have pointed out, ‘The Hungarian effect could 
also be seen in the Kremlin’s hardening attitude toward political dissent at home’.66 
 
The form that this ‘hardening’ took was a campaign of legal repression against 
dissenters, initiated by a secret Central Committee letter that was sent out to all Party 
organisations on 19 December 1956, entitled ‘On the strengthening of the political 
work of Party organisations in the masses and the suppression of attacks by anti-
Soviet enemy elements’.67  As the KGB’s own internal history textbook, written in 
1977, stated: ‘the December letter began a merciless (besposhadnyi) campaign against 
anti-Soviet elements’.68  The veteran sociologist and historian Boris Firsov has even 
argued that the December letter was one of the key moments in the entire history of 
                                                 
65 Khrushchev vacillated for some time over the matter before eventually acceding to the exhortations 
of Suslov and Serov, among others, and agreeing to sanction the use of force.  The most strident 
opponent of this move was Khrushchev’s long-time ally, Anastas Mikoyan. 
66 A. Fursenko and T. Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Story of an American Adversary, New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2006, p. 141. 
67 RGANI, f. 89, op. 6, d. 2, ll. 1-15. 
68 V. Chebrikov et al.  Istoriya sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti: uchebnik, Moskva: 
Vysshaya krasnoznamenskaya shkola komiteta gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti pri sovete ministerov 
SSSR, 1977, p. 527. 
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the Soviet regime.69  This may be a slight exaggeration but in regard to the 
Khrushchev era it is undoubtedly true. 
 
2.3.2 FORMULATING THE LETTER 
 
The records of the Central Committee Presidium session held on 6 December show 
that the subject of dissent was formally included on its agenda, the aim of which was 
to produce a draft letter to be sent out to all Party organisations, KGB branches and 
regional Procurators.70  The list of those present at the session was as follows: 
Khrushchev, Nikolai Bulganin, Lazar Kaganovich, Georgy Malenkov, Anastas 
Mikoyan, Vyacheslav Molotov, Kliment Voroshilov, Maksim Saburov, Mikhail 
Pervukhin and Georgy Zhukov.  These were, of course, all men who had risen to 
positions of power under Stalin but that should not, in itself, be taken as a direct cause 
behind the conservative turn that was about to follow in regard to social control.  It 
should also be remembered that, by virtue of their occupying high positions in the 
Stalin years, these were figures who had first-hand knowledge of the problems that 
unrestrained Stalinism had bequeathed the country and who had moved quickly to 
bring the situation back under control after his death.71   
 
The principal question to be addressed was ‘What should be done with anti-Soviets 
(antisovetchiki)?’ The minutes of the session show that Malenkov proposed the 
strengthening of Party discipline, Molotov spoke of the need to improve propaganda 
and overcome shortages, Mikoyan emphasised that the views of the Party must be 
more clearly presented to the people and Khrushchev proposed increased monitoring 
                                                 
69 B. Firsov, Raznomyslie v SSSR 1940-1960 gody: Istoriya, teoriya i praktika, Sankt Peterburg: 
Izdatel’stvo Evropeiskogo universiteta v Sankt Peterburge, 2008, p. 261. 
70 GARF, f. 3, op. 12, d. 1006, l. 54.    
71 See Gorlizki and Khlevnyuk, Cold Peace.   
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of potentially hostile elements that had recently been released from the camps, 
particularly Trotskyites.72  The threat of rising unrest at home was a subject on which 
it appears that there was minimal disagreement within an otherwise divided 
leadership: Derek Watson described the session in question as having been 
‘surprisingly united’.73    
 
From his vacillating over employing the use of force in response to events in 
Hungary, and later at Novocherkassk, as well as his undoubted bravery in taking the 
lead on exposing Stalin’s crimes, we can be reasonably certain that Khrushchev was 
not by nature a leader inclined to large scale repression.  Nonetheless, despite his 
reputation as something of a risk-taker on the international stage, Khrushchev 
consistently came down on the side of the hardliners when the question of domestic 
stability arose.  It therefore seems reasonable to speculate that he could have been 
persuaded into giving his approval by conservative figures within the leadership such 
as Suslov and Serov, the latter of whom was cited by Mikoyan as being someone able 
to manipulate Khrushchev to his own ends.74   
 
It is not a new hypothesis to say that Khrushchev was an inconsistent promoter of 
liberalisation yet it is a theme that is starkly presented here.  His specific reference to 
Trotskyites – who were never a genuine feature in dissenting behaviour at this time or 
later – perhaps indicated that he too struggled to see beyond the impact of his 
formative experiences during the Stalin period.  As we will see again in the summer 
of 1962, when faced with what was considered a potentially destabilising situation, 
                                                 
72 GARF, f. 3, op. 12, d. 1006, ll. 1-54. 
73 D. Watson, Molotov: A Biography, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 259. 
74 See A. Mikoyan, Tak bylo: Razmyshleniya o minuvshem. Moskva: Vagrius, 1999.  
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the Khrushchev regime was still ultimately liable to revert to large-scale repression 
and violence in order to force the desired outcome. 
 
The results of the 6 December session were passed down to a Central Committee 
commission for editing before being transformed into a confidential Party letter. The 
redrafting commission was headed by Leonid Brezhnev and included among others 
Georgy Malenkov, Averkii Aristov, Nikolai Belyaev, Ivan Serov and Roman 
Rudenko.75  The commission met on 14 December to ‘exchange opinions’ on the 
results of the Presidium session and to draft the letter that was to be sent out to all 
Party organisations.76   
 
It is immediately noteworthy to point out that the combined make up of the two 
bodies that were principally involved in the production of this letter (firstly the 
Central Committee Presidium and then the drafting commission) effectively spanned 
three successive administrations (those of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev), and this 
was perhaps one of the main reasons why it is possible to see such strong links with 
both the past and the future in the regime’s responses to dissent during the 
Khrushchev period. 
 
2.3.3 THE FINAL TEXT 
 
The drafting was completed by 14 December and sent to the Presidium for final 
approval.  The tone of the letter was actually softened slightly in redrafting – 
                                                 
75 RGANI, f. 89, op. 6, d. 1, ll. 1-15.  At the time of the redrafting these men occupied positions of 
Central Committee Secretary, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, two Central Committee 
secretaries and the heads of the KGB and Procuracy respectively.    
76 RGANI, f. 3, op.14, d. 83, ll. 1-2. 
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specifically, a clause was added insisting that punishment should not be aimed at 
people who were ‘mistaken’ rather than truly anti-Soviet – before the letter was 
dispatched to all Party organisations five days later.  In its very earliest lines the letter 
asserted that the ‘present harmful atmosphere’ in the USSR was a product of events 
taking place elsewhere, particularly in Hungary, where the imperialist powers had 
increased their efforts to undermine the socialist camp.  The ultimate goal of the West, 
according to the letter, was the restoration of capitalism across Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union: a sufficiently apocalyptic threat that would justify the new direction.77 
 
The letter went on to upbraid local Party organisations for allowing instances of 
criticism to go without a decisive and timely response and stated that bourgeois 
elements were attempting to ‘hijack’ the struggle with the Cult of Personality for their 
own ends.  The real crux of the document could be found in statements such as ‘each 
and every communist must play their part in fighting for the Party line and defending 
its interests’ and ‘in the struggle against anti-Soviet elements we must be strong and 
unrelenting’.78   
 
It is not hard to see why the KGB interpreted this as signalling a ‘merciless’ struggle 
against dissenters, but such remarks were actually tempered somewhat in the letter.  
For example, only a few lines below the comment about being ‘strong and 
unrelenting’ toward anti-Soviet elements, a cautionary note was included that said ‘we 
have to work on people who are being influenced by foreign propaganda, they should 
not be automatically considered enemy elements’.79  This acceptance that dissenters 
were not necessarily enemies but could simply be mistaken or naïve was a major 
                                                 
77 RGANI, f. 89, op. 6, d. 2, ll. 1-5. 
78 RGANI, f. 89, op. 6, d. 2, l. 12. 
79 RGANI, f. 89, op. 6, d. 2, l. 12. 
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break with past doctrine but it also sent out conflicting signals to those who were 
expected to do the policing at ground level.  However, this clause went almost entirely 
unheeded over the next eighteen months.    
  
Whether or not it did so intentionally, the letter seriously misrepresented the situation 
on the ground at several vital junctures.  For example, the majority of dissenters at this 
stage were not ‘bourgeois elements’ but often strongly adhered to Marxist-Leninist 
ideological principles and were by no means ‘agents of imperialism’.  This kind of 
hyperbolic rhetoric bore little relation to the real state of affairs around the country. 
Similarly, it is shown at various points throughout the thesis that although the Soviet 
authorities were at least partly correct to see outside involvement in unrest across the 
socialist camp, they consistently overstated the problem.  The Eisenhower regime 
spoke of pursuing a policy of ‘rolling back’ communism and rumours abounded that 
the CIA had allocated millions of dollars to fund opposition groups inside the Soviet 
Union yet no evidence has ever surfaced of any groups that received such material 
assistance.80   
 
It is unclear whether the Soviet authorities truly believed in the scenario that they 
presented in the December letter.  Suslov’s biographer, Serge Petroff, has asserted that 
he firmly believed the US to be the driving force behind the Soviet regime’s domestic 
discontent, yet it remains unclear whether his colleagues felt the same way.81  Other 
sources have suggested that Khrushchev considered the Hungarian regime to be 
                                                 
80 In fact, the ethical questions that were raised by the station’s encouragement of the Hungarian rising 
proved to be especially far-reaching after it was bloodily put down.  One of the results was that Radio 
Free Europe’s sister station changed its name from Radio Liberation to Radio Liberty, thus striking a 
slightly less militant tone.        
81 S. Petroff, The Red Eminence: A Biography of Mikhail A. Suslov, New Jersey: Kingston Press, 1988, 
p. 117. 
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largely responsible for provoking the uprising on account of its ineptitude and 
brutality.82  The most important point was that, almost regardless of how the situation 
had come about, Hungary had got completely out of hand and the same could not be 
allowed to happen inside the USSR.   
 
2.4 THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST DISSENT 
 
One of the characteristic aspects of the Khrushchev years was the regime’s tendency 
to undertake widespread, but often short-lived, campaigns in order to overcome its 
problems.  The struggle to cultivate the Virgin Lands of Siberia and Kazakhstan, the 
battles against ‘social parasites’, religion and financial speculation, to name just a few, 
were all conducted in this way.  Unlike other campaigns, however, the struggle 
against dissent was conducted without media fanfare and seems to have gone largely 
unnoticed among the general population.  
 
Although the Central Committee Presidium set the tone for the forthcoming 
clampdown in the December Letter, responsibility for its implementation was placed 
squarely with regional officials.  Correctly perceiving that they had not only been 
shown the green light to take measures against critics but also that there would be 
negative consequences for themselves if they did not, local officials began to act.  As 
Boris Firsov has written: ‘…the call was heard. All the links of the Party and state 
apparatus began to move and to reply, just like in the old days’.83  The campaign that 
followed was nowhere near the scale of the Great Terror of the late 1930s yet neither 
                                                 
82 See Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, p. 140. 
83 Firsov, Raznomyslie v SSSR, p. 261. 
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did it resemble the kind of ‘thaw’ that has so often been used to characterise the 
Khrushchev years.   
 
2.4.1 CONVICTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 58-10 
 
The table below shows the number of individuals sentenced under article 58-10 
during the Khrushchev period.  The surge of convictions in 1957 and 1958 is 
particularly noticeable.  The data was provided by Viktor Chebrikov, chairman of the 
KGB between 1982 and 1988, in response to a request from Mikhail Gorbachev for 
details on repression in the post-Stalin era. 
 
Table 2.3 Annual sentences for anti-Soviet activity and propaganda, 1956-1964.84 
 
 
Year 
 
Annual sentences Proportion of all political 
sentences during the 
Khrushchev period.   % 
1956 
 
384 6.7%
1957 
 
1,964 34.3%
1958 
 
1,416 24.7%
1959 
 
750 13.1%
1960 
 
162 2.8%
1961 
 
207 3.6%
1962 
 
323 5.6%
1963 
 
341 6%
1964 
 
181 3.2%
Total 
 
5,728 100%
 
Source: Istochnik, 1995, No. 6, p. 153. 
                                                 
84 For the complete list of annual political sentences up to 1987 see appendix.  
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It is important to point out that the above figures on sentences for anti-Soviet activity 
do not only include those who engaged in political dissent but also nationalist and 
religious activity.  For the most part though, the authorities did not clampdown on any 
two of these three kinds of dissent concurrently.  Anti-religious drives were begun in 
1954 and again toward the end of 1958, while persecution against nationalist activity 
was in decline for some time prior to the Secret Speech but rose again toward the mid-
1960s.  Across the period as a whole approximately two-thirds to three quarters of 
those jailed for anti-Soviet activity and propaganda were political dissenters.  During 
the campaign that followed the December Letter, however, almost all convictions 
under article 58-10 were based upon political dissent. 
 
As Burlatsky wrote in his memoir of the era: ‘Later I learned that under Khrushchev 
many hundreds of people had suffered for so-called political crimes, that is, for 
voicing disagreement with his policies.  Brezhnev developed this practice on a 
massive scale and with even greater deceit, but it must be acknowledged that it began 
under Khrushchev’.85  In fact, the practice of imprisoning dissenters in this way not 
only began under Khrushchev but was actually more prevalent during his time as First 
Secretary – a fact that would probably come as a surprise for most people.   
 
At no other time in the entire post-Secret Speech era were a comparable number of 
citizens arrested and sentenced for dissenting activity.  Although many times lower 
than the amount sentenced for anti-Soviet activity and propaganda in the Stalin years, 
the total of 1,964 sentences for anti-Soviet activity and propaganda in 1957 alone by 
far outstripped that of any subsequent year.  It is worth noting that in the entire period 
                                                 
85  Burlatsky, Khrushchev and the First Russian Spring, p. 97. 
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of 1966 to 1980 (when the Soviet dissident movement was most active) the total 
number of ‘political sentences’ was 1,829.86  However, one must exercise some 
caution in making sweeping comparisons between the two periods by reference to this 
measure alone, as there was a general move away from large-scale custodial 
sentencing in later years (see chapter 4).  Nonetheless, the records quite clearly show 
that many more people were jailed for dissent under Khrushchev than Brezhnev, and 
over half of those were sentenced during 1957 and 1958. 
 
2.4.2 GROUNDS FOR ARREST AND CONVICTION 
 
By providing only a rudimentary outline of what constituted anti-Soviet behaviour, 
the ensuing campaign saw a considerable degree of unpredictability return to the 
Soviet repressive apparatus.  That the provincial officials charged with conducting the 
clampdown were often poorly educated and trained, and eager to appear vigilant was 
a cause of considerable inconsistency and one of the reasons why the December Letter 
spawned a full-blown campaign, according to Aleksandr and Elena Papovyan.87  The 
result was that local procurators and KGB branches frequently erred on the side of 
caution and employed article 58-10 in a wide-ranging and often wholly unsuitable 
fashion.  As a subsequent review of sentences during the period noted, there were 
many cases where citizens were jailed for private conversations or jokes and instances 
of local authorities pursuing vendettas against individuals on the basis of personal 
                                                 
86 The figures provided on the Brezhnev period included sentences under article 70 (the successor to 
article 58 – see chapter 4) as well as article 190-1 which was introduced in 1960 as a means of 
strengthening the already existing legal provisions for dealing with dissent.   
87 A. Papovyan and E. Papovyan, ‘Uchastie verkhovnogo suda SSSR v vyrabotke repressivnoi politiki, 
1957-1958’ in Eremina and Zhemkova eds, Korni Travy, p. 86. 
 135
animosities or instances of entirely acceptable criticism such as letters of complaint 
about poor housing conditions or low wages.88   
 
Most notable, however, was the sheer volume of those sentenced as a result of 
apparently isolated, and often drunken, outbursts: over fifty per cent of all sentences 
during the campaign.  Several instances have already been cited in chapter 1 where 
individuals found themselves arrested and sentenced for anti-Soviet behaviour after 
drunkenly calling members of the militia ‘fascists’ or shouting slogans such as ‘long 
live Eisenhower’.  Numerous underground groups – such as those of Pimenov and 
Krasnopevtsev – and anonymous letter writers were also arrested and jailed at this 
time yet the authorities largely failed to make a distinction between this kind of 
purposive, deliberate behaviour and angry drunken outbursts.  Those who remained 
silent were still unlikely to be embroiled in any kind of ‘trumped up’ charges, but 
there was rarely any attempt made to establish whether a person who criticised the 
authorities was actually opposed to the regime or not.  
 
The citizens of Moscow and Leningrad were hit hardest by the clampdown, with 
records showing 102 and 45 convictions in those cities respectively during 1957.  
From a total of 1,964 sentences in 1957 only 63 were women and out of 1,416 in 1958 
there were 45 women (a little over 3% of all convictions in both years) – most of 
whom were jailed on the basis of underground activity rather than spontaneous and 
drunken outbursts in 1956 and 1957.  However, although no documentation has yet 
arisen to prove the matter, this huge discrepancy between sentences against men and 
                                                 
88 GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5080, ll. 30-35. 
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women may not only reflect that females were less inclined to engage in dissent but 
also that the authorities were more reluctant to jail them for it. 
 
Females who distributed leaflets and became members of underground groups were 
almost always outnumbered by their male group-mates, with the one exception of a 
five strong all-female group uncovered in Krasnoyarsk in 1961.  This group was 
particularly active for a short while in late 1961, pasting up leaflets in many locations 
around the city under the name of The Krasnoyarsk Workers and attempting to hold 
anti-Soviet meetings with fellow Komsomol and trade union members.89  It also 
seems that in several cases they were the wives or girlfriends of the more prominent 
males within a given group and so their impetus to join possibly came from an already 
existing bond.   
 
Although the statistics held in Procurator files are incomplete, one can see that 476 of 
those convicted in 1957 were classified as having achieved ‘lower’ level education 
and almost 150 were recorded as having undergone some form of higher education.90  
Clearly, a sizeable majority of dissenters had only a few classes of formal education. 
However, the 1959 census stated that less than two per cent of the Soviet population 
had undergone higher education – indicating that the most educated people were 
actually considerably over-represented among those jailed for dissent.  This marks a 
clear distinction from the dissident activity of the Brezhnev era in which members of 
the intelligentsia famously predominated.    
                                                 
89 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 91724, Ll. 1-8. 
90 Unfortunately, the KGB appears to have been less consistent at recording political prisoners’ 
education levels. Approximately two thirds of case files for individuals sentenced under article 58-10 
give some basic data on educational achievement.  The category of ‘lower educated’ contains 
everything from illiterate up to 10 classes of schooling, ‘middle’ usually involves some kind of 
technical qualification and ‘higher’ indicates attendance at university or some other higher education 
institute. 
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It is also interesting to look briefly at the number of CPSU and Komsomol members 
jailed for dissent around this time.  For the period of 1957-1958 a total of 99 full 
CPSU members and 100 Komsomol members were jailed for acts of political dissent.  
When one looks at the kinds of dissent that they engaged in there was a strong trend 
for Party and Komsomol members to have been involved in anonymous rather than 
open activity.  Most commonly among CPSU members this meant individual acts of 
protest such as the writing of anonymous anti-Soviet letters and leaflets.  In the 
Komsomol there was a more pronounced trend toward group activity such as the 
formation of underground political parties.  This was presumably a further reflection 
of the fact that a person’s age tended to have an impact upon what kinds of dissenting 
behaviour they became involved in.   
 
It has already been established that CPSU and Komsomol members were less likely to 
be jailed as a result of dissenting activity than were ordinary members of the public, 
yet it is a point worth revisiting.  One can put forward two potential reasons for this 
trend.  The first reason would be to suggest that because these people were Party and 
Komsomol members – and therefore communists – the authorities were less likely to 
jump to the conclusion that they were genuine enemies of the Soviet regime.  A 
second explanation would be that these were people over whom the authorities had a 
wider breadth of punitive measures available.  For example, one could punish a 
dissenting CPSU member with a Party reprimand or expulsion (with all the negative 
consequences that this entailed) as well as with article 58-10.  For a non-Party 
member who engaged in dissent at this time the only major sanction available was 
imprisonment.    
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These two factors were not mutually exclusive yet the second was perhaps the more 
important.  The fact that, like CPSU and Komsomol members, students were also less 
likely to be jailed than ordinary members of society supports this argument because 
the authorities had the option to expel them from university rather than simply jailing 
them or doing nothing.  As Moshe Lewin has shown, this was a time when workers 
were in short supply and, therefore, in a strong position when it came to finding 
employment.  As such, simply having a dissenting worker fired from his or her job 
would not necessarily have been a major sanction.91    
 
In later years the authorities were less inclined to jail dissenters and instead came to 
rely heavily on what were known as ‘prophylactic measures’ – essentially a form of 
targeted intimidation intended to forestall dissenting behaviour.  This showed that 
once a viable deterrent that could be applied to all members of society had been 
established it quickly supplanted more forceful means of response.  Nonetheless, 
CPSU and Komsomol members who engaged in acts of protest and criticism remained 
less likely to be jailed than non-communist dissenters and those who were actually 
convicted of political crimes were generally dealt with less severely than others once 
in jail and seem to have fared better in appeals for release and rehabilitation.92      
 
One of the interesting aspects of the campaign was the way that it was applied across 
the entire country.  Although detailed figures are not available for the second year of 
the campaign, the following table gives an indication of how matters were played out 
in the individual union republics during 1957: 
 
                                                 
91 See Lewin, The Soviet Century, p. 172. 
92 See Kozlov and Mironenko eds, Kramola, p. 100. 
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Table 2.4  Distribution of sentences for anti-Soviet activity and propaganda by 
union republic in 1957 
 
Union Republic Total sentenced in 
1957 
% of all sentences 
in 1957 
of Soviet  
population by 
union republic %  
Russia 957 53.1% 56.4%
Ukraine 443 24.5% 20.5%
Belarus 65 3.3% 3.8%
Moldova 27 1.4% 1.3%
Latvia 43 2.3% 1%
Lithuania 68 3.6% 1.3%
Estonia 39 2.1% 0.6%
Georgia 25 1.3% 2.1%
Armenia 11 0.6% 0.9%
Azerbaidzhan 10 0.5 1.6%
Turkmenistan 22 1.1 0.7%
Kirgizstan 11 0.6 1.1
Uzbekistan 55 3.1 3.4%
Kazakhstan 44 2.3 4.3%
Tadzhikistan 4 0.2 1
Total 1,796 100% 100%
 
Source: 1958 Procurator review.  GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5080, l. 5.93  
 
                                                 
93 The data on the composition of the Soviet population (in the right-hand column) is taken from the 
1959 census. See Tsentral’noe statisticheskoe upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrove SSSR, Chislennost’, 
sostav i razmeshchenie naseleniya SSSR: kratkie itogi Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1959 goda, 
Moskva: Gosstatizdat TsSU SSSR, 1961, p. 3-8. 
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As we can see from the above data, this was undoubtedly an all-Union campaign.  
Broadly speaking, the volume of sentences in each union republic was roughly 
proportionate with its contribution to the overall Soviet population.  The fact that the 
total number of sentences provided by the Procurator’s Office does not tally with data 
provided by the KGB – cited in table 2.3 – is, unfortunately, reflective of the fact that 
Soviet statistics can be incomplete and contradictory at times.  This discrepancy may 
have stemmed from the fact that some legal records were apparently lost during the 
numerous administrative reshuffles of the Khrushchev era.94  The fact that the KGB 
figures were compiled three decades later would suggest that they may have 
incorporated information that was unavailable at the time of the original Procurator 
review and, therefore, may be the more accurate of the two.  Nonetheless, the two 
different totals provided by the Procuracy and KGB (1,964 and 1,796 respectively) 
are sufficiently close together that some faith can be placed in their general validity in 
terms of regional distribution. 
 
2.4.3 LEGAL PROCESSES 
 
The processes involved in prosecuting acts of dissent on a legal basis provides a 
useful example of the way that the different elements of the law enforcement 
apparatus functioned in tandem with one another.  More often than not where acts of 
dissent involved some kind of public manifestation, such as drunken outbursts against 
the leadership, it was the militia that were first to respond since they were the 
regime’s most numerous and most visible representatives at ground level.  The case 
would then usually be passed directly to the KGB, who theoretically had complete 
                                                 
94 See Kozlov and Mironenko eds, Kramola. 
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jurisdiction in all matters concerning political crimes, though arrests and searches had 
to be sanctioned by the Procurator of a given oblast’.   
 
Indicative of the improved legal procedures that emerged following Stalin’s death was 
the creation in 1953 of the ‘Department of Supervision of KGB Investigations’ (otdel’ 
po nadzoru za sledstviem v organakh gosbezopasnosti prokuratury SSSR) within the 
Procurator’s office.  However, although this new department theoretically had the 
authority to challenge evidence provided by the security organs and to re-classify and 
overturn cases where inconsistencies or lack of evidence were found to be present, 
there is little evidence to suggest that it did so at this time.  Subsequent years would 
show that considerable division and rivalry existed between the security organs and 
the legal establishment when the latter did begin to reclassify and overturn sentences 
that had been passed during the campaign of 1957 and 1958.     
 
Prior to the establishment in 1968 of the specialised Fifth Directorate under the 
chairmanship of Yuri Andropov, matters relating to dissent had been under the 
jurisdiction of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, that of Internal Security and 
Counter-Intelligence (again demonstrating the regime’s perception of dissent as a 
foreign-inspired phenomenon).95  This seems to have meant that there was less 
coordination of practice and specialised skills within the security organs for dealing 
with dissenters during the early Khrushchev period in particular.  
 
The security organs’ investigation techniques had changed much since the Stalin era.  
After his own arrest in 1957 Revolt Pimenov recalled that his interrogators were 
                                                 
95 See C. Andrew, The Sword and the Shield: The Secret History of the KGB, London: Basic Books, 
1999, p. 568. 
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almost unfailingly, and at times even obsequiously, polite.96  Violence and torture had 
ceased to be staples of KGB investigations yet pressure could still be applied in other 
ways, such as threats to arrest suspects’ friends and loved ones.  Stool pigeons were 
regularly placed in prisoners’ cells while they were under interrogation and deception 
in regard to co-defendants testimonies remained widespread.    
 
What one repeatedly encounters even among classified materials is a tendency to shy 
away from presenting detailed information on the ‘nuts and bolts’ of the investigation 
process.  For example, reports sent from the KGB to the Central Committee’s General 
Department tend to be studded with phrases such as ‘the KGB is utilising all its 
resources’ or ‘measures are being taken’ to investigate a specific occurrence.  Exactly 
what the use of such oblique terminology covers up is unclear yet the reasons for it 
can be easily inferred.  The condemnation of Stalin’s abuses created a situation 
whereby information directly linking any individual to repressive measures would 
naturally be avoided where possible.  The Secret Speech had established a precedent 
that could well be repeated at some stage in the future. 
 
Unfortunately, what could potentially have been the most valuable document in 
regard to the policing of dissent was destroyed on the orders of General Procurator 
Roman Rudenko.  In 1958 a putative manual had been produced, entitled ‘On 
Procurator Supervision in Cases of State Crimes’.  The manuscript had been intended 
as a general guide on how the courts and security organs ought to handle cases of anti-
Soviet activity, particularly useful in the provinces where improved legal practices 
were less well established and mistakes in investigations and legal procedures were 
                                                 
96 R. Pimenov, Vospominaniya, Moskva: Informatsionno-ekspertnaya gruppa ‘Panorama’, 1996, p. 103. 
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made more frequently.  However, on reviewing the completed document Rudenko 
ordered that all plans for its publication be abandoned and that the existing copies (38 
in total) be removed from circulation.  All but one were destroyed and the final copy 
was classified but has yet to come to light.97  Since there was clearly some need for 
this document, and no replacement was produced, one can only assume that Rudenko 
decided that it was too incautious to commit such matters to paper. 
 
Despite various improvements to the legal system, a Soviet courtroom was still not a 
place where one could expect anything resembling a fair trial.  By all accounts, judges 
did not see their task as establishing guilt or innocence but in establishing the level of 
guilt and reflecting this in their sentencing; a fact neatly demonstrated in the March 
1964 trial of Joseph Brodsky where a sign had been hung on the entrance to the 
courthouse that read ‘trial of the parasite Brodsky’.98  At any rate, no cases have yet 
come to light in which KGB evidence was dismissed in court and an individual was 
judged innocent of the accusations against them.   
 
Unfortunately, few case files contain information in regard to the duration of 
individual sentences passed down upon conviction for anti-Soviet activity and 
propaganda.  However, it is possible to find some basic details on the subject:   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 Kozlov and Mironenko eds,  Kramola, p. 32. 
98 See Burford Jr, R.  ‘Getting the Bugs Out of Socialist Legality: The Case of Joseph Brodsky’, The 
American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 22, No. 3, Summer 1994, pp. 465-501. 
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Table 2.5 Length of sentences under article 58-10 in the period 1956-5799 
 
 
Year Up to 5 Years 6-10 Years Over 10 Years  Total 
1956 95
(41.1%)
131
(56.7%)
5 
(2.2%) 
231
(100%)
1957 930
(52%)
829
(46.4%)
29 
(1.6%) 
1,788
(100%)
 
Source: 1958 Procurator review.  GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5080, l. 7 
 
 
From the above evidence, contained in a 1958 Procurator review of anti-Soviet 
activity, it appears that the average length of sentence under article 58-10 was 
approximately five years.  Perhaps most striking is the fact that so few were sentenced 
to periods of ten years or more and, though the above table does not show this, none 
were executed as a result of dissenting behaviour.  Although the potential price to be 
paid for dissenting behaviour remained high, it was far lower than during the Stalin 
years. 
 
The fact that this campaign progressed throughout 1957 without any kind of 
interruption raises two interesting points.  Firstly, it suggests that this was not 
something that had simply been forced upon Khrushchev by the hard-line Stalinists in 
the leadership, since the most senior among them were removed after the anti-Party 
affair in June 1957, yet the campaign continued unabated for another year afterward.  
This may offer support for Carl Linden’s supposition that Khrushchev’s victory over 
                                                 
99 The document in question gives no indication as to why the percentage figures do not add up to one 
hundred. Again, this is testament to the occasional weakness of Soviet statistical data. 
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the anti-Party group had been achieved after colleagues in the leadership had made 
him agree to shelve, or at least to slow down, the process of deStalinisation.100      
 
It is also notable that all of this was ongoing before, during and after the World Youth 
Festival, which brought tens of thousands of visitors to Moscow from around the 
world.  It made good sense for the authorities to remove vocal discontents from the 
streets, leaving visitors with the impression that all was well inside the Soviet Union – 
a practice that was repeated during the 1980 Olympics.  In fact, the Youth Festival 
appears to have been something of a propaganda victory for the Soviet regime and 
helped to propagate its image as a progressive state, showing that the campaign 
proceeded largely unnoticed by those not directly affected. 
 
The lack of wide-scale press coverage accompanying the crackdown on dissent 
suggests that the campaign cannot have been intended to intimidate potentially 
rebellious elements into silence.  It was, therefore, most likely intended as a short-
term measure: a palliative against the existing unstable environment that the 
Hungarian rising had provoked.  This showed the extent to which the relationship 
between the Soviet regime and society had already come to involve the outside world 
to an ever increasing extent since Stalin’s death and also the extent to which the 
regime still, in the first instance, looked to use repression as a sticking plaster to cover 
up its problems rather than seeking a longer term solution. 
 
Although generally not its default approach to the matter, the Khrushchev regime 
clearly was willing to revert to arrests and sentences on a fairly large scale when it 
                                                 
100 C. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1990, p.  47.  
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was deemed necessary.  This increased level of repressive activity did not just reflect 
that the authorities were more attentive to dissent during 1957 and 1958 but also that 
there had been a real growth in the number of individuals who were either publicly 
attacking the regime or undertaking clandestine political activity according to 
evidence presented by the KGB and Procurator’s office.101  That there has been 
practically no mention of this campaign against dissent in Western historiography on 
the Khrushchev era is perhaps one of the reasons why many commentators have 
overstated the liberality of that time.   
 
2.5 WINDING DOWN THE CAMPAIGN 
 
The Soviet regime’s struggle with dissenters was, of course, to carry on virtually 
without pause up to the eventual collapse of the USSR and later years featured two 
more particularly important clampdowns on dissenters – one in the early 1970s and 
another toward the end of that decade.102  The campaign that had been initiated by the 
December letter lasted until around the middle of 1958.  By that time over 3,000 
individuals had been jailed for anti-Soviet activity since the letter had been circulated. 
This was a total far lower than for any eighteen month period under Stalin yet also 
much higher than any comparable period of time under Brezhnev.   
 
By the middle of 1958, the main stimulus for the crackdown on dissent – the threat of 
instability prompted by events in Hungary – had all but evaporated.  The extent to 
which the application of article 58-10 had been dependent upon the prevailing 
                                                 
101 GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5080, l. 4. 
102 The first of these two Brezhnev era clampdowns was primarily aimed at destroying the samizdat 
journal The Chronicle of Current Events. It proved to be a failure in the long-term but did prevent The 
Chronicle from appearing for well over a year.  The second campaign was most notable for the fact that 
leading members of the Moscow Helsinki Group were arrested and subsequently jailed, including Yuri 
Orlov, Aleksandr Ginzburg and Anatoly Shcharansky. 
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domestic and international programme was shown by the Soviet legal experts 
Kurlasnky and Mikhailov.  They explained that ‘in the period of the counter-
revolutionary revolt in Hungary, persons hostilely inclined toward the socialist order 
expressed approval of the revolt, who lauded the acts of the rebels and called for 
restoration of capitalist ways in the USSR were properly held responsible under 
article 58-10’ yet criticism of other areas of Party policy did not require such a harsh 
response.103  In other words, while the rising in Hungary was considered a potential 
source of domestic instability the authorities would take a hard line against dissenters 
who spoke on this theme.  At other times, when the domestic situation was more 
stable, such comments could go without a severe response.    
 
Although the causes of the campaign may have disappeared, it still required some 
kind of tangible catalyst for it to be decisively drawn to a close.  Perhaps the most 
interesting aspect of the way that the campaign was ended is the fact that the telling 
pressure was applied neither from outside of the regime nor from within the top 
political leadership.  Instead what can quite clearly be seen is that it was the  entreaties 
and advice of the Soviet legal establishment, in the form of the Procurator’s office and 
the Supreme Court in particular, that played a leading role in winding down the wave 
of arrests and sentences. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
103 V. Kurlanskii and M. Mikhailov eds, Osobo opasnye gosudarstvennye prestupleniya, Moskva: 
Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo iuridicheskoi literatury, 1963, p. 126. 
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2.5.1 THE PROCURATOR REVIEW 
 
The Supreme Court had in fact been expressing reservations about the legality of the 
campaign for some months by the summer of 1958.  According to Aleksandr and 
Elena Papovyan, pressure had already started to build for the campaign to be ended in 
1957 but, they suggested, inertia within the repressive mechanisms and KGB 
resistance had prevented any softening of policy.104  Perhaps the Party leadership had 
simply not been ready to listen to voices urging caution at that time.  One particular 
document in which doubts were raised in respect of several specific cases and calls 
were made for sentences to be reviewed was the report entitled ‘Information on the 
results of legal practice in cases of counter-revolutionary crimes’.105  Compiled in 
early 1958, and drawing upon numerous cases from 1956 and early 1957, the report 
essentially argued that too many of those who were being sentenced under article 58-
10 should not have been branded ‘anti-Soviet’ but dealt with in some more 
appropriate manner. 
 
In May 1958 this report was forwarded to the CPSU Central Committee.  The timing 
of its submission to the Central Committee suggests that the Supreme Court spravka 
(report) was the direct catalyst for a review of sentencing policy in cases of counter-
revolutionary crimes that was subsequently carried out during May and June of 1958.  
The ultimate impact of this report leads one to conclude that it had been sanctioned by 
the very highest political authorities and that, in all likelihood, its recommendations 
may well also have been pre-ordained.   
 
                                                 
104 Papovyan and Papovyan, ‘Uchastie verkhovnogo suda SSSR’ in Eremina and Zhemkova eds, Korni 
Travy, p. 68.   
105 GARF, f. 9474, op. 16c, e.kh. 648, ll. 1-73.  
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The review began by presenting detailed figures on the numbers and social 
composition of those who had been sentenced during the campaign.  It went on to cite 
numerous individual cases of citizens arrested and jailed for anti-Soviet agitation and 
propaganda since Stalin’s death, and particularly since the December letter.  It pointed 
to the uprising in Hungary and the unmasking of Stalin as the two main catalysts for 
raised levels of dissenting activity and stated that the increased number of convictions 
showed that the KGB and Procuracy had been effective and vigilant in following the 
new guidelines set out in December 1956.106 
 
However, after the ‘sugar coating’ that was traditional at the beginning of such 
reports, it then painted a more complete picture.  In its concluding remarks the review 
stated ‘the (security) organs are essentially conducting the struggle well but are 
sometimes apprehending people who are not truly anti-Soviet’, before proceeding to 
assert that ‘…complaints about individual shortages or problems are not anti-Soviet.  
This can entail gossip about leaders, jokes of a political character, complaints about 
agriculture – all of which can be without counter-revolutionary meaning’.107  It then 
referred back to the statement in the December letter that had urged caution in 
sentencing as anti-Soviet those who were simply mistaken in their views, naïve or 
materially unhappy.  The closing lines of the review proved to be the most significant 
of all: ‘Mistakes are being made in cases of counter-revolutionary crimes.  The courts 
require a clarification from the Plenum of the Supreme Court as regards what does 
and does not constitute anti-Soviet behaviour’.108 
 
 
                                                 
106 GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5080, l. 17. 
107 GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5080, l. 42. 
108 GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5080, l. 43. 
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2.5.2 THE SUPREME COURT 
 
The Supreme Court resolution duly arrived on 13 June 1958.  Its overall message can 
be summed up by the following line: ‘for an act to be considered anti-Soviet it has to 
be consciously aimed at harming the Soviet state’.  It then went on to recommend that 
those who drunkenly curse the authorities or act primarily out of material discontent 
should not necessarily (italics added) be charged under article 58-10 and that courts 
and investigators should look at individuals’ biographies, including their work and 
war record, social status and age, in order to help distinguish between anti-Soviet 
activity and a ‘faulty attitude toward certain events or policies’.109  At the end of 1958 
these recommendations were included in a new set of basic legal principles for 
dealing with what were now termed ‘crimes against the state’ rather than ‘counter-
revolutionary crimes’ (see chapter 4).   
 
This was a crucial step in the creation of a more sophisticated and effective corpus of 
policy against dissent.  It marked the point where the regime’s ‘fire fighting’ approach 
to policing dissent began to be replaced with a more sophisticated and less outwardly 
repressive approach.  It showed that by the end of the 1950s the authorities themselves 
had implicitly begun to distinguish between conscious acts of dissent such as those 
often carried out by members of the intelligentsia and the spontaneous expressions of 
frustration and anger that tended to feature more among workers, and subsequently to 
tailor their response accordingly.  Roughly speaking, the regime had come to see that 
even when reflected in political language, material dissatisfaction was inherently less 
dangerous than political dissatisfaction provided that it was kept at manageable levels. 
                                                 
109 GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5080, l. 64. 
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There was some considerable wisdom in making this distinction between the kinds of 
spontaneous worker dissent and the more persistent and pre-planned dissent that 
reflected some degree of genuine discontent at the contemporary political situation.  
However, it is also true that much of the pre-planned and more deeply politicised 
dissenting behaviour that took place around this time was still not ‘consciously aimed 
at harming the Soviet state’ or genuinely opposed to the regime either – something 
that the authorities completely overlooked. 
 
What this new distinction signalled was that the political authorities were beginning to 
gain a more nuanced understanding of dissent.  As chapter 4 of the thesis shows, this 
was to prove an important and effective shift in the direction of policy against dissent.  
Nonetheless, to suggest that this represented proof of the Soviet regime embracing the 
rule of law would be a step too far.  More effort was put into creating a façade of 
legality yet, in actual fact, the regime continued to enjoy a virtually free hand in the 
way that it responded to its critics.  As soon as the authorities perceived a threat to 
domestic stability, all other considerations – such as legal processes and international 
public opinion – could still be brushed aside.   
      
A wider point arising from the way that the campaign was brought to a close is that of 
the role played by the Soviet legal establishment.  This was not the first or last time 
that the Supreme Court and Procurator’s office were able to have a restraining effect 
on Party policy.  As Harold Berman pointed out in regard of the parasitism laws that 
Khrushchev attempted to force through, Soviet jurists were able to exert a degree of 
pressure on the leadership preventing a return to the arbitrariness and mass illegality 
of Stalinism – something that was also the case here in regard to the persecution of 
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dissenters.110  Yoram Gorlizki has shown that justice officials also resisted 
Khrushchev’s attempts to give Comrades’ Courts the power to exile citizens for up to 
five years and Moshe Lewin has stated that Soviet jurists took the lead in pushing for 
greater liberalisation of criminal justice during the 1970s.111  This is not to suggest 
that one should consider the legal establishment to have been somehow ‘liberal’ but 
instead one should see it as an attempt to become more ‘professional’ and a little more 
independent of the political authorities.  This was a development that also seems to 
have been taking place among scientists at the time (see chapter 3).   
 
The reality is that the legal establishment was able to have a restraining influence such 
as this only when the leadership allowed them to do so, meaning that any gains in this 
area could always be reversed at a stroke.  In support of this argument Leonard 
Schapiro cited a remark that was apparently made by a Soviet Deputy Procurator 
General to a visiting American professor of law: ‘…if it becomes necessary we will 
restore the old methods.  But I think it will not be necessary’.112  Naturally one must 
place a question mark over the validity of such anecdotal evidence, especially as it 
seems doubtful that a senior member of the Soviet legal establishment would have 
spoken so candidly with a visiting American.  Ultimately though, whether these words 
were actually uttered by the Deputy Procurator or not, this was the position that had 
been adopted. 
 
                                                 
110 See H. Berman, ‘The Struggle of Soviet Jurists’, Slavic Review, Vol. 22, No. 1, June 1963, pp. 314-
320.  
111 See Y. Gorlizki, ‘Delegalization in Russia: Soviet Comrades’ Courts in Retrospect’, American 
Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 46, No. 3, Summer 1998, pp. 403-425 and Lewin, The Soviet 
Century, p. 171.   
112 Schapiro, The Communist Party, p. 611. 
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2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This was clearly a period in which the regime struggled to find the most effective way 
of getting to grips with dissent: a fact that is reflected in the characteristic policy 
zigzags.  Rather than implementing a pre-planned series of measures to forestall 
protest and criticism, the regime was often occupied with reacting to events that had 
already happened.  This generally entailed reliance upon more traditional Stalin-era 
responses such as sentencing critics to labour camps and prisons.  Although members 
of the leadership were rarely involved in responding to individual acts of dissent, it 
was the Central Committee Presidium that set the overall tone for the way that society 
was policed.       
 
The assumptions and attitudes on which policy against dissent was based were rarely 
entirely unrealistic yet they were frequently exaggerated or unsophisticated.  What 
this meant was that the authorities’ perception of the danger presented by dissenting 
activity was occasionally overestimated and thus led to an unnecessarily severe 
response to acts that actually belied little or no genuine oppositional sentiment or 
intent.  In turn this served to increase the alienation of some dissenters and in the long 
term force them from a mildly critical position to one approaching outright 
condemnation of the regime.   
 
Even though the regime could not be described as pursuing a coherent and 
sophisticated plan, their attempts to combat dissenting behaviour were not without 
success.  Open dissent within the Party and Komsomol was quickly reined in within 
less than a year after the Secret Speech.  The student body too seems to have become 
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a far less notable source of criticism and protest once the regime began to take 
measures to neutralise ‘unhealthy elements’ in its midst.  There were also failures, 
however.  Although CPSU and Komsomol members had largely ceased to engage in 
public criticism, and remained outwardly obedient for decades after, they did continue 
to participate in underground groups and sent anonymous letters.  Eliminating public 
acts of dissent did not equate to eliminating all dissent and in fact the first half of the 
1960s saw underground activity flourish.    
 
The general characterisation of the Khrushchev period as one of relative liberality is 
called into question by the evidence presented in this chapter.  The fact that well over 
a thousand people were jailed for anti-Soviet activity and propaganda on the basis of 
isolated drunken clashes with the militia or for telling jokes about political figures 
clearly demonstrates that a strong vein of authoritarianism remained.  The key 
difference with the Stalin era was not that the scope of acceptable criticism had been 
expanded significantly but that the regime had reduced the severity of what it 
considered to be an appropriate response to acts of criticism and protest.   
 
In regard to the way that dissent was policed in later years, it was the winding down 
of the 1957-1958 campaign that was most significant.  The insistence that acts of 
protest and criticism had to show genuine intent to undermine or weaken the Soviet 
regime for them to be regarded as ‘anti-Soviet’ became a keystone of the authorities’ 
responses to critics.  Many of the lessons that were learned, however, showed how not 
to react to dissent.  Reliance upon local Party organisations to respond to critical 
remarks without providing detailed guidelines prompted inconsistency.  Later years 
witnessed a degree of centralisation in this sphere as a more methodical and 
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considered approach was employed.  By the end of the 1950s, the Soviet regime 
began to punish less but to punish better. 
 
The relationship between the state and society was undergoing major changes around 
this time as the transition away from unrestrained Stalinism continued.  This was a 
period when the authorities viewed society with more than a little trepidation, fearing 
that the stability of the regime was not entirely certain – perhaps rightly so.  One of 
the key aspects of the Khrushchev era as a whole in regard to the relationship between 
state and society was the way that the regime became more sensitive to public moods.  
Although more noticeable in the later part of the Khrushchev era, this could already 
be seen in the authorities’ panicked response to the Hungarian rising, for example.  
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CHAPTER 3 
PROTEST AND DISSENT: 1959-1964 
 
In many ways the first half of the 1960s were not fundamentally different to the late 
1950s in regard to dissenting behaviour; people still made anti-Soviet leaflets, formed 
underground groups and generally criticised the regime’s failings.  As a social 
phenomenon in which participants were almost entirely isolated from each other, one 
would not expect dissenting behaviour to evolve quickly or evenly across years, 
regions or classes.  However, when one takes a more panoramic view of the entire 
period, there were also some important developments that can be observed during the 
second half of Khrushchev’s rule. 
 
While the years following Stalin’s death could be characterised as a time of great 
political and social oscillation, for the country at large life had begun to settle down a 
little by the end of the 1950s and living standards continued to improve.  With a rising 
standard of living and higher levels of education came greater aspirations and 
increased demands were made upon the regime.  There were no political upheavals 
comparable to the XX CPSU Congress and no foreign activity as divisive as the 
Hungarian invasion yet, in a number of ways, the problem of dissent became even 
more acute for a time before the authorities were able to again reduce acts of protest 
and criticism to a minimum. 
 
With dissenting behaviour taking on a more stable form around the turn of the decade, 
the present chapter (and that which follows) has a slightly more thematic focus.  It 
addresses the most important themes and forms of protest and criticism among 
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workers and the intelligentsia, such as opposition to Khrushchev, mass disorders and 
underground activity, as separate phenomena.  Approaching the subject in this way, 
one can see that although there was still relatively little appetite for revolution, 
popular enthusiasm and respect for the regime and, to an extent also for Marxism-
Leninism, were in decline.  Social stability was becoming dependant upon material 
satisfaction and the formative stages of the Brezhnev era human rights movement 
were taking place during Khrushchev’s last years in power.       
 
The kind of misjudged criticism of the authorities that had been a feature of the post-
Secret Speech period was eradicated as the new boundaries of acceptable and 
unacceptable comment had been firmly established by the end of the 1950s.  It was 
not only the uncertainty of the post-Secret Speech period that had faded by the turn of 
the decade but also much of the atmosphere of utopianism that it had engendered.  
Many dissenters and would-be dissenters had already been jailed, removed from the 
Party and Komsomol or otherwise intimidated into silence.  Even before the end of the 
1950s it had become entirely evident that there was still practically no legitimate 
outlet for loyal political criticism.  Many acquiesced to this new reality but some grew 
ever more alienated from the regime because of it.  As such, the dissent that did 
surface increasingly took on a much sharper and more quasi-subversive tone while 
manifestations of worker protest often also became more volatile. 
 
Marxism-Leninism continued to be the dominant political philosophy among most 
dissenters but was a waning force throughout the 1960s and even a growing number 
of those who still held out hope for a more liberal form of socialism no longer 
believed it could happen under the existing regime.  Khrushchev in particular became 
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a ‘lightning rod’ for people’s dissatisfaction as the legitimacy of the incumbent Soviet 
leadership and support for its domestic activity seems to have begun a notable decline 
in the eyes of the people.113 
 
Material concerns remained the overwhelming catalyst for acts of protest among 
workers in particular.  Although still cloaked in Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, it was 
apparent that the workers were essentially demanding an acceptable standard of living 
and were, on occasion, prepared to fight to achieve it.  Importantly, they were, to a 
considerable extent, successful in forcing the authorities to address their most pressing 
concerns.  During the first half of the 1960s worker dissent flared violently before 
almost entirely tailing off by the middle of the decade.  The result was that the 
working class went on to remain outwardly passive until that same combination of 
political turbulence, general atmosphere of renewal and widespread material 
shortcomings again made themselves felt under Gorbachev years later.114 
 
Among dissenters from the intelligentsia, spiritual matters (in the non-religious sense) 
dominated over material concerns while ideological issues generally became less 
important.  Particularly in Moscow, critics of the authorities began to enter into each 
other’s orbit and to find common ground, establishing rudimentary networks of like-
minded individuals.  Underground activity went into decline and the tendency toward 
open and more legalistic forms of criticism began to develop, displaying a number of 
very clear indicators of the subsequent human rights movement of the Brezhnev years. 
                                                 
113 See for example V. Shlapentokh,  Public and Private Life of the Soviet People: Changing Values in 
Post-Stalin Russia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989 and E. Zubkova, Obshchestvo i reformy 
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labour indiscipline and drunkenness, that arguably represented a form of ‘silent resistance’.  See for 
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Although still slanted heavily in favour of the latter, the relationship between society 
and the regime became slightly less one-sided than it had been in previous years.  The 
disturbances of summer 1962, in particular, demonstrated to the authorities that 
popular dissatisfaction could have potentially cataclysmic results and had to be 
prevented as far as possible.  One can also see the extent to which the outside world 
was becoming a more important actor in the relationship between society and the 
regime as ever-greater breaches were made in the authorities’ monopoly on the 
information that reached Soviet citizens, seemingly causing cynicism and mistrust to 
grow exponentially. 
 
3.1 OPPOSITION TO KHRUSHCHEV 
 
 
Considering the general tone of present-day appraisals of Khrushchev, one might 
reasonably have expected him not to feature among the most frequent targets of 
dissenters’ criticism.  Historians in the West have generally viewed Khrushchev quite 
positively as an individual and he was, after all, the man who had exposed Stalin’s 
crimes, fostered a degree of cultural liberalisation and expended considerable effort 
on raising living standards.   
 
On the contrary, Khrushchev was singled out for a great deal of criticism and personal 
abuse from dissenters.  Like other Soviet leaders he was the subject of mocking 
nicknames, caricatures and anekdoty yet there was also an aspect to these attacks that 
was much more pointed but has rarely been raised in studies of the period.  This was 
not a phenomenon that was entirely novel to the early 1960s but it was one that 
appears to have grown noticeably in both volume and intensity since the late 1950s.  
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Looking back three and a half decades after Khrushchev’s ouster, Ludmilla 
Alexeyeva was able to state that ‘in his uneven and boorish way, Khrushchev was one 
of the greatest leaders Russia ever had’.  However, Alexeyeva also conceded that this 
degree of admiration for Khrushchev had not developed until some time after he had 
been deposed in 1964.115  As Stephen Bittner has argued: ‘from the vantage point of 
October 1964…the thaw seemed like a long sequence of missed opportunities and 
squelched reforms.  From the vantage point of 1968 and later, the thaw was a 
“magical era that ended as quickly as it has begun”’.116  Hindsight has since done 
much to exonerate Khrushchev from some of the criticism and abuse that was directed 
his way, yet the fact that a multitude of vitriolic attacks took place at the time remains 
significant. 
 
3.1.1 EARLY ATTACKS ON KHRUSHCHEV 
 
A strain of anti-Khrushchev sentiment already existed in the second half of the 1950s; 
something that can be seen in numerous case files of individuals convicted for anti-
Soviet agitation and propaganda around that time.  One example could be seen in the 
case of N.P. Ipatov of Kirovskaya oblast’ who was jailed after publicly declaring in 
February 1957 that ‘Khrushchev and Bulganin drink the people’s blood’.117  Another 
case that had proceeded through the courts a month previously saw M.K. Yusubov, a 
CPSU member from Azerbaidzhan, sentenced after sending anonymous letters to 
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Pravda in which he accused Khrushchev of ‘leading the country toward disaster’.118  
The kind of hyperbolic language and lack of constructive comment involved reflect 
that this was a theme more prevalent among workers in the first half of the era.  This 
is perhaps indicative of the fact that a degree of co-operation and even mutual reliance 
still existed between Khrushchev and the intelligentsia during the second half of the 
1950s.119 
 
Predictably, at this early stage one of the prominent trends among those who attacked 
Khrushchev specifically was opposition to the exposure of Stalin’s crimes – a theme 
that soon became apparent in the above-cited case of Yusubov, who had also declared 
that the Secret Speech had been a disaster.  However, it was by no means only 
Stalinists who attacked Khrushchev in this way.  Swingeing troop cuts in the Red 
Army, restrictions on peasants’ private plots and unpopular shake-ups of the 
bureaucracy and education system are just a few examples of ways in which different 
strata of society would have understandably felt great animosity toward Khrushchev. 
 
3.1.2 ‘BRINGING DISGRACE UPON THE COUNTRY’ 
 
One case that shows how this trend was manifested among workers can be seen in a 
series of leaflets that were distributed around Moscow by Yuri Grimm and Abdulbai 
Khasyanov in November 1963.  The pair produced 500 copies of three different 
leaflets and distributed them around Kievskii Vokzal and Bauman, Kuibyshev and 
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Pervomaiskii raiony of the capital.  The first leaflet stated, among other things, that 
‘You are nothing to Nikita, just as you were nothing to Stalin’ and asked ‘is it not 
time for Khrushchev to claim his pension before he converts to a god?’120  The second 
leaflet included statements such as ‘Are you a patriot for your homeland? If yes then 
you cannot calmly relate to the disaster that our leaders are taking us to’ and ‘for 
almost half a century of this regime we have strained with titanic labour and yet we 
still live worse than other peoples’.121  The third and final leaflet is reproduced in its 
entirety below: 
 
Comrades! 
In the name of a happy life for the Soviet people, 
in the name of a bright future for our children, 
in the name of saving our country from the disgrace 
that the windbag Khrushchev has brought us to, 
demand that the Supreme Soviet quickly removes him 
from all of his positions, together with all his toadies 
and names them enemies of the people. 
Wake up comrades! 
Don’t wait for a change, make it happen!122 
 
It is eminently clear that in this instance, and in many others like it, it was Khrushchev 
and the ruling clique rather than the overall Soviet regime that drew people’s anger.  
The closing remark inciting readers to action is indicative of the growing militancy 
that featured among leaflets of the time, while the belief that the Supreme Soviet 
would or could remove Khrushchev and his associates from power displays a political 
naivety typical of worker dissent.  The word ‘windbag’ (boltun), like ‘maize nut’ 
(kukharuznik) and ‘joker’ (paren’), was among the most common insults directed at 
Khrushchev.  The demand that Khrushchev be declared an ‘enemy of the people’ 
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(vrag naroda), on the other hand, does not seem to have been a staple of dissenters’ 
attacks. 
 
One of the more notable remarks of the accompanying investigation protocol was that 
‘Grimm had a long-standing and unhealthy interest in the broadcasts of Voice of 
America and the BBC as well as in capitalist films and literature which had caused 
him to relate negatively to Soviet activity’.123  However, this presents something of an 
inconsistency since neither the BBC nor Voice of America were among the stations 
that tended to attack Khrushchev personally or attempted to incite Soviet citizens to 
engage in acts of protest.124  Whether the statement was true or simply something that 
Grimm had conceded in order to appease his investigators remains unclear, though it 
seems likely that the security organs would have pursued this avenue of questioning.  
It again demonstrates the extent to which the regime sought to tie acts of dissent with 
foreign powers. 
 
The notion that Khrushchev was somehow bringing disgrace upon the country or 
leading it to disaster is one that repeatedly cropped up in such attacks.  It seems that 
for many people low living standards in general and particularly agricultural failures 
lay at the heart of this apparent disgrace.  For example, leaflets scattered on a bus in 
Odessa oblast’ during September 1963 simply read: ‘Increased prices and lowered 
wages.  Agriculture is collapsing.  This is Khrushchev’s work!’125  Similarly, 
Vladimir Bukovsky recalled spending summers labouring on a collective farm in his 
youth and being woken daily by the sound of peasant women outside swearing, 
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cursing and singing vulgar songs about Khrushchev while they worked.126  
Khrushchev’s (largely unsuccessful) meddling in agricultural matters and the decision 
to buy grain from abroad for the first time in 1963, as well as restrictions that were 
imposed on peasants’ private plots, left him unpopular and lacking credibility among 
the peasantry in particular, despite a number of major improvements that his rule had 
brought for them.127 
 
In regard to the peasantry, Khrushchev was not alone in being the target of their 
animosity.  Sheila Fitzpatrick, for example, has stated that the peasants had also hated 
Stalin.128  Whether they engaged in open abuse and criticism of him to the same 
degree seems doubtful, however.  It is entirely logical to suggest that the generally 
lower levels of fear that existed within society under Khrushchev would have been an 
important factor in such relatively public displays of animosity.  It is important at this 
stage to flag up the point that evidence of peasant involvement in anti-Soviet activity 
at any point whatsoever is hard to come by in the files of the Procurator and KGB yet 
that may well say more about the relatively low level of policing that existed within 
village communities than about their attitudes toward the regime. 
 
It is worth highlighting the value of Bukovsky’s anecdotal evidence at this point.  In 
the same way that Yuri Orlov’s recollections helped to provide a much stronger 
picture of events at the Thermo-Technical Institute in 1956, so Bukovsky has 
provided information that most likely exists in no archives, memoirs or secondary 
accounts.  It helps to give some insight into the scale of opposition to Khrushchev 
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Collectivization, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 289-296. 
 165
around the country and also into the world of political attitudes among the Soviet 
peasantry – both of which are areas on which available information is particularly 
scarce.       
 
Khrushchev’s frequent and occasionally lengthy trips abroad with a huge retinue and 
the holding of vast state banquets for visiting dignitaries aroused considerable anger 
among the working class in particular.  An anonymous letter left in a Kaliningrad 
ballot box spoke of ‘communist millionaires’, stating that ‘They are stealing money, 
living in luxurious palaces and they see workers as beasts’.129  This reflected the fact 
that people were angry not just at the general contrast in living standards between the 
USSR and the West but also between the political elites and ordinary citizens and was 
indicative of the way that people were becoming more cynical and losing respect for 
the authorities. 
 
This same pattern of cynicism and declining respect can also be seen in regard to 
Khrushchev’s boasting about rising living standards, of catching up with the West and 
predicting that communism would be ‘just about built’ by the year 1980.  Alexeyeva 
cited a popular joke on this theme: ‘Is it true that Comrade Khrushchev’s health is 
declining? Yes. He is suffering from a hernia caused by lifting the level of agricultural 
production, hyperventilation caused by trying to catch up with America, and verbal 
diarrhoea caused by God knows what’.130  In many cases this cynicism took a more 
pointed form.  One response to the 1962 price rises that has been cited by Samuel 
Baron seems to have been reflective of the growing resentment: ‘If only we’d keep 
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quiet about already overtaking America.  It’s disgusting to hear our loudspeaker 
(going on) every day about we, we, we. All this endless boasting’.131   
 
3.1.3 THE KHRUSHCHEV CULT 
 
Among other themes that saw Khrushchev provoke a sense of consternation among 
some of the population was that of a burgeoning ‘Khrushchev cult’: something that 
has already been touched upon in Grimm and Khasyanov’s first leaflet that asked 
‘isn’t it time for Khrushchev to claim his pension before he converts to a god?’132  
What has since become the most famous attack on this apparently developing cult 
took place on 7 September 1961 when Petr Grigorenko (at that time a general in the 
Red Army but later to become one of the most celebrated figures in the dissident 
movement) addressed Moscow’s Lenin District Party conference.133  He talked of the 
need to struggle against careerism, bureaucracy, servility, and privilege within the 
Party but his main point lay in the question ‘Is everything being done to prevent the 
repetition of a personality cult while the personality itself is perhaps arising?’: a clear 
attack on Khrushchev himself.134  This was subsequently followed by an open letter to 
Moscow voters in which Grigorenko attacked the ‘unreasonable and often harmful 
activities of Khrushchev and his team’.135 
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One of the problems that this burgeoning cult exacerbated was that of declining faith 
in the authorities’ pronouncements.  Elena Zubkova has argued that when Khrushchev 
renewed his attack on Stalin at the XXII CPSU Congress – this time more bitterly 
than at the XX Congress and without official secrecy – it was largely greeted with 
cynicism because he was widely perceived to be building his own cult at that very 
time.136  It is true that responses to the XXII Congress were muted in terms of 
dissenting behaviour yet this was not just caused by cynicism.  After the initial attack 
on Stalin one probably could not expect the same subject to have made such a 
profound impact a second time, and neither was the uncertainty of the post XX 
Congress period replicated in October 1961.  It will also be shown in chapter 4 that 
this time the authorities had taken steps to deal with potential outbursts of open 
dissent inside the Party arising from the renewed attack on Stalin and were able to 
quickly snuff them out. 
 
Among workers and peasants in particular, where dissent often resembled something 
akin to a primal lashing out at authority, it seems to have been that in some cases 
Khrushchev became the focus of dissatisfaction on account of his being the regime’s 
figurehead and therefore the most prominent target.  Although he had proved to be a 
skilful political intriguer during the struggle to succeed Stalin, Khrushchev was not 
always adept at presenting a favourable image of himself to the public.  
 
Khrushchev not only failed to distance himself from unpopular or failing policies but 
allowed his name to be inextricably linked to them.  Where Stalin’s March 1930 
Pravda article Dizzy with Success had seen him attempting to deflect the blame for 
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‘excesses’ that had occurred during the collectivisation process – laying it at the door 
of local officials instead of national elites – Khrushchev demonstrated no comparable 
grasp of political strategy.137  The price rises of June 1962 were a prime case in point; 
Khrushchev had been advised to distance himself from the measure yet declined to do 
so and even tied his own name to the initiative more closely.138  Consequently, many 
of the manifestations of discontent that followed had a pronounced anti-Khrushchev 
tone.  This included instances of his portraits being vandalised, demonstrators using 
slogans threatening to make sausages or pies out of him and even an instance of one 
female protester at Novocherkassk being beaten by an angry mob solely on the basis 
that her surname happened to be Khrushcheva.139 
 
It is demonstrative of the bind that Khrushchev was confronted with that his decision 
to purchase grain abroad was repeatedly cited in attacks on him as a great disgrace 
and embarrassment for the Soviet state.  It was clearly a blow to national pride yet in 
previous times bad harvests had meant widespread hunger and even starvation; a 
cycle that Khrushchev broke, yet for which he was pilloried.140  Evidently, it was the 
wound that was inflicted on Soviet national pride that had the greatest impact in the 
short term but those looking back on events with a little more objectivity would 
struggle to argue that Khrushchev had done the wrong thing.  This is not necessarily a 
reflection of moral values in the present or in the West being different from those of 
the Khrushchev era USSR, but one whereby an ability to view such an undertaking in 
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a wider perspective, and with more information, than that available at the time 
facilitates a different conclusion. 
 
The way that people related to Khrushchev as the Soviet leader raises two vital points 
in regard to the way that the relationship between the state and society had changed 
following the exposure of Stalin’s crimes.  Undoubtedly no single figure could again 
arouse the same degree of public adulation that Stalin had – even though displays of 
his popularity were to a large extent stage managed, there is little doubt that he also 
commanded a degree of genuine veneration in much of the Party and society at large.   
However, the lack of reverence for Khrushchev was not only a result of cynicism 
fostered by the Secret Speech but also because of other issues such as rising education 
levels and the growing flow of critical information coming from the West.  More 
importantly, the problem was not simply that of a lack of veneration for Khrushchev 
but in some cases one of seemingly genuine detestation. After Stalin it may have been 
impossible for a leader to be so admired again but this did not necessarily mean that 
he would be despised by so many people either. 
 
3.1.4 KHRUSHCHEV’S CHARACTER 
 
One of the reasons that Khrushchev was subjected to so much criticism was that he 
was deemed in some quarters, particularly among educated citizens, to be an 
embarrassment as a statesman.  In a society that was becoming increasingly well 
educated there was considerable resentment at being represented by a leader capable 
of such boorish and impulsive behaviour.  Eduard Kuznetsov, for example, recalled 
how he had felt certain that Khrushchev’s reckless behaviour would provoke a Third 
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World War even before the Cuban Missile Crisis brought such a possibility perilously 
close to reality.141   
 
Yakov Rizoi, a CPSU member of 20 years, was jailed in 1962 after sending a series of 
anonymous letters to political figures, including one which stated that ‘we have to 
make the government turn and face the people.  Mistakes in its policies will 
undoubtedly lead us to war’.142  Kuznetsov and Rizoi did not expand upon their 
reasons for believing this to be the case yet one could confidently point to issues such 
as the increasingly hostile Sino-Soviet split, the unsettled status of the Berlin question 
and Khrushchev’s occasionally bullying behaviour toward other world leaders as 
potential sources for this war.143  
 
Ludmilla Alexeyeva recalled Khrushchev’s ‘kitchen debate’ with Richard Nixon at 
the 1959 American Exhibition as an event that had caused a deep sense of shame in 
herself and her friends at the time.144  A brief account of Khrushchev’s visit to Egypt 
gives some indication of his unsophisticated behaviour: ‘He also ate and drank like a 
peasant, downing six large sweet cakes at one sitting even after his daughter Rada had 
begged him to stop, guzzling brandy and pouring his soup into a saucer and then 
drinking it without a spoon’.145  His ‘shoe-banging’ episode at the UN, plainly 
ridiculous boasts about overtaking the US in production of meat and milk, crude 
outbursts against the intelligentsia, apparent climb-down in the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
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reputedly frequent drunkenness and unrefined manners all went a long way to 
undermining Khrushchev as a credible figure.  Again, history has since exonerated 
him on a few of these ‘charges’, particularly that of his apparent capitulation in the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. 
 
It is particularly notable that the figure of the leader and the legitimacy of the regime 
were no longer inextricably linked to the same extent that they seem to have been 
under Lenin and Stalin.  The above-cited leaflet by Grimm and Khasyanov, and many 
others like it, showed that even very bitter opposition to Khrushchev and his clique 
did not necessarily equate to rejection of the regime and the goals that it stood for – a 
distinction that some authors have suggested was rarely made under Stalin.146  Carl 
Linden broached this subject when he wrote that ‘unlike Stalin, Khrushchev was to a 
great extent judged on the success or failure of his policies’.147  There were undoubted 
successes for the regime during the period, most notably with Yuri Gagarin’s orbit of 
the earth, yet there were also some painful and embarrassing failures such as the 
diplomatic crises over Berlin and rapidly dwindling returns from the much-heralded 
Virgin Lands programme.   
 
Veniamin Iofe touched upon this last point when he wrote that ‘the late Khrushchev 
years were characterised by arbitrariness and incompetence by the higher political 
authorities in various spheres of life that provoked new political activism’.148  This 
theme of incompetence is certainly something that comes across in the anti-Soviet 
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leaflets from the period.  However, whether it actually caused a growth of active 
dissent is unclear.   
 
3.1.5 LEGITIMACY 
 
The distinction between the legitimacy of the existing leadership and of the wider 
regime could be seen in the fact that Lenin was almost never a target of dissenters’ 
criticism and many dissenters still revered him unquestioningly.  As Baron wrote of 
the events that took place when striking workers forced their way into a factory 
director’s office at Novocherkassk in June 1962: ‘they did not tear down the portraits 
of Lenin; it was Khrushchev they reviled.  Khrushchev had betrayed the ideals of the 
founder, to whom they remained steadfastly loyal.  When the next day they marched 
with portraits of Lenin and red banners, they were implicitly asserting that they and 
not the established authorities were the true legatees of the revolution’.149  In other 
words, the legitimacy of the regime as a whole was not in question among the workers 
at Novocherkassk, but the legitimacy of Khrushchev and the group around him was. 
 
Taking a slightly wider view of why the legitimacy of the regime was no longer 
inextricably bound to that of the leader, it is noteworthy to point out the diminished 
personal links to the revolutionary era of those who were now leading the Party and 
state.  Even though propaganda had subsequently inflated his role immeasurably, 
Stalin had indeed been a close associate of Lenin and been a reasonably important 
figure among pre-revolutionary Bolsheviks.  After Stalin’s death, the top leadership 
still had some ties to Lenin and to the state’s revolutionary heritage in the likes of 
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Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich and Kliment Voroshilov among others.150  
By the 1960s these ties to the past were considerably weaker, with only Mikoyan of 
the frontline leadership able to claim any real legitimacy as a figure of the 
revolutionary era.151  
 
After Khrushchev’s ouster the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War was to 
become a key totem of the regime’s legitimacy, as demonstrated by the widespread 
and grandiose memorialisation and the repeated over-inflation of Brezhnev’s own role 
in that war.  Perhaps because of its association with Stalin, this was not such a 
prominent theme of discourse under Khrushchev.  Although he had been a political 
commissar rather than a direct combatant, Khrushchev had been present for much of 
the battle of Stalingrad and for both the unsuccessful defence and eventual liberation 
of the Ukraine, yet made relatively little capital out of it.  The unceremonious firing of 
the popular war hero Marshall Georgy Zhukov from his position as Defence Minister 
in October 1957 further demonstrates the extent to which Khrushchev failed to bolster 
the regime’s prestige and legitimacy in this respect. 
 
The sense that he had somehow ‘betrayed Lenin’ is interesting because of the 
emphasis that had been placed on ‘return to Leninism’ by Khrushchev himself in the 
drive to overcome the consequences of the Cult of Personality.  From the very outset 
there had been no shortage of people, mostly among the intelligentsia, who did not 
subscribe to Khrushchev’s brand of Leninism.  However, in many such cases this 
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accusation of betraying Lenin was a charge that seems to have been largely devoid of 
any ideological basis but was instead principally driven by questions of workers’ self-
interest, such as wages or prices.  If something was seen as detrimental to the material 
interests of the workers, it was therefore un-Leninist in their eyes.  This simplistic 
interpretation of Marxism-Leninism in fact reflected the essence of the new contract 
between state and society: an acceptable standard of living was to be provided in 
exchange for outward political conformity.    
 
One must take care not to overstate the link between criticisms made by dissenters 
and the mood in society at large, yet neither were the two entirely unrelated.  
Dissenters did not necessarily represent any kind of ‘silent majority’ yet, as this thesis 
has repeatedly shown, they were drawn from a diverse range of backgrounds all 
across the USSR and were therefore not simply some kind of small and 
unrepresentative clique.  We cannot say confidently how many people complained 
and criticised Khrushchev without coming to the authorities’ attention, though the 
available evidence leads one to suspect that this was at times a fairly widespread 
trend.   
 
By the time of his ouster there seems to have been little support or even sympathy left 
for Khrushchev anywhere.  This was perhaps ultimately demonstrated by the 
complete lack of popular protest at his enforced retirement in October 1964.  
Furthermore, an August 1965 report from KGB chairman Vladimir Semichastnyi to 
the Central Committee on the subject of Khrushchev stated that since his removal 
from power, not only had the number of anti-Soviet documents circulating dropped by 
around fifty per cent compared to the same period of the previous year but also that a 
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large proportion of those that had been found since then actually expressed 
satisfaction at Khrushchev’s ouster.152 
 
That Khrushchev was unpopular among large elements of the population must have 
been well known among members of the Presidium and Central Committee at the 
time.  Reports came in from the KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs that alluded to 
this unpopularity by describing instances of dissent around the country with phrases 
such as ‘abuse of specific individuals among the leadership’ or ‘attacks on a leading 
Party and state figure’: this practically always meant Khrushchev.  Although it is, of 
course, speculation, it makes sense to suggest that knowing the extent of his 
unpopularity may have been a factor in the minds of those who plotted to overthrow 
Khrushchev in 1964 – at least to the extent that they knew such a move would be 
unlikely to arouse any significant show of popular discontentment.   
 
3.2 THE OUTSIDE WORLD 
 
In Stalin’s final years, great effort had been spent on sealing the Soviet Union off 
from the outside world, particularly from the capitalist West.153  Very few foreign 
visitors entered the USSR and cultural exchange was virtually unheard of.  The result 
was that the Soviet people were largely isolated from outside information and often 
remained naïve about the true state of the outside world and of events in the USSR 
itself – something already touched upon in chapter 1.  When the authorities’ 
monopoly on information was undermined, the massive gap that often existed 
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between state propaganda and reality was to be one of the major catalysts for 
declining faith in the regime.  As trust and faith diminished, so the regime’s 
credibility came to be ever-more bound to its ability to provide a decent standard of 
living.         
 
The opening up of the system began quickly, though hesitantly, after Stalin’s death.  
A limited amount of Western literature was published, student exchange programmes 
were enacted and foreign tourism encouraged.154  The primary importance of the 
West in regard to Soviet dissent at this time did not lie, as the authorities asserted, in 
overt attempts at subversion but in the steady erosion of faith in the regime’s 
pronouncements and activities.  As Vladimir Bukovsky recalled of the 1957 World 
Youth Festival and the 1958 American Exhibition, ‘All this talk about “putrefying 
capitalism” became ridiculous.  The importance of these events was comparable to the 
exposure of Stalin’.155  The latter part of Bukovsky’s remark may have been 
somewhat hyperbolic yet the broader message it conveyed was undoubtedly realistic.  
Official propaganda looked increasingly anachronistic when faced with evidence to 
the contrary and the credibility of the authorities duly suffered. 
 
3.2.1 LIVING STANDARDS 
 
The issue of poor living standards among the population grew more pressing as it 
became evident how far superior conditions were in the West – something that could 
be seen in media coverage attacking citizens for ‘praising life in the West’ (see 
chapter 4).  Even though the Khrushchev era had begun to bring palpable 
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improvements to the lives of Soviet citizens, the system was still found badly wanting 
in comparison.  Alexis de Tocqueville’s assertion that material grievances become 
intolerable once it is made apparent that a better situation exists elsewhere seems 
particularly apt in this regard.156  For years state propaganda had told of inhuman 
conditions endured by workers in the West, a factor that had ameliorated the many 
privations endured by the Soviet people to some extent, but by the Khrushchev era it 
was an increasingly obvious lie of major proportions. 
 
In his study on dissent in the former GDR, Jonathon Grix claimed that citizens there 
had been able to use the vastly more successful West Germany as a comparison for 
the shortcomings of their own state and that this went a long way to undermining the 
prestige of the regime in the eyes of its people.157  Although lacking in the racial and 
historical aspects of the German model, the analogy of Soviet citizens looking at the 
way that the people of the world’s only other superpower lived would most likely 
have had a similar effect. Furthermore, Soviet students and young people were 
apparently deeply agitated when they found that even students from People’s 
Democracies such as Poland and East Germany invariably had considerably better 
clothes than they did.158  Growing contact with the outside world, therefore, had a 
two-pronged impact in this respect: it showed that people had more goods elsewhere 
and that the Soviet regime had persistently deceived its people.  In the long term this 
may well have made communist ideology lose a degree of credibility among the wider 
population. 
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The theme of material shortages and hardship was subsequently seized upon and 
exacerbated by some Western radio stations broadcasting to the USSR.  Gene Sosin – 
an early Radio Liberty staff member – recalled that during the Cuban Missile Crisis 
Radio Liberty regularly ran messages such as ‘for every Soviet missile in Cuba, 
enough money, material and labour have been expended to provide shoes for 25,000 
people’.159  Already inflammatory in a country often lacking basic necessities, 
broadcasting such material in late 1962, not long after a period of tension and unrest 
sparked by price rises and low wages, would undoubtedly have had some resonance 
among those who heard it.  It may or may not be a coincidence that the Washington 
Evening Star reported in November 1963 that longshoremen in Odessa had refused to 
load butter on a boat bound for Cuba because butter had not been available to ordinary 
people in Odessa for several months.160  However, one must be particularly cautious 
about putting any great faith in US media reports on Cuba and the Soviet Union, 
especially so soon after the Missile Crisis and the Bay of Pigs fiasco.    
 
The subject of Cuba raises another interesting aspect of dissenting behaviour in the 
Khrushchev period which supports the notion of diminishing enthusiasm among the 
people for the communist project: that of criticising Soviet aid to satellite and client 
states.  One of the leaflets distributed by Grimm and Khasyanov in 1963, mentioned 
earlier in the present chapter, shared this sentiment: ‘The Soviet people tighten their 
belts every year yet they suffer and stay silent, still clapping for Nikita when 
necessary.  We work in order to feed ‘unlucky’ Negroes and ‘poor’ Germans yet the 
Soviet people have no bread’.161  The General Department’s correspondence also 
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contains several anonymous letters in which this theme was raised, including one 
addressed to Aleksandr Shelepin from Komi ASSR that attacked the domestic 
situation and ended with the line ‘The hunger here is because you and your colleagues 
are giving all of our products away’.162 
 
However, this was not a theme that was restricted solely to the Khrushchev era.  As 
mentioned in chapter 1, calls for subscriptions to aid the Republican side during the 
Spanish Civil War had also met with a highly critical response in some quarters even 
during the late 1930s.163  What one could conclude from this is that some of the 
Soviet people, and this seems to apply most specifically to workers, had long resented 
giving away the fruits of their collective labour while there were major shortages to be 
addressed at home.164  This again demonstrates that the sources of frustration which 
afflicted Soviet workers were not always unique to the period or to the Soviet system 
but could easily have been reproduced anywhere in the world.   
 
3.2.2 WESTERN RADIO BROADCASTS 
 
Western intrusion into Soviet airwaves increased throughout the Khrushchev period 
as the number of stations expanded along with the number of broadcasting hours, 
languages and signal strengths.  A report sent to Khrushchev from the Ministry of 
Culture in May 1956 showed the extent to which this was already a growing problem, 
pointing out that there were already 25,000,000 private radio sets in the USSR but by 
the end of the sixth five-year plan in 1960 this figure would have risen to around 
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70,000,000.165  Even allowing for variable factors such as signal jamming, it is 
evident that the potential audience for hostile broadcasts was becoming truly massive.  
Its monopoly on information had long been one of the Soviet state’s most effective 
weapons against criticism and political heterodoxy, Western radio broadcasting, and 
later samizdat too, badly undermined this monopoly.   
 
More than any other broadcaster, it was Radio Liberty that cropped up in investigation 
protocols and KGB reports to the Central Committee.  As a rule, its broadcasts did not 
call for listeners to rise up against the regime but emphasised the need for 
democratisation, condemned central tenets of the Soviet system such as 
collectivisation and sometimes broadcast banned novels like Dr Zhivago (occasionally 
at an intentionally slow speed so that listeners would be able to transcribe the 
broadcast and thus eventually have a copy of the book).166  There were exceptions to 
this trend of calling for outright resistance, however, such as when a speech by 
Trotsky’s widow, Natasha Sedova, that called for the overthrow of the regime was 
broadcast in 1956.167  The proliferation of broadcasts in non-Russian languages also 
made it harder for station bosses in the USA and Germany to control the content of 
such shows on account of the fact that they were frequently able to understand only 
Russian.  As such, shows aimed at non-Russian nationalities were occasionally far 
more strident in their criticisms of the regime and did call upon their audience to rise 
up.168 
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An important matter to note in regard to Radio Liberty in particular is that, in line 
with the Soviet regime’s accusations, the station actually was an integral part of US 
propaganda efforts against the Soviet regime.  Set up, supervised and covertly funded 
by the CIA, the long-term goal of the station was not so dissimilar to that which 
Soviet authorities alleged; to undermine and discredit the Soviet system in the eyes of 
its citizens.169  The name of its official parent company Amcomlib – an acronym for 
‘American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism’, and its staff of Second World 
War émigrés and Soviet national minorities clearly suggest that Radio Liberty had a 
distinctly political function. 
 
3.2.3 NTS 
 
Even more hostile than Radio Liberty was the Frankfurt-am-Main based ‘People’s 
Labour Union’ or ‘Narodno trudovyi soyuz’, known as NTS.  Although largely 
neutralised and reduced to a semi-mythical ‘bogeyman’ status by the Brezhnev years, 
the organisation was very real during the Khrushchev era and its efforts to stir unrest 
inside the Soviet Union were considerable to say the least.170  For example, a July 
1956 report to the Central Committee from KGB chairman Ivan Serov described the 
NTS strategy of sending unmanned hot-air balloons packed with anti-Soviet 
propaganda materials from bases in West Germany across Soviet and East European 
territory, reporting that in the preceding six months a total of 806 balloons had been 
found in Ukraine and Belarus, along with Russian oblasts including Moscow, 
                                                 
169 The fact that Radio Liberty was funded by the CIA was not exposed until 1971.  The link between 
the two was officially severed soon after. 
170 Numerous dissidents, including Aleksandr Ginzburg and Yuri Galanskov, were falsely accused of 
links to NTS during the Brezhnev era.  See J. Rubenstein, Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggle for Human 
Rights, Boston: Beacon Press, 1980, p. 70.  Yuri Orlov recalled that even in the late 1970s he had 
believed the group to be a fictional invention of the KGB.  Yu. Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts: Memoirs 
of a Russian Life, New York: William Morrow and Company, 1991, p. 205. 
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Yaroslavl, Ivanov, Voronezh, Chelyabinsk, Omsk and Tyumen containing over 
106,000 leaflets, brochures and newspapers in total.171  That this practice continued 
into the 1960s could be seen by figures cited in the KGB’s classified history textbook 
which stated that over 5,000 such balloons were discovered on Soviet territory during 
1961-1962, containing a total of over 1,000,000 anti-Soviet leaflets.172 
 
A KGB report of 10 June 1960 warned that NTS had been attempting to establish 
contacts among Soviet tourists visiting West Germany and trying to persuade them to 
smuggle leaflets back into the USSR and to distribute them on their return.173  NTS 
also sent agents into the Soviet Union attempting to incite unrest or otherwise attack 
the regime, though without any notable success.  There were even rumours that the 
organisation operated a mobile radio station from inside the Soviet Union, though 
Pavel Litvinov pointed out that, like many oppositional groups, NTS habitually 
promulgated entirely false rumours such as this and stated that he personally never 
saw or heard any evidence of its existence.174     
 
This does raise the point that, as with the pronouncements of the authorities on the 
subject of dissent, one must be cautious in ascribing validity to any assertions made 
by dissenters in this highly politicised and adversarial context.  In the case of NTS in 
particular, these were generally extremists bearing practically no resemblance to the 
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well-known, respectable and broadly liberal figures of the later human rights 
movement.   
NTS did have sporadic successes with its anti-Soviet radio broadcasts, however.  In 
Stavropol the medical worker (fel’dsher) M.M. Ermizin posted tens of anti-Soviet 
leaflets between 1962 and 1964 to local and national newspapers and to the Central 
Committee Presidium in the name of NTS, calling for others to produce and circulate 
anti-Soviet materials and to hold strikes and risings.175  A similar example could be 
seen in the case against I.I. Unger, I.I. Kuk and V.G. Neifel’d (all ethnic Germans) of 
Tomsk oblast’ in which the trio had recorded and transcribed a number of NTS 
broadcasts.  On 14 October 1962, an election day, they attached copies of these 
transcriptions to walls of factory buildings and stuffed them into the ballot box.  The 
leaflet discovered in a ballot box read as follows: 
 
Voice of the People 
 
NTS calls on you to join the struggle against the Khrushchev dictatorship. 
Ask yourself a question: what exactly is ‘Soviet power’? 
The radio and press say nothing about many events that are happening 
in our country. For example, the rising in Temirtau, 
the attempt on Khrushchev’s life at the Soviet-Polish border 
and the strikes at the Kirov factory in Leningrad. 
Comrades! The time has come to struggle against the existing order. 
We have great faith in the strength of the people, 
Russia is waking up and we are hearing a new sound. 
It is the future! 
Of that there can be no doubt! 
 
NTS176 
 
Although there undoubtedly was a rising at Temirtau around this time (discussed later 
in the present chapter), further research has failed to reveal evidence of either the 
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strike in Leningrad or the attempt on Khrushchev’s life at the Polish  border, raising 
the possibility that these events were also fabrications.   
 
It seems that the number of Soviet citizens who responded to the incitements of NTS 
was particularly small.  As has already been stated at several points during this thesis, 
the general desire among most of the populace does not appear to have been for 
revolution but for stability and better living standards.  Soviet patriotism remained 
strong among Russians at least, and the legitimacy of the regime remained largely 
unquestioned.  This was a fact further supported by Radio Liberty’s own research on 
its Soviet audience which found that many people either did not like or felt offended 
by anything that was deemed to be sharply hostile toward the Soviet Union.177 
 
One of the main questions arising from this is how far such broadcasts were 
essentially ‘preaching to the converted’ rather than turning previously obedient 
citizens into critics of the regime.  It seems doubtful that completely loyal Soviet 
citizens would have even listened to the more extreme anti-Soviet broadcasts such as 
those of NTS.  However, those who were wavering in their belief were likely to find 
abundant encouragement for their disenchantment, not just in extreme broadcasts but 
in those of the BBC and Radio Liberty among others.  It seems probable that most 
listeners remained passive dissenters and manifested their discontent in less tangible 
ways, such as workplace drunkenness and theft.  
 
3.2.4 COMMUNICATING WITH THE WEST 
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Among the most interesting facets of the developing relationship between dissenters 
and the West was the small but growing volume of communication flowing outward 
from the USSR.  In the second half of the 1950s communication between Soviet 
citizens and the West had been a predominantly unidirectional affair – information 
was being broadcasted into the USSR but news about Soviet society was reaching the 
West far less often.  By the early 1960s dissenters were gradually beginning to open 
up a route outwards.   
 
One of the first notable instances of this developing route to the West could be seen in 
Yuri Galanskov’s utilisation of links with foreign journalists to transmit information 
on the riots that took place in Murom and Aleksandrovsk during 1961.178  The main 
significance of sending this information to the West arguably lay in the extent to 
which it both foreshadowed and contrasted with the human rights activity of the 
Brezhnev years.  After hearing rumours of the risings in Murom and Aleksandrov, 
Viktor Khaustov, Eduard Kuznetsov and Vladimir Osipov immediately visited the 
towns in order to gather information on what had happened.  They then wrote up the 
details in leaflet form and sent them abroad through Galanskov.  This was similar to 
the kind of activity that would later characterise the information gathering practices of 
the Chronicle of Current Events.179  The contrast, which provides a useful illustration 
of the distinction between dissent under Khrushchev and under Brezhnev was that, as 
opposed to the sober and rigorously factual work of these later reports, the trio 
                                                 
178 Polikovskaya, ‘My predchuvstvie…predtecha’, p. 221. 
179 The Chronicle of Current Events was a regular samizdat journal of the Brezhnev era containing 
factual reports on the regime’s abuses of human rights around the country.  Founded in 1968, the 
Chronicle was published and distributed secretly and appeared 63 times before disappearing in 1983.  
See P. Reddaway ed, Uncensored Russia: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union, New York: 
American Heritage Press, 1972.  The website of Memorial carries a digitised back catalogue of the 
Chronicle of Current Events.  See http://www.memo.ru/history/diss/chr/index.htm.     
 186
produced a heavily romanticised and politicised account of what were to some extent 
hooligan uprisings.   
 
A growing number of Soviet citizens were arrested and jailed as a result of attempts to 
communicate with the West around this time.  As mentioned in chapter 1, in many 
cases this involved correspondence with organisations such as Radio Liberty or NTS 
whereby Soviet citizens wrote to ‘safe addresses’ that were usually located in Holland 
or West Germany. However, not all cases were entirely as they seemed.  Nina 
Barbarchuk, a doctor from Minsk, was jailed in January 1962 after writing a series of 
anonymous letters to US President John F. Kennedy during December of the previous 
year.  One letter held in Barbarchuk’s case file included a warning to the President of 
her own doubts about the Soviet regime’s desire for peace and outlined the poor living 
standards and frustrations of the Soviet people.180  As an educated citizen it seems 
doubtful that Barbarchuk could have reasonably expected her letter to reach the US 
President – care of the American embassy in Moscow – without being intercepted.  
This would suggest that Barbarchuk was perhaps using the letter to President 
Kennedy as an oblique channel of communication between herself and the Soviet 
authorities in order to make clear the extent of people’s dissatisfaction.181    
 
3.2.5 CHINESE ANTI-SOVIET AGITATION 
 
Foreign involvement in anti-Soviet activity was not restricted to the West, however.  
One of the less well-known themes of dissenting behaviour in the Khrushchev era is 
the role of Chinese anti-Soviet agitation.  The catalyst for China’s ideological 
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antagonism against the Soviet authorities was the Sino-Soviet split – a fact that could 
be seen in the extent to which Khrushchev was a prominent target of Chinese 
propaganda attacking the Soviet regime.  On 4 May 1963 KGB chairman Vladimir 
Semichastnyi reported to the Central Committee that China was ‘continuing to send 
propaganda into the Soviet Union’ and that in April 1963 alone over 5,000 Chinese 
anti-Soviet brochures had been discovered and confiscated by the KGB.182  This was 
followed on 20 May by a further communiqué that explicitly linked the Chinese 
regime to such documents.  An informer named Chzhao Pin-Khyan reported to the 
KGB that the Chinese embassy in Moscow had been preparing anti-Soviet materials 
and forcing Chinese students studying in the USSR to distribute them.  Furthermore, 
the report also claimed that regular meetings and seminars were held at the Chinese 
embassy in which Soviet domestic and foreign policy were slandered along with 
members of the leadership – most likely meaning Khrushchev.183 
 
By January 1964 the Chinese had also begun using radio to transmit their ‘schismatic 
views’ in broadcasts amounting to eight hours per day according to the KGB.184  It 
was soon discovered that the Albanian regime had been colluding with the Chinese in 
this behaviour.  A report from the Ministry for the Protection of Public Order dated 8 
January 1964 stated that over 2,000 anti-Soviet leaflets had been discovered at the site 
of the recently vacated Albanian embassy in Moscow while others had been posted to 
356 individuals and official organisations around the country including libraries, 
newspapers and embassies.185 
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 Chinese anti-Soviet agitation was not without some success, particularly in the 
Eastern provinces of the USSR where their radio signals were strongest.  In August 
1963 Komsomol members G.A. Svanidze, L.M. Kizilova and V.S. Miminoshvili were 
caught pasting up leaflets in Batumi that called for Khrushchev to be overthrown and 
declared ‘Our leader is Mao-Tse Tung!’186  In December of the same year, I.M. 
Panasetskii was sentenced for writing graffiti on walls in Chernigov oblast’ with 
slogans including ‘Long Live the KPK’ (the Chinese Communist Party) and ‘Long 
Live Mao Tse-Tung’.187 Leaflets supporting the Chinese position on various political 
questions were discovered in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in the Tatar 
and Bashkir ASSRs along with Novosibirsk and Omsk oblasti.188  Others, such as a 
former Party worker named Fedoseev and several underground groups, including one 
named the ‘Organisation of Idealistic Communists’, had attempted to establish 
contacts with representatives of the Chinese regime and offered to share ‘hostile 
materials’ with them and to otherwise agitate on their behalf according to the KGB 
report.189  What this clearly demonstrated was that the individuals in question were 
not anti-communists but were disenchanted at the prevailing ideological situation in 
the USSR.   
 
The role played by the outside world in dissenting behaviour during the Khrushchev 
period can be divided into two distinct categories.  The first can be seen as overtly 
subversive; activity promoted by the likes of NTS or the Chinese, aimed at directly 
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provoking disturbances and resistance to authority.  While this may have occasionally 
yielded some immediate results its impact was almost entirely superficial and short-
term, not least because for many people those who were attempting to incite 
resistance and disturbances were even less appealing than the existing Soviet regime.  
As such, the kinds of foreign-inspired subversive activity that the authorities feared 
most were actually rather rare.   
 
The second way that the outside world came to impact upon political dissent was by 
exposing the Soviet regime’s failures, lies and hypocrisy.  This largely resulted from 
the less overtly hostile broadcasts of stations such as the BBC, Voice of America or 
Radio Liberty and in the simple process of Soviet citizens coming into contact with 
their Western counterparts.  While this may not have provoked an impassioned and 
immediate response from dissenters, the long-term result was an ever-growing 
cynicism that left the regime ideologically holed and ensured that obedience became 
increasingly dependant upon the state’s ability to adequately fulfil basic needs such as 
employment and the provision of goods. 
 
3.3 UNDERGROUND ACTIVITY IN THE EARLY 1960s 
 
 
As stated in chapter 1, Maurice Hindus seems to have been correct in arguing that the 
Soviet underground of the late 1950s ‘hid no bombs and manufactured no guns’.190  
One could not say the same thing about the first half of the 1960s, when underground 
activity distinctly became more hostile in tone and more subversive in its aims.  
Marxist-Leninist ideology continued to predominate in this sphere yet a growing 
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number of dissenters that participated in underground activity no longer felt that the 
incumbent regime could be fixed but now had to be replaced.   
 These changing trends of clandestine activity reflected the fact that the underground 
was no longer so dominated by students and the intelligentsia.  This was partly 
because the intelligentsia began to move toward more open and legalistic forms of 
dissent in the early 1960s, and partly because underground workers’ groups started to 
appear.  The former theme is discussed later in the present chapter; the latter probably 
reflected the extent to which there was no legitimate outlet for sharp criticism as well 
as the fact that there was still a certain romanticism attached to underground activity.    
 
For the most part, these acts of dissent offered little in the way of realistic alternatives 
to the perceived failures of the existing system but instead traded in a rhetoric that was 
imbued with a sense of revolutionary romanticism which lacked any real substance.  
Many such groups can be seen as ‘playing at revolution’ and ultimately achieved 
practically nothing in the way of concrete activity, yet the growing extremism in 
terms of the language that they used and the demands that they made remains 
significant.  Ultimately, this reflected the fact that the sense of disillusionment at the 
regime seemed to be deepening among dissenters.    
 
3.3.1 GROWING DISILLUSIONMENT 
 
What had largely begun as disappointment at the authorities’ failure to live up to the 
apparent promise of liberalisation that was offered by the Secret Speech had already 
spread to antipathy toward the ruling authorities and was gradually beginning to touch 
upon the regime as a whole.  Again, it is worth emphasising that this did not mean the 
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regime had lost legitimacy in the eyes of all Soviet citizens but it does go some way 
toward explaining the cynicism and stagnation that seemingly characterised the 
Brezhnev period.   
 
One symptom of this spreading disillusionment at the political authorities was the 
growing influence of the Yugoslav dissident Milovan Djilas’ stinging critique against 
the state of the Soviet regime, The New Class (1957).191  His fundamental argument 
stated that the Soviet Union was no longer a dictatorship of the proletariat on the path 
toward communism but had become a dictatorship of the bureaucracy, permanently 
mired in self-interest.  Although The New Class was banned inside the USSR, copies 
began to appear and Djilas’ ideas soon emerged primarily among the intelligentsia but 
also among some working class dissenters.  It was for attempting to reproduce a copy 
of The New Class that Bukovsky was first jailed in 1963. 
 
A leaflet that was distributed in Donetsk, Zhitomir, Rovensk and Lugansk oblasti 
during May 1963 gives some indication of the themes and language that featured 
among underground dissent in the late Khrushchev period: 
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 ALL UNION DEMOCRATIC FRONT – 
REVOLUTIONARY SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
 
The reaction is coming. Khrushchev is reviving Stalinism. 
His plan spells disaster. 
The people are rising for the struggle 
We demand 
1. 100 roubles minimum wage. 
2. A 30 hour working week. 
3. Minimal bureaucracy and militarism 
4. Democratic freedoms. 
5. Legalisation of the VDF and RSDP.192 
6. Amnesty for political prisoners. 
The state order in our country is a bureaucratic clique 
based on the exploitation of the workers. 
Our aim is to replace this order with 
socialist democracy. 
Comrades! 
The struggle has begun. 
The strike movement is widening. 
The soldiers are refusing to fire on the people 
All to the ranks of the revolution! 
We will win! 
Down with Khrushchev’s reactionary clique! 
Long live socialist democracy! 
Long live the fourth Russian Revolution!193 
 
 
 
Over 800 copies of this particular leaflet were scattered in the streets and sent by post 
to various private individuals and political figures.  The subsequent KGB 
investigation confiscated a further 1,221 copies that had either already been 
distributed or were ready for distribution.  The interrogation revealed that the main 
culprit, V.I. Bul’binskii, had prepared the leaflets alone but had been assisted in 
handing them out by the three others, including a student named N.M. Trofimovich – 
who had already scattered 1,200 leaflets in Odessa and Rovensk – and the former 
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prisoner S.A. Babich – who had distributed over 1,000 leaflets around Zhitomir.194  
Particularly indicative of the changing times was the sheer volume of leaflets 
involved.   
 
Again and again one finds reports and interrogation protocols from the early 1960s in 
which leaflets and brochures were discovered in their hundreds or even thousands 
whereas in the 1950s a total of even twenty copies was quite rare.  For example, the 
case of Grimm and Khasyanov that has already been cited in the present chapter 
involved 500 leaflets.  In February 1963 Galina Zakharchenko and Viktor 
Khozyainov were arrested after distributing over 2,000 leaflets in Vinitsa and 
Zhitomir, in September of the same year an underground group calling itself ‘Oreol’ 
distributed around 200 leaflets in Frunze (Kirgiz SSR) and in April 1964 the so-called 
‘Democratic Union of Socialists’ distributed over 850 leaflets including statements 
such as ‘the dictatorship of the Party means freedom for communists and 
unquestioning obedience for the vast majority of people’.195    This trend of high 
print-runs of these anti-Soviet leaflets could be seen in countless other cases besides.   
                                                
 
One can see the influence of Djilas’ political philosophy in Bul’binskii’s statement 
that read: ‘the state order in our country is a bureaucratic clique based on the 
exploitation of workers’.196  That the leaflet concluded with a call for citizens to ‘join 
the ranks of the revolution’ is indicative of one of the most fundamental differences 
between the political dissent of the Khrushchev era and the human rights activity of 
the Brezhnev era.  The former most frequently relied upon the threat of domestic 
 
194 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 412, ll. 69-71. 
195 GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 95164, ll. 1-4, GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 96174, ll. 3-4 and RGANI. f. 5, 
op. 30, d. 454, l. 72. 
196 GARF, f. 8131, op. 30, d. 412, l. 67. 
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unrest as its main lever for applying pressure on the authorities while the latter 
primarily relied upon Western public opinion and diplomatic pressure.  The big 
difference was that the threat of civil unrest was for the most part a hollow one and 
was furthermore fraught with even greater danger since the safeguarding of domestic 
stability remained the authorities’ single greatest priority.  Reliance on the West was 
dangerous too, and often frustrating for dissidents, but it did offer some protection for 
those who spoke out. 
 
The importance of material concerns – already shown in Bul’binskii’s leaflet – was 
demonstrated in numerous reports sent by the KGB to the Central Committee’s 
General Department.  For example, on 30 December 1961 anti-Soviet leaflets were 
pasted up on walls in the centre of Chita with remarks including ‘Loudmouth 
Khrushchev – where is your abundance?’ and ‘Comrades! How much longer will we 
live half-starving and destitute?’.197  An anonymous letter sent to the Central 
Committee presented the situation as follows:  ‘There are five million people who are 
living under communism – they are the government and the ministers.  Ten million 
are living under socialism – these are the directors, generals, engineers and 
bureaucrats.  The other one hundred and eighty five million of us are waiting for 
socialism and do not even know what it is.’198  Again, one can clearly see the 
resentment at privileges enjoyed by the elite and criticism at Khrushchev’s boasting 
which contrasted sharply with widespread discontent at the low living standards 
endured by the bulk of the population. 
 
                                                 
197 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 378, l. 28. 
198 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 82931, l. 1. 
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Incidentally, this problem was not unique to the Soviet system.  A note sent by the 
KGB to the Central Committee in 1962 stated that the Bulgarian security organs (the 
Darzhavna Sigurnost or DS) were experiencing similar forms and themes of protest, 
reporting that 529 investigations had been initiated as a result of anonymous letters 
and leaflets that year alone, predominantly complaining about high food prices.  Like 
their Soviet counterparts, the Bulgarian security organs placed the blame for this kind 
of activity squarely on capitalist subversion.199  Whether they were simply following 
the Soviet regime’s lead in this respect is unclear but it is again worth raising the point 
that foreign powers actually were attempting to carry out subversion in the socialist 
bloc on occasion, just as members of the socialist bloc were undertaking subversive 
activity in Western Europe, Latin America, Africa and elsewhere. 
 
3.3.2 1962-1963 
 
The year 1962 saw a major resurgence of clandestine dissenting activity; a fact that 
was demonstrated by a KGB report from 25 July of that year.  It stated that in the first 
half of 1962 the security organs had recorded 7,705 different anti-Soviet leaflets and 
documents distributed by 2,522 authors – a figure twice as high as that of the same 
period in 1961.  The main centres of dissenting activity were the Ukraine, 
Azerbaidzhan, Georgia, Latvia, Stavropol, Krasnodar, Rostov, Leningrad and 
Moscow.200  According to the report, these documents were characterised by themes 
including calls for active struggle against the Soviet authorities, malicious attacks on 
individual leaders, nationalist attitudes, lack of faith in the building of communism 
and slander of Soviet democracy.  A growing number also expressed hatred of the 
                                                 
199 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 424, l.30. 
200 RGANI, f. 89, op. 51, d. 1, ll. 1-4. 
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CPSU and made terrorist threats against communists, Komsomol members and 
members of the Party aktiv.201  This kind of tone had been particularly rare in the 
second half of the 1950s. 
 
A survey of a few cases that arose in the first six months of 1963 gives some 
indication of this growing tendency toward extremism.  A group of three citizens from 
Sverdlovsk oblast’ fashioned themselves as ‘The Revolutionary Party’ and produced a 
programme of action in which they pledged to establish contact with the embassies of 
capitalist states, to acquire weapons and launch a wave of terror against the authorities 
and to carry out agitation work inside the army.  The group was uncovered and its 
participants were arrested in January 1963 while attempting to attract new 
members.202  On 13 March 1963, and then again on 31 August and 1 September, over 
100 anti-Soviet leaflets were discovered in Tashkent that had been produced by the 
‘Secret Terrorist Union’ – though there appears to be no record of group members 
being arrested.203  In June 1963 the Belarusian KGB arrested three participants of an 
underground group in Minsk, the members of which had managed to acquire several 
firearms and explosives and had produced detailed plans to blow up Minsk radio 
station number 3 and to attack a local militia station.204 
 
The above cases serve to highlight the extent to which underground activity had come 
to reflect an increasing degree of alienation from the existing regime among some 
dissenters.  It is also true, however, that even though they may have been entirely 
earnest, most groups did not get the chance to put their militant programmes into 
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203 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 429, l. 88. 
204 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 412, ll. 70-77.  As the next section of the present chapter will show, attacks 
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action.  In the case of the Petr Grigorenko’s underground group, ‘The Union of 
Struggle for the Restoration of Leninism’, Andrei Grigorenko – himself a member of 
the organisation – conceded that although the group’s leaflets spoke of uprisings and 
revolution there was never any effort made to acquire weapons or to plan any kind of 
rising.205  Underground groups seem to have been particularly isolated from the 
population, partly because of their extremism and partly because of the need for 
secrecy in order to evade the attention of the KGB.   
 
It appears that the period of 1962-63 was to be the last time that underground activity 
was such a major feature of dissenting behaviour until it later began to re-emerge 
under Gorbachev.206  This could be seen by a June 1964 KGB report stating that a 
significant reduction in the volume of anti-Soviet documents in circulation had been 
noted.  It was announced that in the first five months of 1964 a little over 3,000 
leaflets and letters had been discovered as compared to approximately 11,000 
documents found during the same period of the previous year.207  When one adds to 
this a report from Semichastnyi to the Central Committee in August 1965, which 
stated that the volume of anti-Soviet documents had dropped by over half in 
comparison with the same period of the previous year, it is possible to see a marked 
decline in progress.208 
 
One can point to numerous reasons for the decline in this form of dissenting activity.  
After the events of summer 1962 in particular, the authorities took the danger posed 
                                                 
205 Interview with Andrei Grigorenko, New York, October 2006. 
206 This re-emergence of underground dissent in the Gorbachev era was apparently a response to the 
perceived failures of the Brezhnev era dissident movement, which was effectively crushed by the early 
1980s.  See L. Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and 
Human Rights, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1987, p. 384.  
207 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 454, ll. 110-111. 
208 RGANI, f. 89, op. 5, d. 28, l. 2. 
 198
by worker dissent more seriously and accordingly took new measures to forestall it, 
such as deeper KGB penetration of workplaces and greater use of informers among 
society.  However, what seems to have been by some way the most important reason 
for the move away from underground dissent was that since a considerable volume of 
protest and criticism was prompted by material dissatisfaction it naturally declined as 
the authorities increased their efforts to provide an acceptable standard of living.   
 
3.4 MASS DISORDERS 
 
The greater social volatility of the early 1960s was not only evident in attacks on 
Khrushchev and increasingly hostile underground activity but, most famously, in the 
series of public disorders that occurred among workers, culminating in what Rudolf 
Pikhoya referred to as ‘an explosion of popular discontent at Khrushchev’s policies’ 
in the summer of 1962.209  In an article entitled ‘Uprisings that the country did not 
know about!’ the newspaper Novoe vremya listed fourteen different cities that had 
experienced significant disturbances between 1960 and 1962, including 
Novocherkassk, Aleksandrov, Murom, Nizhnyi Tagil, Temirtau, Odessa, 
Dneprodzerzhinsk, Lubna, Kuibyshev, Kemerova, Krivoi Rog, Groznyi, Donetsk and 
Yaroslavl.210  Again, the point to emphasise here is the extent to which this was a 
period of real domestic turbulence that arguably had the potential to spiral out of 
control yet has been largely overlooked in many accounts of the era.211   
                                                 
209 R. Pikhoya, Sovetskii Soyuz: Istoriya vlasti, 1945-1991, Moskva: Rossisskaya akademiya gos. 
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210 Novoe vremya, April 22, 1991.  Exactly what constituted a ‘significant disturbance’ remains unclear 
from the text of the article. 
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Khrushcheve i Brezhneve, 1953-1980gg, Novosibirsk: Sibirskii Khronograf, 1999 or in translation: V. 
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These disorders were almost exclusively made up of workers and were bore clear 
similarities to the kind of spontaneous public outbursts against the authorities for 
which so many individuals were jailed during 1957 and 1958.  The fact that acts of 
group protest could turn violent like this not only says something about the extent to 
which those involved were embittered by the present situation but also of the way that 
people have long behaved in crowds, especially when drunk and angry.  It seems quite 
clear that something had changed within society for such a proliferation of large 
public disorders to occur in what was still being labelled by some seasoned observers 
as a totalitarian system.212  Essentially, Charles Zeigler was correct to argue that the 
threshold whereby material dissatisfaction turned into violence, among workers in 
particular, had been significantly lowered.213 
 
There were a multitude of overlapping reasons for this working class volatility in the 
late Khrushchev years, such as declining fear of, and respect for the authorities, raised 
aspirations and growing public cynicism to name just a few.  What this again 
demonstrates is that with rule by terror abandoned and the relative material wealth and 
stability of the Brezhnev era not yet in place, this was very much a transitional phase 
of Soviet history.      
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 3.4.1 DISTURBANCES IN THE LATE 1950s 
 
A relatively brief survey of some large-scale disturbances during this period gives an 
indication of their tone and position in the wider scenario of dissenting behaviour.  
Although already touched upon in chapter 1, it is worth revisiting briefly the disorders 
in Tbilisi during March 1956.  Anger had begun to spread in the Georgian capital 
once the content of the Secret Speech became known and an angry mob of 
approximately 70,000 gathered around a Stalin monument in the centre of town.214  
The next day and the day after, 8 and 9 March, angry crowds again gathered in the 
centre of Tbilisi and the atmosphere turned even more volatile, with key buildings 
being stormed and occupied by demonstrators.  When soldiers tried to disperse the 
crowds on March 10 they encountered violent resistance and tanks were brought in 
with hundreds of arrests and tens of deaths soon followed.  What the events in Tbilisi 
showed was that when citizens protested en masse, it was now they, rather than the 
authorities, who were usually first to become violent.  
 
The disturbances that took place during the Virgin Lands programme of the late 1950s 
were largely provoked by ethnic tensions between settlers and the indigenous 
population, and as such were manifested in gang fights in which the authorities tended 
to come between warring factions.  This trend was also reflected in the disorders 
which took place between returning members of the deported nationalities and those 
who had since settled in the places they had been banished from.  This was most 
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extreme in Groznyi, where conflict between returning Chechens and Russians 
provoked a murder that ended in mass riots and pogroms during August 1958.215 
 
The only notably politicised uprising of the Virgin Lands campaign took place at 
Temirtau in Kazakhstan from 1-3 August 1959 when over 500 workers, 
predominantly from Belarus and the Ukraine, protested at poor living conditions by 
erecting barricades in the street, throwing rocks at members of the militia and then 
looting shops and warehouses.  A subsequent commission set up to investigate the 
event reported to the Central Committee in September 1959 that protesters had written 
graffiti on walls such as ‘anarchy is the mother of order’ along with shouting slogans 
in demand of a shorter working day, higher wages and the right to go on strike.216 
 
3.4.2 DISTURBANCES IN THE 1960s 
 
The June 1961 disorders in Murom (Vladimir oblast’) had been sparked after a 
worker died whilst held in police custody and a rumour began that he had been killed 
by the militia.217  Three days later the worker’s funeral procession descended into a 
mass riot after mourners attacked a local police station.  Kozlov has argued that 
‘…hardly any of the activists thought that, dissolved within the anonymous crowd, 
they were carrying out something more serious than their typical hooliganism’.218  It 
is true that there was an element of common hooliganism in most of the mass 
disorders of the Khrushchev period yet this does not imply that they were, therefore, 
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apolitical.  For example, the subsequent Procurator report on events in Murom stated 
that protesters did significant damage to the militia and KGB buildings; breaking 
windows, doors and furniture, severing telephone connections and stealing official 
documents and a large quantity of firearms: this was clearly not just looting for 
personal gain.219     
 
The following month, partly inspired by events in Murom, another major disturbance 
was registered in nearby Aleksandrov after a fracas, that had begun when a policeman 
arrested a pair of drunken soldiers, quickly degenerated into a riot.  Again the 
subsequent disorders were short-lived and localised but involved extensive alcohol-
fuelled hooliganism and anti-police sentiment.  With Murom and Aleksandrov being 
situated on the edge of Moscow’s ‘101 kilometre ring’ – inside which many 
‘undesirables’ were not permitted to reside – they both featured an unusually high 
proportion of released prisoners and known ‘trouble-makers’.220  One could perhaps 
speculate that the risings therefore demonstrated some kind of residual anger at the 
Soviet regime that could quickly flare into violence under the right circumstances.  
 
The pinnacle of this rising tide of social volatility was witnessed at Novocherkassk in 
June 1962.  The rising there included over 5,000 protesters and ended with 62 
individuals being convicted of anti-Soviet activity (seven of whom were sentenced to 
death) as a result of their part in the demonstrations and left an estimated 24 dead and 
100 wounded.221  KGB reports from that summer give an idea of the scale of 
discontentment all around the country, referring to angry crowds, calls for strikes or 
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demonstrations and terrorist threats occurring in cities including Riga, Kiev, Perm, 
Minsk, Krasnoyarsk, Moscow, Gor’kii, Tambov, Donetsk and Chelyabinsk among 
others.222  That the discontent around the country was linked to the 17 May 
announcement of price rises on a range of staple goods has been well established, yet 
there were also other factors.  There was a growing anger at the discrepancy between 
the living standards of officials and ordinary citizens.  Massive state banquets and 
officials’ perks were contrasted by the fact that further restrictions had recently been 
placed on peasants’ private plots.223  That acts of dissent showed an increasing 
bitterness should probably come as no surprise in light of this. 
 
3.4.3 NOVOCHERKASSK 
 
One of the most important catalysts that made the rising at Novocherkassk turn so 
extreme was a raise in the work norms at the town’s main factory.224  Nonetheless, as 
with Murom and Aleksandrov, it required a specific, local event to spark off mass 
unrest.  This local catalyst was the insensitive and inappropriate reaction to workers’ 
complaints by the factory director B.N. Kurochkin.  On hearing concerns at the 
impact of the new rises Kurochkin retorted that ‘if there isn’t enough money for meat 
and sausage let them eat pies (pirozhki) made from liver’.  This was apparently the 
‘spark that touched off the powder keg’.225  It again shows that acts of protest among 
workers in particular tended to be caused by resentment at specific individuals or 
events rather than at the Soviet system overall.  Although these actions probably 
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reflected a considerable element of pent-up frustration, it seems likely that this would 
not have crossed over into active dissent if it were not for specific local events. 
 
At around 8 am on the morning of June 1 the factory workers decided to go out on 
strike.  Within a matter of hours the military had been brought in and attempts to 
make the protesters return to work by force only served to heighten their indignation.  
The striking workers, with women and children alongside, marched from the outlying 
factory district toward the centre of town, gathering sympathisers along the way yet 
the procession remained peaceful.  
 
When it became evident that the crowd would not be met by a delegation that had 
been hurriedly flown in from Moscow (headed by Anastas Mikoyan, Frol Kozlov, 
Aleksandr Shelepin and Andrei Kirilenko), the mood turned more hostile.226  
Frustration boiled over and the more aggressive elements in the crowd forced their 
way into the town’s Party building and began to ransack and vandalise the place.  
Soon afterward a group of the demonstrators attempted to release prisoners from the 
police station (there were in fact none there by that time) and it was then that the 
armed forces began to fire into the crowd that had gathered outside the town’s gorkom 
building, killing dozens of people and wounding hundreds more.   
 
Aside from insisting that overall there had been few complaints and most people 
agreed that the price rises were a good and necessary measure, a subsequent KGB 
report of 7 June 1962 was surprisingly candid but nonetheless incomplete in its 
content.  It stated that the workers had been justifiably angry at poor levels of 
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workplace safety and some wages had decreased by up to thirty per cent and that the 
local Party committee knew about this growing discontentment but did nothing to 
tackle it.227  What it singularly failed to mention, however, was that the situation 
would most likely never had occurred were it not for the raft of price rises. 
 
With tensions high across the country in the wake of the June 1962 price rises it 
seems entirely feasible that if society at large had been aware of the rising in 
Novocherkassk and the way in which it was violently put down, it could have 
triggered an untold degree of domestic strife.  The most immediately striking 
comparison is with the events surrounding the Bloody Sunday massacre of January 
1905 (a theme that is alluded to in the title of Baron’s volume on Novocherkassk) 
which prompted months of rebellion across Russia after government forces fired into 
a crowd of petitioners outside the Winter Palace.  That the authorities also seem to 
have drawn this analogy with 1905 could be seen in the fact that great effort was 
expanded on preventing news of the events from leaking out of the city both while the 
rising was underway and for many years after.228 
 
It is worthwhile to consider how workers’ protest had come to take on such a drastic 
tone and what this said about their relationship with the authorities.  One point that 
has to be raised is that 1962 witnessed a qualitatively different kind of protest because 
of the nature of its immediate catalyst.  Unaffordable prices, like unavailable goods, 
were always likely to provoke a different calibre of response to less tangible issues 
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such as foreign policy or stalled liberalisation because, at their most extreme, they 
presented a question of survival rather than one of political principles.229  Their goals 
may not have been primarily political but to suggest, as some authors have in the past, 
that Soviet workers showed no revolutionary potential is to underestimate the danger 
that these mass disturbances posed.230 
 
The events at Novocherkassk provide further evidence of the new social contract that 
was emerging between state and society.  What had long been apparent to Stalin’s 
successors, that living standards would have to be raised appreciably if the regime 
were to survive in the long term, was brought into focus more sharply than ever 
before.  It became quite clear to the authorities that they could no longer act with 
virtual disregard for the popular mood without provoking a potentially ruinous 
response.  As the next chapter will show, disorders around the country ultimately 
forced the Soviet authorities to take the public mood into greater account before 
taking major decisions.   
 
It is also important to point out that, in so far as we know at present, there were no 
public disturbances on this kind of scale during the later part of the Stalin period or at 
any time under Brezhnev.  Here one can again point to the fact that the Khrushchev 
era was a time of transition; highly repressive policing had been discredited but the 
relative prosperity and more sophisticated social control of later years were not yet in 
place.  What the summer of 1962 showed most of all was that although ordinary 
people generally did not stand in opposition to the Soviet regime, they did demand 
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that it provided an acceptable standard of living and were liable to respond with real 
force if the circumstances presented themselves.  
 
3.5 A PRECURSOR TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
 
One of the key factors in the development of intelligentsia dissent in the late 
Khrushchev era was the lack of room for even quite mild criticism.  Educated 
professionals who were essentially loyal to the regime but continued to harbour 
reservations about specific policies were increasingly required to remain silent and 
‘toe the line’.  Most ultimately acquiesced and returned to the fold, but others did not.  
There was still no dissident movement to speak of but it was at this stage that initial 
networks were being forged and new kinds of dissenting behaviour were emerging, 
particularly in Moscow.  The names of some of those involved in various forms of 
dissenting activity at this stage constitute a veritable ‘who’s who’ of the Soviet human 
rights movement: Aleksandr Esenin-Volpin, Vladimir Bukovsky, Yuri Galanskov, 
Aleksandr Ginzburg, Petr Grigorenko and Andrei Amalrik to name just a few. 
 
Whereas previously students and other educated dissenters had shown a tendency 
toward clandestine activity, the early 1960s witnessed the start of a general move 
toward the kind of behaviour that would later characterise the more open and 
legalistic dissident activity of the Brezhnev years.  With the inexorable decline of 
faith in Marxism-Leninism that took place among disgruntled elements of the 
intelligentsia around this time, the early 1960s were effectively a period of searching 
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for new philosophies and forms of expression.  This was, according to Veniamin Iofe, 
a process that had been largely completed by the middle of the decade.231  
 
3.5.1 MAYAKOVSKY SQUARE 
 
Among the key events in intelligentsia dissent were two series of unofficial poetry 
meetings held at Mayakovsky Square in Moscow.  The first series of gatherings had 
begun in 1958 and ended in early 1960; the second began at the end of that year and 
lasted into the autumn of 1961. The initial meeting had begun as a spontaneous affair 
after the unveiling of a statue dedicated to the futurist poet Vladimir Mayakovsky in 
1958.  After officially approved speakers had given readings, enthusiastic members of 
the crowd took it upon themselves to continue the evening by giving their own 
recitals.  Having enjoyed the evening, many of the participants arranged to meet again 
a week later and soon the readings were taking place regularly.  Initially the 
authorities had looked quite benignly on these gatherings but became increasingly 
uneasy about them as time passed, often employing volunteer police (druzhiniki) to 
intimidate and apprehend participants approaching the Square.232  By the spring of 
1960 the authorities had managed to put a stop to the meetings. 
 
They were then revived in September 1960 on the initiative of Vladimir Bukovsky 
and Vladimir Osipov and again drew large crowds on Saturday and Sunday evenings.  
Over the course of the next year these poetry readings would go on to play a crucial 
role in bringing together various nonconformist elements from Moscow and 
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elsewhere.  While many who attended the readings did so as poetry lovers rather than 
dissenters, there was also a strong political undercurrent to events – a fact that is 
perhaps not surprising since Vladimir Bukovsky recalled that his main motivation for 
resurrecting the sessions was to draw together like-minded critics of the regime.233  
He was not alone in this – Apollon Shukht (one of the attendees and a close friend of 
many participants) suggested that Vladimir Osipov too had conceived of the meetings 
as something akin to the Petöfi Circle that had played such an important role in 
triggering the Hungarian rising.234 
 
Events were not just restricted to the public gatherings in the centre of Moscow.  
Participants also used to gather at friends’ apartments in the centre of the city and hold 
‘salons’ consisting of anything between ten and thirty people, where conversations 
turned far more open and critical than anything that was said during the readings at 
Mayakovsky Square.  There was no attempt to form any kind of unified group among 
the participants yet most were on friendly terms and spoke of similar notions such as 
democratisation, loss of faith in socialism and the desirability of establishing some 
form of loyal opposition to the existing regime.235  It was in these salons and 
friendship groups (kompanii) and others like them throughout the capital that many of 
the personal and philosophical bonds that later united members of the dissident 
movement were first forged. 
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As Alexeyeva wrote of her own experiences of the time: ‘kompanii were initially 
about dancing to jazz, drinking vodka and talking till dawn’.236  They later became 
arenas where samizdat was shared, philosophies were debated and lifelong friendships 
were formed.  It was also in these groups that the fusion of politics and culture 
became more pronounced and where dissenters began to co-ordinate their activity 
before ultimately becoming a relatively coherent movement around the middle of the 
decade.    
 
One of the more interesting comments from Lyudmila Polikovskaya’s collection of 
interviews with Mayakovsky Square attendees (‘My predchuvstvie…predtecha’, 
1997) was provided by Zinaida Eskina.  She stated that even when the authorities 
began to put pressure on participants by summoning them for ‘chats’ with the KGB 
and had several expelled from their universities, they were still not scared and had 
always known that they were taking a risk.237  This was very much the same kind of 
ethos that many members of the subsequent human rights movement lived by – again 
reflecting the degree of continuity between the attitudes and activities of the late 
Khrushchev period and the Brezhnev era dissident movement.  
 
One must also consider whether this was an accurate reflection not only of other 
participants’ emotions at the time but also of Eskina’s own.  Her name does not 
feature as having been an active dissenter at this period or any other, suggesting that 
attendance at the Square was perhaps her sole act of overt defiance against the regime.  
The fact that Polikovskaya’s interviews were conducted in the mid-1990s, when it 
                                                 
236 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, p. 83. 
237 Interview with Zinaida Eskina in Polikovskaya, ‘My predchuvstvie…predtecha’, p. 127.  In the same 
interview Eskina also mentioned that she recalled Joseph Brodsky coming to Moscow from Leningrad 
and hearing him read his work at one of these salons.    
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was relatively fashionable in some quarters to salute those who had struggled with the 
regime in the Soviet days, may also have facilitated a slightly romanticised recall of 
events.  It is therefore important to bear in mind that, whether she had consciously 
intended to or otherwise, Eskina may have presented a portrait of events that was 
somewhat at odds with the way things actually happened. 
 
On the other hand, assuming that Eskina’s recollection was accurate, and there is no 
overt reason to doubt this, it provides a telling snapshot of the domestic situation as it 
stood at that time.  Firstly, it is again worth flagging up the extent to which this kind 
of behaviour would have been unthinkable not just a decade earlier but even five 
years previously.  Furthermore, it not only demonstrates the extent to which fear of 
the authorities had diminished in some quarters of society but also the way in which 
culture, and literature in particular, was fusing with politics as both a theme and a 
form of intelligentsia dissent. 
 
Although the authorities had immediately begun to apply various forms of pressure on 
those who attended the meetings, it was not until October 1961 that they came to an 
end.  The reason for this halt was the arrest of two of the organisers – Vladimir 
Osipov and Eduard Kuznetsov – who had plotted an attempt on Khrushchev’s life.238  
The pair had long been at the political extreme of those who participated in the 
meetings at Mayakovsky Square, apparently leaning toward a broadly anarcho-
syndicalist philosophy, but had in fact been persuaded to call off the plot by 
Galanskov, Bukovsky and a few others shortly before the fateful day.  Nonetheless, 
                                                 
238 The plot had been drawn up by an acquaintance named Anatolii Ivanov and the assassin was to be a 
man named Vitalii Rementsov.  Both of these two were arrested and subsequently confined in 
psychiatric institutes.  
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the KGB got wind of the plot, arrested those involved and undertook a general 
crackdown across the board.239  
 
The demonstration at Pushkin Square on 5 December 1965, held in order to demand 
glasnost’ in the forthcoming trial of Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, is widely 
acknowledged as having been the first collective protest for the observance of human 
rights in the USSR, yet philosophically, and perhaps for some also physically, the 
road to Pushkin Square seems to have begun at Mayakovsky Square.  These were the 
first open and entirely peaceful meetings held in defiance of authority right in the 
centre of the capital and, moreover, featured at their core numerous individuals who 
were later to feature among the regime’s most prominent critics.240 
 
3.5.2 SAMIZDAT 
 
The meetings at Mayakovsky Square also proved to be occasions on which large 
volumes of forbidden literature regularly changed hands and were integral to the birth 
of several of the earliest samizdat journals.  Samizdat literature, generally viewed as 
the backbone of the entire dissident movement, was not only growing in volume 
during the early 1960s but was also becoming more politicised as alternative 
philosophies were gaining acceptance while Marxism-Leninism declined.  What this 
meant was a further series of breaches in the regime’s vital information blockade as 
well as the establishment of an unofficial forum for debate and discussion.  Samizdat 
was, according to Solomon Volkov, ‘one of the main reservoirs of intellectual 
                                                 
239 Polikovskaya, ‘My predchuvstvie…predtecha. 
240 See P. Litvinov, The Demonstration in Pushkin Square, London: Harvill Press, 1969; N. Kostenko, 
et al eds. Pyatoe dekabrya 1965 goda v vospominaniyakh uchastnikov soytii, materialakh samizdata, 
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opposition’ to the Soviet authorities.241  Importantly, it was very much a phenomenon 
that had distinct roots in the Khrushchev era.     
 
Aleksandr Ginzburg, often regarded as the pioneer of samizdat, had already produced 
three volumes of his anthology Syntaxis (Sintaksis) featuring uncensored work by 
Moscow and Leningrad writers (among the most notable of whom were Bulat 
Okudzhava and Joseph Brodsky) before he was arrested whilst preparing a fourth 
edition in July 1960.  Following Ginzburg’s arrest, Mayakovsky Square attendees 
Vitalii Skuratovskii and Anatolii Yakobson produced Cocktail (Kokteil’) while Yuri 
Galanskov compiled the almanac Phoenix (Feniks) and Vladimir Osipov set up 
Boomerang (Bumerang).   Prompted by the authorities’ success in putting an end to 
the meetings, Mikhail Kaplan then released two volumes of Sirens (Sirena) in the first 
half of 1962 – both were dominated by the works of people who had read out their 
work at Mayakovsky Square. 242 
 
3.5.3 THE LEGALIST APPROACH 
 
The most significant outcome of the trial of Osipov and Kuznetsov in the spring of 
1962 proved to be the growing credence of legalistic forms of dissent that were being 
espoused by Aleksandr Esenin-Volpin.  His numerous experiences of the state’s 
repressive apparatus under both Stalin and Khrushchev had convinced Volpin that the 
authorities had to be faced openly and with knowledge rather than with threats and 
arms.243  It was an argument that few had taken seriously at first. 
 
                                                 
241 Volkov, The Magic Chorus, p. 180. 
242 See V. Igrunov, ed. Antologiya samizdata: nepodtsenzurnaya literatura v SSSR 1950-1980, Tom 1 
Kniga 2, Moskva: Mezhdunarodnyi institute gumanitarno-politicheskikh issledovanii, 2005. 
243 Interview with Aleksandr Esenin-Volpin, Revere, Massachusetts, November 2006. 
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Although trials like that of Osipov and Kuznetsov were declared ‘open’, in reality 
they were very much closed to the public. Nonetheless, Volpin had studied the Soviet 
constitution, learned his rights under the law and demanded access to the trial.  
Vladimir Bukovsky summed up Volpin’s successful entry in the following way: 
“Little did we realise that this absurd incident, with the comical Alik Volpin 
brandishing his criminal code like a magic wand to melt the doors of the court, was 
the beginning of our civil rights movement and the movement for human rights in the 
USSR”.244  The creation of the human rights movement was not quite that simple, of 
course, but this undoubtedly was a pivotal moment that demonstrated the changing 
dynamics of dissenting behaviour.  What Volpin had done was to hasten a change in 
the rules of engagement between dissenters and authority.   
 
There were several reasons for the decline of underground dissent among the 
intelligentsia.  Perhaps the most important was that, as Petr Grigorenko entitled his 
famous book: ‘in the underground one can meet only rats’.245  His view, and that of a 
growing number of others at the time, was that reliance on what were seen as 
Bolshevik means of struggle could ultimately only produce a new dictatorship and all 
the negativity it would entail – exactly what most dissenters among the intelligentsia 
did not want.  Another important factor was that underground dissent had proved 
itself almost entirely ineffective.  It was an irritant for the authorities but seems to 
have made no real impression on the public mood.  Indeed, it seems highly probable 
that, rumours aside, ordinary people knew practically nothing concrete about this kind 
of activity.  The serious risks that group members took in producing and distributing 
                                                 
244 Bukovsky, To Build A Castle, p. 131. 
245 See P. Grigorenko, V podpol’e mozhno vstretit’ tol’ko krys, N’yu Iork: Detinets, 1981.  This was the 
conclusion reached by Grigorenko after his own group, the Union of Struggle for the Restoration of 
Leninism, was arrested in February 1964.   
 215
manifestos or leaflets simply did not produce any kind of tangible return among 
society. 
 
In Leningrad – a city generally depicted as one where underground activity continued 
to flourish for some time – the situation was a little different.  Valery Ronkin’s 
Kolokol group came together in the summer of 1964 and subsequently distributed a 
Djilas-inspired manifesto entitled from dictatorship of the bureaucracy to dictatorship 
of the proletariat which spoke of overthrowing the regime with a Hungarian-style 
revolution.246  Others, however, leaned toward a more Russian nationalist ethos, such 
as the All-Russian Social-Christian Union and The Path (Put’).  
 
Procurator records show that people all around the country continued to be arrested 
and sentenced after sending anonymous anti-Soviet letters and, less often, distributing 
leaflets.  As the middle of the decade approached a growing proportion of the state’s 
attention was again turned toward nationalist and religious dissent, particularly group 
activity.  One occasionally still encounters underground political groups toward the 
middle of the 1960s but with far less frequency than in previous years.     
 
Outside of Moscow it becomes much harder to piece together a pattern in regard to 
the evolution of intelligentsia dissent.  It remains unclear whether this is primarily 
because acts of protest and criticism became less common or because evidence of 
these acts has not yet come to light.  Open acts of defiance, such as the Mayakovsky 
Square poetry readings, would have been a far more risky undertaking in the 
provinces where the authorities were less constrained by factors such as the presence 
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of the Western media.  Perhaps the most important point to raise in this respect is that 
the available evidence is too scant to indicate anything definitively. 
 
3.5.4 KHRUSHCHEV AND THE LIBERAL INTELLIGENTSIA 
 
It also appears that the evolution away from more subversive forms of intelligentsia 
dissent could be partly attributed to the fact that dissent had begun to draw in a 
growing number of educated professionals whose attitudes had previously been on the 
margins of what was deemed acceptable and unacceptable.  Within the scientific 
community, for example, there was growing disquiet at the continued official support 
for the ‘charlatan biologist’ Trofim Lysenko.247  Simmering resentment burst into the 
open when Lysenko was publicly denounced by a number of leading physicists in 
1962, including Petr Kapitsa – later a Nobel laureate – yet Lysenko retained his 
dominance in the field.  It was not just his controversial, and ultimately false, work on 
‘hybridization’ that riled his fellow scientists but the fact that he had marginalized and 
denounced many within the scientific community who had opposed him and his 
acolytes.248 
 
Two years later, in June 1964, Andrei Sakharov too weighed in with an attack on 
Lysenko and his followers, an act that he later recalled as an early landmark on his 
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way to becoming an active dissenter.249  In resisting a proposal that Lysenko’s 
associate Nikolai Nuzhdin be elevated to full membership of the Academy of 
Sciences, Sakharov took the rostrum and rounded on Nuzhdin, stating that ‘…together 
with academician Lysenko, he is responsible for the shameful backwardness of Soviet 
biology…, for the adventurism, for the degradation of learning and for the firing, 
arrest, even death of many genuine scientists’.250 
 
The event that Sakharov had considered his first foray into what he called ‘civic 
activity’ had actually come two years earlier when he protested to Khrushchev about 
the decision for the USSR to resume nuclear testing in 1962.  The result was a 
strongly worded rebuke from Khrushchev in which Sakharov was warned not to 
meddle in politics. As Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs ‘this disagreement left its 
mark on Sakharov’.251 
 
The tentative alliance that had existed between Khrushchev and the liberal 
intelligentsia during earlier years was not to survive to the end of the period.  
Although the relationship had been through numerous ups and downs already by the 
early 1960s, it reached a new low point after Khrushchev’s outburst against non-
conformist artists at the Manezh gallery in December 1962.  On visiting the exhibition 
which included numerous abstract paintings, Khrushchev soon flew into a rage, 
crudely abusing some of the artists and threatening to send several of them to logging 
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camps in the far north.  This was, it seems, the result of a provocation engineered by 
Mikhail Suslov, intended to facilitate an attack on the liberal wing of the cultural 
establishment.252  The aftermath of this attack saw conservatives driving home their 
advantage over powerful liberals and their supporters, taking almost complete control 
within the cultural establishment and finally closing off the avenue of ‘permitted 
dissent’ in the cultural sphere. 
 
Shortly before this decisive turn toward conservatism in the cultural sphere, the 
November 1962 edition of the celebrated liberal literary journal Novyi Mir had carried 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s seminal debut novella One Day in the Life of Ivan 
Denisovich.  This was undoubtedly the most daring publication to come out of the 
Khrushchev period, and one that the First Secretary himself had pushed through 
against the resistance of several colleagues.253   
 
At home and abroad, the success of Ivan Denisovich was huge, with successive print 
runs selling out almost immediately.  The massive domestic success of Ivan 
Denisovich unquestionably proved that Stalin’s Gulag was a subject that remained 
close to the surface within society.  The subsequent explosion of Gulag literature ‘had 
an enormous impact on Soviet society and, in fact, altered the ideological climate in 
the country.  With each new work, it became increasingly evident that Stalin’s terror 
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had possessed deep roots…’254  The result was that all the awkward questions arising 
from the abuses of the previous era were brought back into focus.  In addition to this, 
the international acclaim that greeted Ivan Denisovich was ultimately to provide 
Solzhenitsyn with a platform from which to air his many criticisms of the Soviet 
regime.   
 
3.5.5 JOSEPH BRODSKY, ANDREI SINYAVSKY AND YULI DANIEL 
 
In what can be seen as an important forerunner of the 1966 trial of Sinyavsky and 
Daniel, the arrest and sentencing of the young Leningrad poet Joseph Brodsky 
demonstrated that the tide had turned definitively against the relative cultural 
liberality of previous years.  Having already subjected Brodsky to official censure 
when he was caught attempting to pass illicit materials to Western tourists, and having 
had two friends sentenced for anti-Soviet activity, he was surely a marked man for 
some time prior to his arrest.  However, according to a KGB report it had been 
decided that Brodsky would not be jailed for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda as 
he was both too young and ‘insufficiently hostile’.255  Instead, a case was constructed 
under parasitism legislation in what can be seen as a key show trial that marked an 
intensification of the government’s drive to silence the liberal intelligentsia.256 
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A KGB report to the Central Committee from May 1964 showed that the creative 
intelligentsia were reacting negatively to the persecution of Brodsky.  Writers’ Union 
members Lev Kopelev, Raisa Orlova and Lidiya Chukovskaya were quoted by the 
KGB as stating that the trial represented a return to Stalinism.  The poet Evgeny 
Evtushenko described the trial as ‘fascistic’ and others, including the director Samuil 
Marshak, the celebrated children’s author Kornei Chukovskii and composer Dmitry 
Shostakovich, promised to undertake a petition in defence of Brodsky.257   
 
Although there was never any doubt in regard to the outcome of his trial, it was 
nonetheless notable for the fact that Brodsky vigorously defended himself against the 
accusation that he was a social parasite.  He was also ably supported by a number of 
key defence witnesses who testified to both his skill as a poet and his willingness to 
work.258  Presumably because of the standing of supporters such as Anna Akhmatova, 
Brodsky’s case began to draw international attention and he was eventually released 
from exile in the far north of Russia ahead of schedule in October 1965.  However, 
the fact that Brodsky’s early release came at the same time as the arrest of Sinyavsky 
and Daniel was most likely not a coincidence.   
 
Had Brodsky been a young poet from Moscow rather than Leningrad it may well have 
been the case that his trial would have provided the spur for events that followed the 
arrest and sentencing of Sinyavsky and Daniel almost two years later.  As it happened, 
Khrushchev was soon overthrown and, contrary to rumours circulating amongst the 
intelligentsia at the time, a period of relative calm between the liberal intelligentsia 
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and the authorities followed until the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel re-ignited the 
standoff at the end of 1965.259 
 
Because it occupies such a prominent place in the historiography of Soviet dissent it is 
worthwhile to look briefly at the lineage of the January 1966 trial of Sinyavsky and 
Daniel.  Although integral to the cycle of protest and repression that occurred 
throughout much of the Brezhnev era, it was actually a sequence of events that was 
deeply rooted in the preceding Khrushchev years.  Andrei Sinyavsky, an employee of 
the Gorky Literary Institute in Moscow, had begun to send his works abroad for 
publication under the pseudonym Abram Tertz in 1959 and his co-defendant Yuli 
Daniel had done likewise since 1961 under the pseudonym of Nikolai Arzhak. 
 
The KGB investigation against the pair had been initiated in the early 1960s but for 
several years had produced no success in uncovering Tertz and Arzhak or even 
verifying that they definitely were writing from within the Soviet Union.260  In early 
1964 the investigation led detectives to Yuli Daniel and from there to Sinyavsky.  For 
several months they were monitored along with others involved in the smuggling 
operation and were finally arrested in September 1965. 
 
The point to be made here is that the traditional association which is made between 
the persecution of the two writers and the conservatism of the Brezhnev regime has 
been somewhat overstated: the pair’s dissenting activity, the KGB investigation, and 
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by implication the events that followed it, were all deeply rooted in the Khrushchev 
years. 
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The second half of the Khrushchev era witnessed some truly embittered acts of protest 
and criticism that indicated a growing antipathy toward the regime as a whole.  KGB 
reports stretching across the duration of the period show that tens or even hundreds of 
thousands of anti-Soviet leaflets and letters were distributed or posted and well in 
excess of a hundred underground groups of various political shades were uncovered.  
While the first half of the period had arguably been characterised by frustration at the 
stalled progress of deStalinisation, the 1960s saw resentment increasingly focused on 
the ruling political authorities.  The sense of utopianism that had been evident in the 
late 1950s had largely evaporated and, although Marxist-Leninist ideology continued 
to dominate many dissenters’ political philosophy, there was an increasing sentiment 
that the regime could no longer be ‘fixed’ but required fundamental change.   
 
The most notable theme of intelligentsia dissent in the second half of the Khrushchev 
era was that the scene was quite clearly being set for the confrontation between 
dissenters and authority that took place throughout the Brezhnev era.  On the side of 
the dissenters many of the leading figures of the human rights movement had already 
emerged as critics of the regime and had become embroiled in the cycle of repression 
and reaction that would characterise the dissident movement.  The principle of relying 
on open, legal struggle had begun to take root and key tools such as samizdat 
literature and communication with the West had either emerged or were in the process 
of establishing themselves. 
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 It remained the case that most acts of protest among workers were prompted by 
specific incidents, people and policies rather than any kind of wider rejection of the 
Soviet regime.  As the numerous uprisings of the period demonstrated, Soviet workers 
were by no means unquestioningly obedient and were more than capable of venting 
their frustrations at the authorities.  While worker dissent displayed a growing degree 
of cynicism in regard to the authorities this was, by the later stages of the period, 
increasingly kept in check by rising living standards and increasingly effective 
methods of social control.   
Even more than the earlier part of the Khrushchev era, the gulf between worker 
dissent and that of the intelligentsia remained pronounced: the former demanded 
material improvement and the later wanted political reform.  There were a multitude 
of reasons why workers and members of the intelligentsia never found common 
ground, not least of which were the authorities’ efforts to prevent such an alliance by 
methods such as presenting an image of the intelligentsia as ‘eggheads’ and ‘cry 
babies’ according to Kagarlitsky.261 
 
Unlike the intelligentsia, the working class had the sheer number of people and the 
forceful manner of protest to engineer change yet their desires were ultimately rather 
limited.  Lenin had perhaps been correct to argue that without the guidance of the 
intelligentsia the workers would only ever develop a ‘trade union mentality’, as 
discontent among the working classes was effectively ‘bought off’ by the regime after 
the disorders of 1962.  From that point onwards overt dissenting activity was largely 
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reduced to a small core of the Moscow intelligentsia and, according to Alexei 
Yurchak’s research, was of little relevance to most people’s everyday lives.262 
 
After a somewhat tumultuous period around 1962, the relationship between society 
and the regime began to settle down again as the middle of the decade approached.  
The measures taken were essentially aimed at neutralising the threat of major unrest 
among the working class, and thus reducing the threat to the regime’s stability.  What 
the dissenting activity of this period in particular had achieved was to demonstrate to 
the authorities that society’s compliance could not be taken for granted but had to be 
earned and maintained.   
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 225
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
OFFICIAL RESPONSES TO DISSENT: 1959-1964 
 
While the development of policy against dissent during the early Khrushchev period 
was largely characterised by a sense of trial and error, the first half of the 1960s saw 
the authorities employing a more consistent and thought out approach. Neither the 
uncertainty of the immediate post-Secret Speech period nor the ‘fire-fighting’ 
approach that had followed the December letter were to be repeated.  Instead the 
regime began to develop a more sophisticated and varied corpus of policy whereby 
greater efforts were made to prevent dissenting behaviour among the population in the 
long term as well as continuing to employ punitive responses against those remaining 
dissenters who were perceived as being genuinely anti-Soviet.  Less serious 
transgressions were treated with greater lenience while more serious offences 
continued to be met with a harsh punitive response: naked coercion was no longer the 
only response to dissent but it did remain an option for the authorities.263 
 
In many ways the regime’s responses to dissenting behaviour were becoming 
markedly less Stalinist in that they came to see the use of camp and prison sentences 
as a last resort rather than a default reaction.  The ever-growing reliance on ‘soft’ 
methods of social control, such as prophylactic measures, succinctly demonstrated 
this fact.  Nonetheless, the authorities’ more outwardly restrained approach continued 
to be backed up by the application of severe punitive measures against hundreds of 
dissenters.   
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What these factors and others, such as the growth of psychiatric confinement, 
demonstrate is that by the early 1960s one can see very clear continuities with the 
struggle against dissidents that took place during the Brezhnev era.  That the 
authorities’ principal aim was to minimise and stifle criticism rather than to eradicate 
it was increasingly evident, as was the fact that rationalisation rather than 
liberalisation dictated responses to dissent.  New restraints upon the authorities 
appeared and existing ones became more important, such as improvements in the legal 
system and a desire to avoid negative publicity abroad, yet ultimately the regime was 
still willing and able to disregard any such factors if domestic stability was deemed to 
be at stake. 
 
It is evident that a new relationship between society and the regime had been just 
about established by the time of Khrushchev’s ouster in October 1964.  In particular, 
the authorities had become increasingly cautious of provoking widespread discontent 
within society.  As Kozlov wrote: ‘The lessons of the early 1960s pushed the Party 
leadership into a search for means of compromise in the conflict between authority 
and the people’.264  In practice, this meant that those whose discontent was based on 
material factors were largely placated or intimidated into silence, while those with 
genuinely political grievances were ostracised or crushed.   
 
4.1 POLICING DISSENT 
 
As dissenting behaviour had begun to take on a more consistent and stable form by 
the end of the 1950s, so the authorities too increasingly honed their tactics and 
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practices of policing.  Stalin-era investigators and security agents had been replaced 
by people who were better educated and trained, without direct involvement in the 
crimes of previous years.  Reviews and reorganisations of the camp and prison system 
were conducted, the KGB was reorganised and slimmed down and new legal 
guidelines were enacted as the process of rationalisation continued.  While the second 
half of the 1950s can arguably be seen as a time when the regime began to move away 
from the most brutal aspects of its Stalinist past, it was during the early 1960s that 
new policies began to crystallise and the Brezhnev era system of policing society 
began to take hold. 
 
4.1.1 THE LEADERSHIP 
 
For the most part, members of the top leadership were less actively involved in the 
minutiae of the struggle against dissent than they had been in the 1950s.  However, 
they were still kept abreast of the most important developments around the country in 
general and particularly during times of heightened unrest such as summer 1962.  
While the Central Committee Presidium was provided with occasional summaries of 
dissenting behaviour, its General Department received regular updates from the KGB, 
and less frequently from the Ministry of Internal Affairs or Procurator’s office, on 
specific instances of protest and criticism around the country as and when they took 
place. 
 
Often these reports related to foreign attempts to stir unrest inside the USSR or to the 
exposure of underground groups and supposed terrorist plots, but information about 
even quite banal occurrences could also be sent practically to the top of the political 
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ladder.  For example, when three anti-Soviet leaflets were found scattered in the halls 
of the Central Lenin Museum in Moscow during June 1964, the case was brought to 
the attention of the General Department.   
 
This gives a useful indication as to where the policing of dissent lay among the 
regime’s priorities and of the role that the General Department played as a ‘clearing 
house’ for a whole range of information that was key to policy formation and 
implementation.  For the vast majority of the time dissent would probably not have 
been a subject that occupied the likes of the First Secretary or other top leaders, 
according to Sergei Khrushchev.265  Instead, the law enforcement agencies seem to 
have been left to conduct affairs without the kind of constant interference that had 
been the case under Stalin.  The KGB’s own history textbook stated it was they rather 
than the Central Committee Presidium that began to take the more active role in 
drawing up measures to deal with dissent in this period.266   
 
There were, however, a number of cases in which members of the top leadership did 
become actively involved in dealing with dissent.  We know that when Aleksandr 
Esenin-Volpin’s philosophical treatise A Leaf of Spring was smuggled out of the 
USSR and published in the West in 1961 it prompted Leonid Il’ichev, head of the 
Central Committee’s Department of Agitation and Propaganda, to declare that the 
tract displayed ‘hatred toward Soviet society and the Soviet people’ and to brand the 
author ‘pretentious and illiterate’ as well as ‘mentally ill’ – a denunciation that most 
likely led to Esenin-Volpin’s subsequent spell of psychiatric incarceration.  Evgeny 
                                                 
265 Interview with Sergei Khrushchev, Rhode Island, December 2006. 
266 V. Chebrikov et al, Istoriya sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti: uchebnik, Moskva: 
Vysshaya krasnoznamenskaya shkola komiteta gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti pri sovete ministerov 
SSSR, 1977, p. 581. 
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Evtushenko – a poet who will be forever associated with deStalinisation – even stated 
at the same meeting as Il’ichev that Volpin was ‘scum’.267   
 
The most notable instance where the leadership did play a direct role in responding to 
dissent was in relation to the rising at Novocherkassk.  Mention has already been 
made in the preceding chapter of the fact that a delegation composed of high-ranking 
figures was immediately dispatched to the town – showing just how concerned the 
leadership was by the developing situation.268  It seems that, as in Hungary, the 
delegation was expected to report back to Moscow on how events were developing 
but were perhaps also supposed to make recommendations back to the centre on how 
to proceed and to placate the protesters.269 
 
The composition of this delegation was in itself significant.  Its most senior figures 
were the hard-line conservative Frol Kozlov and the more moderate Anastas 
Mikoyan.  This duo practically embodied the authorities’ policy against dissent at the 
time.  As Samuel Baron argued: ‘While one (Mikoyan) could explore the chances for 
a peaceful solution, the other (Kozlov) could be relied upon to crack down should the 
situation warrant’.270  This bore a close resemblance to the way that events had 
panned out in Budapest six years previously (that time Mikoyan had been dispatched 
as Khrushchev’s envoy and was accompanied by arguably the era’s most 
unreconstructed hardliner, Mikhail Suslov).  As in Hungary, Khrushchev had hoped to 
                                                 
267 B. Nathans, ‘The Dictatorship of Reason: Aleksandr Vol’pin and the Idea of Rights Under 
“Developed Socialism”’, Slavic Review, Vol. 66, No. 4, Winter 2007, p. 650. 
268 The delegation included four of the eleven Central Committee Presidium members - Frol Kozlov, 
Anastas Mikoyan, Andrei Kirilenko and Dmitrii Polyanskii.  Alongside this quartet were included 
former KGB chairman Aleksandr Shelepin and the previously mentioned Leonid Il’ichev. 
269 As a point of interest, it is worthwhile to note that Samuel Baron suggests that Mikoyan had hoped 
to stay in the town and to address the crowd personally yet others, most notably Frol Kozlov, insisted 
that the delegation retreat to a safer location. See S. Baron, Bloody Saturday in the Soviet Union: 
Novocherkassk, 1962, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001. 
270 Baron, Bloody Saturday in the Soviet Union, p. 47. 
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avoid violence but was willing to take a more aggressive stance if he thought it 
necessary.  Again he found the exhortations of conservatives within the leadership the 
more convincing and ultimately sanctioned the use of force, which saw the protest end 
with a bloodbath. 
 
What we can see, therefore, is that while Khrushchev was liable to take daring and 
even reckless risks in fields such as foreign policy, he was less inclined to do so at 
home.  This not only demonstrates the fact that domestic stability continued to be the 
regime’s single over-riding priority but also emphasises the point that notions of 
Khrushchev as a ‘liberal’ and of the era as one of ‘thaw’, can be misleading.  As was 
shown in the campaign against dissent of 1957 – 1958, the authorities were quick to 
revert to a more repressive approach when the possibility of significant unrest 
surfaced.      
 
In this sequence of events one can determine several notable factors at work that 
reflect upon the wider state of the regime at the time.  Most noticeable was the 
division that existed between what can be broadly categorised as liberal and 
conservative elements and the fact that representatives of both groups were sent to 
Novocherkassk, seemingly in order to balance each other out.271  In regard to 
Khrushchev, one can see that he was not by nature a leader inclined to ruthlessness 
but in a tight spot tended to hedge his bets with conservatives instead of liberals.  It is 
also clear that violence against the people was seen as a last resort but by no means an 
impermissible one; showing that the regime did indeed continue to reserve the right to 
                                                 
271 The sphere in which this practice of balancing liberals and conservatives has been most widely 
examined is literature.  See, for example, E. Rogovin-Frankel, Novy Mir: A Case Study in the Politics 
of Literature, 1952-1958, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
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resort to more brutal and characteristically Stalinist methods, as Leonard Schapiro has 
suggested.272 
  
From a closer examination of events, one can also see that the demonstration at 
Novocherkassk was forcefully put down not just because it was a protest and thus 
deserved to be punished but because of the regime’s fear that events could spread to 
the surrounding area and beyond.  This was demonstrated by the fact that all road and 
telephone links with the outside world were immediately cut by the authorities and the 
town held in an effective state of quarantine for several months afterward.  As 
tensions died down and investigations against the demonstration’s ringleaders went to 
trial, the authorities broadcast the harsh sentences on local radio (which included 
seven who were subjected to the death penalty) in order to intimidate the locals into 
silence.273  However, they also made a point of shipping additional food supplies to 
the town in order to placate the local population – showing that the regime wished to 
restore order among the masses just as much as they wanted to punish those who were 
guilty.   
 
4.1.2 THE WORK OF THE KGB 
 
After the campaign against dissent began to be wound down in 1958 one of the 
authorities’ main tasks was to put in place a means of stifling protest and criticism in 
the long term.  For the KGB this firstly meant tackling the efforts of anti-Soviet 
organisations based outside of the USSR in order to minimise their influence on 
                                                 
272 L. Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, London: Methuen, 1970, p. 611. 
273 The last point is particularly indicative of the authorities’ ability to subvert their own laws because 
the 1958 Law on State Crimes had expressly stated that the death penalty would no longer be applied to 
those jailed for anti-Soviet activity and propaganda, which included participation in mass disturbances. 
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Soviet society.  NTS became a particular object of the security organs’ attention as 
undercover KGB agents penetrated its structures at practically every level.  From then 
on, when NTS agents were dispatched to the USSR they were almost immediately 
apprehended by the authorities and neutralised.  With most KGB materials from the 
period still classified, one can say little of how successful or otherwise this focus on 
foreign centres of anti-Soviet agitation actually was, yet the organs’ internal history 
textbook boasts of uncovering and liquidating ‘many military and political plans 
aimed at the Soviet Union and other socialist powers’.274   
 
Similarly, threats and intimidation were used against those who broadcast to Soviet 
audiences from the West.  Gene Sosin recalled that Soviet agents were ‘planted’ at 
Radio Liberty by the KGB, émigrés working at the station’s Munich offices regularly 
received silent telephone calls, threats and letters from relatives in Soviet Union 
begging them to stop slandering the regime and to return to the USSR.  Most 
significantly, two Radio Liberty staff members were murdered – almost certainly by 
the KGB according to Sosin.275                  
 
This new focus on matters outside of the USSR did not prevent the security organs 
from taking stock of things at home too.  On 19 July 1962 a report was sent from the 
Administrative Organs Department to the Central Committee which effectively 
constituted a review of the regime’s policies against dissent.  To give some idea of the 
report’s significance it is worthwhile to point out that it included the signatures of 
Aleksandr Shelepin, Vladimir Semichastnyi, Matvei Zakharov, Roman Rudenko, 
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Vadim Tikunov and Petr Ivashutin.276  These men were the former KGB chairman, 
presiding KGB chairman, deputy KGB chairman, the head of the Procurator’s Office, 
head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the head of military intelligence 
respectively. 
 
The report stated that the KGB had penetrated deeper into workers’ organisations and 
had improved its ‘prophylactic work’ but conceded that there was still much to be 
done.  Sticking to the traditional formula, it connected the growth in anti-Soviet 
activity with an increase in imperialist intelligence work and stated that there were 
only a few ‘anti-social elements’ who, under the influence of foreign propaganda, 
were ‘continuing to try to use temporary hardships for their own ends’.  Links 
between the KGB and militia were again described as ‘weak’ and it was 
acknowledged that the security organs were not ‘mobilisationally prepared’ for major 
disturbances such as Novocherkassk, conceding that they had struggled to influence 
events once the disturbance was already under way.277 
 
The review then demanded that decisive measures were taken to strengthen the work 
of the KGB against anti-Soviet elements.  Surveillance of ‘suspicious types’ and 
released prisoners was to be stepped up, the recruitment of informers and KGB agents 
increased and specific training undertaken for future scenarios of mass disturbances in 
built-up areas.  To combat weaknesses in the placing and usage of undercover agents 
it called for an increase in the availability of technological services for observation 
purposes as well as improvements in the training and political education of agents.278 
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Alongside the work of professional KGB employees there was a growing degree of 
reliance upon information provided by informants and so-called ‘trusted people’ 
(doverennye litsa) throughout society.279  Although collaboration with the security 
organs was generally viewed by society at large as an ignoble endeavour, the 
authorities proved skilful at creating a web of informers.  As Shelley pointed out: 
‘They (the KGB) offered powerful inducements to comply and severe punishments 
for disobedience, few citizens of the USSR were capable of resisting the power of the 
police’.280   
 
Owners of ground-floor flats located near the lobby telephone in apartment blocks 
were expected to keep the security organs regularly informed about conversations that 
they overheard.  A promise of cooperation with the KGB was often a precondition for 
jobs such as security guards and building commandants.  Louise Shelley has even 
estimated that the proportion of the population that co-operated with the security 
police in some way was between thirty and sixty per cent.281  As one can see, during 
the Khrushchev era the regime’s machinery of social control was actually penetrating 
deeper into the fabric of society than it ever had before.  What this state of affairs 
brings to mind is Michel Foucault’s assertion that ‘the controlled become the source 
of their own control’.282  As the middle of the 1960s approached, this new system of 
social control was proving increasingly effective.          
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The militia were not systematically involved in the day-to-day policing of dissent 
during the Khrushchev years – a fact that was reversed under Brezhnev – though they 
were obliged to assist the KGB in its work when requested to do so.  This could 
involve actions such as temporarily detaining citizens on trumped up charges, 
carrying out unsanctioned apartment searches and conducting provocations against 
specific individuals.  One of their more important responsibilities was to register 
typewriters, printing presses and photographic equipment; something that played an 
important role in tracing the authors of samizdat documents, anonymous letters and 
anti-Soviet leaflets.283   
 
4.1.3 CENTRALISATION 
 
A theme that had not escaped the attention of the leadership was that of local officials’ 
inability to handle potentially volatile situations.  Going right back to the post-Secret 
Speech period, the authorities in Moscow had been unhappy with the way that 
regional officials had ineptly responded to acts of protest and criticism.  Similarly, 
when Vladimir Semichastnyi’s deputy at the KGB, Ivashutin, submitted a report to 
the Central Committee on the events at Novocherkassk, he placed much of the blame 
on the shoulders of local officials and the NEVZ (Novocherkassk Electric Locomotive 
Works) factory management and Party organisation for failing to address the growing 
atmosphere of discontent and proving unable to keep the disturbances localised.284   
 
This reflected the extent to which the Soviet system continued to be one where the 
willingness to take bold decisions was in particularly short supply in the provinces.  
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Whether this was a culture borne out of years of Stalinism, potentially dangerous 
fluctuations at the top of the regime, ineptitude and conservatism on the part of 
regional officials or genuinely restricted room for initiative at a local level is unclear.  
Nonetheless, it does serve to highlight the fact that the system remained very much 
inflexible and dependant on directions sent down ‘from above’. 
 
The Procurator’s office in Moscow also seems to have tightened its control over the 
work of provincial branches.  While the period immediately following the Secret 
Speech and December letter had seen numerous instances where regional offices had 
botched or mishandled investigations, by the turn of the decade more stringent control 
was being put into force by the centre.285  This can be seen in the fact that case files 
from the second half of the period more frequently include communications from the 
centre to oblast’ procurators requesting more and more information on individual 
cases in progress and sentences that were handed out.   
 
The case file of Andrei Danilovich Mosin – arrested in Kursk in October 1962 after 
sending two anonymous letters to the editor of Izvestiya – testifies to this trend.  The 
Kursk Procurator contacted the Procurator’s office in Moscow on 26 October to 
inform that an arrest had been sanctioned and then contacted Moscow again on 16 
November to inform that the investigation was complete and the case was about to 
proceed to court.  On 7 January 1963 the Moscow office asked Kursk to inform of the 
trial’s outcome, which it did four days later – stating that Mosin had been sentenced to 
seven years corrective labour.  On 23 January Moscow then requested to be informed 
of the content of Mosin’s letters and set a deadline of 1 February.  On 2 February 
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another letter was sent from Moscow demanding that the Kursk office speed up its 
work and provide the requested information – which it eventually did so eleven days 
later.286     
 
At a time when Khrushchev was attempting to implement a degree of decentralisation 
in fields such as agriculture and industry, the opposite pattern can be witnessed with 
regard to decision making on the subject of dissent.  This was a trend that became 
even more pronounced from the late 1960s, especially after the KGB’s Fifth 
Department was established in 1967 for the specific purpose of combating dissent.  
This indicated a realisation among the leadership that, since figures such as Sakharov 
and Solzhenitsyn were famous the world over, the way that the regime reacted to such 
prominent dissidents was no longer a strictly internal matter and could not be 
entrusted to regional apparatchiks.  Under Khrushchev this centralisation of the 
struggle against dissent was most likely indicative of the extent to which policies 
against dissent were becoming increasingly planned and co-ordinated and the way that 
law enforcement agencies were placing greater emphasis on professionalism – 
something often lacking in the provinces.   
 
Following the series of critical speeches that had occurred at Party meetings and 
debates in the wake of the Secret Speech, it appears that plans were drawn up to deal 
with this eventuality in the future.  The best demonstration of this was provided by the 
events that followed Petr Grigorenko’s speech at Moscow’s Lenin District Party 
conference on 7 September 1961, mentioned in the previous chapter.  After an attempt 
to deprive Grigorenko of the floor in mid-speech was voted down, his remarks were 
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followed by an extended and unscheduled intermission, during which the heads of 
delegations were assembled in a closed room and ordered to instruct their members to 
condemn Grigorenko’s speech.  When proceedings resumed a motion was put forward 
that Grigorenko be deprived of his delegate’s credentials on the grounds of ‘political 
immaturity’ and, despite the motion receiving the support of less than a third of the 
delegates, it received no opposition and was passed accordingly.287  Needless to say, 
Grigorenko’s Party membership, like his military career, was very soon a thing of the 
past.  That nobody was willing to vote in Grigorenko’s defence was telling of the fact 
that discipline had been thoroughly restored within the Party, yet the number of 
people who refused to condemn his remarks also provided a commentary on the 
extent to which fear had lessened since the Stalin years.  
 
Interestingly, on the very same day Valentin Ovechkin had also delivered a critical 
speech to a Party conference in Kursk that was dealt with in exactly the same way as 
Grigorenko’s had been in Moscow.288  Grigorenko claimed to have subsequently been 
informed that this tactic had been specifically worked out in preparation for the XXII 
Party Congress.289  The fact that two such similar processes were put into action 
against dissenting speeches in different parts of the country at the same time does 
indeed offer persuasive evidence that the process had been prescribed in advance as a 
means of combating critical remarks.  Furthermore, after experiencing the period of 
confusion and disunity within the Party ranks that had briefly arisen after 
Khrushchev’s original exposure of Stalin, it would have been extremely remiss of the 
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leadership not to have put some kind of plans into place for responding to dissenting 
speeches before attacking Stalin again at the XXII CPSU Congress. 
 
4.1.4 POLICING THE MAYAKOVSKY SQUARE MEETINGS 
 
The authorities’ policing of the Mayakovsky Square poetry readings provides a useful 
‘snapshot’ of their struggle against dissent at the time.  The fact that those who 
gathered at the Square were not immediately arrested, and indeed were never arrested 
in most cases, tells us something about the way that the regime had changed since 
even the early Khrushchev period.  This showed that the policing of dissent in the 
second half of the Khrushchev era was, in many ways, closer to that of the Brezhnev 
years than it was to that of the late 1950s. 
 
The authorities were keeping a very close eye on events at the Square.  KGB agents 
were furtively photographing attendees, carrying out searches for samizdat, trying to 
provoke fights and summoning participants for individual ‘chats’.  Expulsions from 
universities and from the Komsomol soon followed.290  The significance of this kind 
of ‘black mark’ against a citizen ought not to be underestimated since it was liable to 
stay on one’s permanent record and would ultimately close a lot of doors for the 
respective individual throughout their entire life.   
 
When this kind of pressure failed to keep people from attending the readings the next 
step was liable to be more forceful.  Bukovsky, for example, has written of an 
occasion when he was accosted on his way home from the Square, bundled into a 
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passing car and driven to an unknown location where he was beaten for several hours 
before being warned that he would be killed if he went to the Square again.291  The 
assailants were, according to Bukovsky, members of the ‘Komsomol operative 
detachments’ (Komsomol’skyi operativnyi otryady) that were used to carry out such 
beatings.  Louise Shelley has also written that these same Komsomol detachments 
tended to conduct themselves violently when undertaking operations such as searches 
for samizdat literature among students.292  Although officially subordinate to the 
militia and Komsomol, such groups were effectively employed to do the ‘dirty work’ 
that the KGB were no longer supposed to do themselves, according to Bukovsky.293  
This was broadly reflective of the way that dissent was policed not just under 
Khrushchev but throughout much of the post-Stalin era.  It is true to say that, on paper 
at least, the Soviet regime was developing something like a ‘proper’ legal system yet 
it remained one that could be, and was, repeatedly subverted by the authorities in their 
efforts to combat dissent.294 
 
The fact that the events discussed above were all played out in the centre of Moscow 
was not unimportant.  In the capital city more than anywhere else, the regime had to 
conduct itself with most restraint in responding to acts of dissent.  The presence of 
foreign journalists and tourists ensured that there was at least some degree of scrutiny 
over the authorities’ behaviour.  Increasingly mindful of international public opinion 
for reasons already outlined, the authorities were more inclined to be seen to be 
‘playing by the rules’ in the capital.  Moscow also tended to be the city where the 
most educated and best equipped KGB and militia operatives were to be found, 
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meaning that there was less likelihood of a panicked and exaggerated response to acts 
of protest and criticism.295 
 
Away from Moscow, responses to dissenting behaviour were likely to have been less 
restrained by the new rules and regulations that had been brought in to prevent a 
recurrence of the Stalin era’s systematic disregard for legality.  Even many of the 
Soviet Union’s second-ranked cities such as Kiev and Minsk were still out of bounds 
to foreign journalists, enabling the authorities there to act against dissenters with 
virtual impunity if they so wished.296  In the more remote and rural regions of the 
USSR the picture is less clear because evidence from these regions simply has not 
come to light so far, yet there is no reason to suspect that provincial authorities were 
any more lenient than elsewhere.  Indeed, the likelihood is that they were harsher. 
 
Details on one of the most interesting practicalities of policing dissent in the provinces 
was provided in a report from Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party, Putintsev, to 
the Central Committee on 24 May 1960.  Describing the discovery of over 450 
leaflets in Aktyubinsk oblast’, written in the name of NTS, Putintsev reported that the 
Party obkom had immediately mobilised 200 people to trace the leaflets in circulation.  
These included local soldiers, Komsomol members, Party workers and KGB staff.297  
That the authorities had seen fit to devote so many people for this operation was 
surely indicative of the extent to which such leaflets were seen to constitute a social 
danger.   
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In a more general sense the resources available for the policing of dissent appear to 
have been practically limitless – again showing that the authorities took the threat 
very seriously.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, the case file of Mikhail Ermizin 
– an assistant doctor (fel’dsher) from Stavropol who had posted tens of anti-Soviet 
leaflets between 1962 and 1964 - demonstrated this.  The investigation protocol 
reported that Ermizin had been traced by ‘graphic expertise’ and ‘forensic methods’ 
yet the most notable fact was that it listed 20 separate KGB specialists who had been 
working on the investigation and a further two ‘scientific experts’.298 
 
The above case is demonstrative of the fact that not only were the authorities able and 
willing to go to great lengths in order to trace and nullify such behaviour but they 
were also determined to find the proper culprit.  This is one of the main points to be 
emphasised in regard to the way that dissent was policed under Khrushchev.  Those 
who had not transgressed the boundaries of acceptable behaviour were no longer at 
risk of facing the authorities’ wrath.  Those who had engaged in some form of 
proscribed behaviour were liable to be faced with the full power of the state.  By the 
1960s this did not always mean imprisonment, however.  
 
4.2 PROPHYLAXIS 
 
The lessons of the Hungarian rising had shown that dissent could not be allowed to go 
unchecked, yet jailing all those who criticised some aspect of the regime was simply 
not a feasible option for the authorities.  The Supreme Court resolution of June 1958, 
which censured the inappropriate use of article 58-10 in cases where individuals were 
not ‘truly anti-Soviet’, further expedited the need for a more viable long-term means 
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of managing protest and criticism within society.   A little over six months later, at the 
XXI CPSU Congress in January 1959, Khrushchev announced that prophylactic 
measures (profilaktika) were to become the main feature of what he referred to as the 
state’s ‘educational work’ (vospitatel’naya rabota).299 
 
The semantic imagery of dissent as some kind of unhealthy phenomenon from which 
society had to be protected is immediately apparent but the precise meaning of the 
term ‘prophylactic measures’ is less clear.  It was, as Julie Elkner has stated, ‘a much 
used but only vaguely defined term’.300  Vasily Mitrokhin’s guide to KGB 
terminology defined profilaktika in the following way: ‘Activity carried out by Soviet 
state bodies and social organisations aimed at the prevention of crimes against the 
state, politically harmful misdemeanours and other acts which affect the interests of 
the state security of the USSR’.301  Whereas previously the state had focused its 
energies upon punishing dissent, now it was also striving to prevent acts of protest and 
criticism from arising in the first place.  The reason that the authorities no longer 
chose to jail critics as they had done previously was not necessarily because the 
regime had become more liberal but because it had begun to take a more rational 
approach to social control. 
 
What Mitrokhin’s definition illustrates is that profilaktika was an umbrella term which 
incorporated a range of measures aimed at policing dissenting behaviour without 
recourse to labour camps and prisons, demonstrating that the Manichean nature of the 
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Soviet regime had softened somewhat in regard to who was considered an ‘enemy’.  
Furthermore, it showed that the authorities were becoming increasingly proactive in 
fighting dissent: a reflection of the fact that the uncertainty and near-panic of the early 
post-Stalin years was fading away.  Social control was becoming more rational and, 
owing to the fact that far fewer people were being jailed as a result of this 
rationalisation, more humanitarian. 
 
One can distinguish two separate forms of prophylaxis: the first aimed at minimising 
protest and criticism throughout society as a whole by educational means (glasnaya 
profilaktika) and the second which employed measures against specific individuals 
who were perceived to be insufficiently compliant or in some way unreliable 
(chastnaya profilaktika).  When combined, these two levels of prophylaxis provided a 
highly effective inter-locking mechanism of social control that played a major role in 
maintaining society’s outward passivity for almost three decades. 
 
4.2.1 MEDIA ATTACKS ON DISSENTERS 
 
One of the key facets of the authorities’ attempts to forestall dissenting behaviour 
across Soviet society as a whole lay in the studying and shaping of public moods.  The 
former made the regime better able to head off potentially imminent unrest and the 
latter provided a more enduring foundation for stifling dissent in the long term.  
Professional study of public opinion had officially begun in 1959 and the Institute of 
Public Opinion was established at Komsomolskaya pravda in 1960.302  The fact that a 
                                                 
302 The Institute of Public Opinion was subsequently closed down at the end of 1967, apparently 
because it continually told the highest authorities news that they did not want to hear.  Both Firsov and 
Grushin worked at the Institute of Public Opinion. See B. Firsov, Raznomyslie v SSSR 1940-1960 gody: 
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newspaper aimed at young people had been chosen as the base for this new institute 
was probably no coincidence.  It demonstrated that the regime continued to be 
concerned by the apparent disengagement of the younger generation from the goals 
and principles of the Soviet regime. 
 
Among the authorities’ main propaganda targets in the late Khrushchev era were 
citizens who dared to voice positive views of the West: often this meant young 
people.  However, the authorities were no longer attempting to portray living 
standards in the West as worse than those in the USSR – a myth that had already been 
comprehensively exploded by the end of the 1950s – but were essentially trying to 
stop people from saying in public what they thought in private.  In other words, they 
were trying to ‘manage’ dissent rather than to eradicate it.     
 
An example of this could be seen by a September 1963 article in Kazakhstanskaya 
pravda entitled ‘From an Alien Voice’ in which two miners from Leninogorsk were 
attacked for ‘lavishing praise upon life in America at every opportune moment’ and 
‘being unashamed to slander their homeland’.303  A similar case was played out in the 
Georgian newspaper Zarya vostoka during November of the same year.  The article, 
entitled ‘A Bark behind the Gate’, attacked citizens who listened to foreign radio 
stations and spread anti-Soviet literature ‘with a foreign voice’.  The author’s 
conclusion was succinct and emotive: ‘we have no right to be indifferent’.304 
 
                                                                                                                                            
2008 and B. Grushin Chetyre zhizni Rossii v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo meneniya: Epokha 
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303 Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 27 September 1963. 
304 Zarya Vostoka, 13 November 1963. 
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Media excoriation was not restricted to those who praised the West, however.  A 
notable drive against public criticism began in March 1964 when Izvestiya published a 
letter, purporting to be from a Magadan miner named Nikolai Kuritsyn, entitled ‘This 
Must Be Fought!’  After allegedly overhearing two young people mocking that year’s 
poor harvest while waiting in line at a bank, Kuritsyn wrote to Izvestiya describing 
such people as ‘toadstools’ and insisting that the Soviet way of life must be defended.  
His comments on how to respond to such individuals were as follows: ‘…we cannot 
act like our woodcutter acted, passing himself off as a gardener for 30 years.  
However, we must fight them, disgrace them, shame them, unmask them in front of 
honest people’.305 
 
Subsequent research by Radio Liberty claimed that Kuritsyn was in fact not a miner, 
as his letter had claimed, but a journalist.306  Assuming that the allegation was 
accurate, this serves to flag up the point that the Soviet media remained very much an 
integral tool in the authorities’ efforts to mobilise public opinion.  The disavowal of 
Stalin (‘the woodcutter’) was central to the letter’s message: we are not reverting to 
the ‘bad old days’ but criticism of the system will still not be tolerated.  Additionally, 
the fact that only one instance of young people ‘praising the West’ had been raised 
was probably intended to give the impression that this was not a wider trend that was 
sweeping the country.  The fact that this issue was raised in such a high-circulation 
newspaper as Izvestiya may suggest that this was not the case, however. 
 
Kuritsyn’s rallying call was heard and numerous letters in support of his remarks were 
duly printed in Izvestiya later that month attacking ‘rumour-spreaders’ and those who 
                                                 
305 Izvestiya, 1 March 1964. 
306 Radio Liberty Monitoring report, March 6, 1964, HU OSA, 300-80-01, Box 44. 
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told anti-Soviet anecdotes.  These letters included comments such as ‘It becomes 
offensive to the point of pain when you hear base, rotten anecdotes from the mouths 
of some young people’ and ‘…just some difficulty, some troubles in our huge 
economy and they are already buzzing like nasty autumnal flies’.307  In fact, the 
language and imagery employed in this last letter were reminiscent of that which had 
recently been used by Khrushchev himself when he chastised a March 1963 gathering 
of the cultural intelligentsia, warning that the growth in literature on ‘the camp theme’ 
that had taken place since the publication of Ivan Denisovich was liable to ‘provide 
ammunition for our enemies, and huge, fat flies will fall on such materials like 
dung’.308 
 
Probably the best example of this general whipping up of ill-feeling against dissenters 
could be seen in the February 1964 edition of Trud where it was said of the 
‘anonymous calumniator’ G.R. Levitin (who had apparently written a series of 
anonymous and hostile letters to Trud, though the content of these letters was never 
made clear): ‘…he poured dirt on Soviet reality and blackened the state which gave 
him an education, a well-built home and guaranteed him a pension’, it then accused 
him of attempting to extort and threaten several of his own friends and concluded that 
‘the anonymous calumniator is not only abominable but he is also dangerous.  Here is 
an evil which we must not tolerate’.309  One can immediately see that Levitin was not 
being attacked on ideological grounds but as someone of dubious morality.   
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Over the course of the following year such articles, editorials and letters cropped up in 
the media with some regularity.  A Radio Liberty analysis of developments in the 
Soviet media, written in May 1964, showed that in February and March of that year 
alone the newspapers Izvestiya, Trud and Komsomolskaya Pravda printed one or more 
articles on issues including anonymous letters, the telling of anti-Soviet jokes, 
spreading anti-Soviet rumours and public discussion of ‘thorny problems’.310  These 
were all newspapers with large circulation figures, particularly Izvestiya, which 
carried four separate stories relating to dissent in this two-month period, meaning that 
their message would surely not go unheard among the population.  However, this was 
clearly not a massive campaign – indicating that such behaviour was probably not 
seen by the authorities as an urgent problem at this stage. 
 
The aim of such letters and articles was essentially to intimidate rather than to 
persuade.  For the most part no arguments were put forward or official positions 
explained other than the simple message that criticism would not be tolerated.  
Referring back to the attack on G.R. Levitin in Trud, it is noteworthy that the content 
of his letters was not even discussed in the article.  Presumably, the authorities were 
not willing to take the risk that Levitin’s criticism would resonate among the 
population as Yuri Orlov’s had back in 1956, and thus denied his remarks ‘the oxygen 
of publicity’.       
 
That this attempt to silence critics was conveyed through newspaper articles, 
editorials and letters purporting to be from the public, suggests that the aim was to 
manufacture public opinion rather than simply to dictate how people should behave.  
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This was perhaps another indication that the authorities, or at least the experts at the 
Institute of Public Opinion, were aware of the declining faith in the regime’s 
pronouncements.  It is also important not to overlook the point that under Stalin, and 
even at times under Khrushchev, instances of citizens ‘lavishing praise’ upon foreign 
powers would most likely have led to a lengthy spell in a corrective labour camp 
instead of scathing press coverage. 
 
One notable factor in the newspaper attacks on dissenters was the change of discourse 
on dissent.  The media had begun to take a more subtle approach to tackling the 
subject and abandoned its previous tone of ideological outrage that had been 
employed in Izvestiya’s accusation that Yuri Orlov and his colleagues had been guilty 
of ‘singing Menshevik songs’, for example.  Instead, newspapers employed language 
intended to invoke hostility against dissenters by way of patriotic, moral or material 
grounds.  This most likely showed the authorities were aware that ideological rhetoric 
was no longer capable of arousing a sufficiently passionate response throughout 
society but patriotism remained strong among Russians at least, while moral values 
and material concerns were still important to the everyday lives of most people.  
 
As Shlapentokh has argued, aside from the idealised picture of society that was 
presented for public consumption, the Soviet leadership did actually hold a more 
practical and realistic image of society too and it was this that they acted upon.  The 
authorities knew that consumer goods and family welfare were becoming more 
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important to citizens than building a communist utopia.311  Attacking dissenters on 
moral and material grounds was a clear indication of this.   
 
The theme of appealing to citizens’ patriotism is one that can be seen at work in 
regard to propaganda against the foreign broadcasts being beamed into the USSR.  
Soviet media attacks on the Munich-based Radio Liberty regularly saw its Soviet 
émigré staff branded ‘fascist riff-raff’ and ‘Vlasovites’ – a label that Gene Sosin 
conceded was not entirely inaccurate.312  In regard to the kind of Chinese anti-Soviet 
agitation that was discussed in the previous chapter, the authorities employed equally 
bellicose rhetoric, at one stage suggesting in Izvestiya that the Chinese regime was 
comparable to that of Hitler, Napoleon or Genghis Khan.313  The intention of such 
remarks to stir up some kind of patriotic fervour as a means of combating dissent was 
entirely evident.  To what extent this would have resounded among the USSR’s non-
Russian population is less clear, though it seems unlikely that the Mongol conquest of 
ancient Rus and the battle of Borodino would have roused a great deal of passion in 
Riga, Vilnius or Tallinn, for example.       
 
It is hard to say with any great certainty just how successful the authorities were at 
shaping public opinion in this way.  In particular it is worth remembering the 
arguments that have been raised at several points throughout this thesis in regard to 
the growing level of cynicism with which many members of society regarded official 
pronouncements: many Soviet citizens had already become skilled at ‘reading 
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between the lines’ when it came to the media.  However, it does seem that by the end 
of the period this new approach had left some impact on public attitudes.  It is 
instructive in this case to cite Ludmilla Alexeyeva’s recollections of people’s stance 
in regard to dissenters during the Brezhnev era: ‘A Soviet dissident quickly became a 
pariah even among those who privately shared his views’ and ‘Isolated from society, 
we lived in what amounted to a ghetto’.314  This stands in stark contrast with the 
earlier experiences of Yuri Orlov and Petr Grigorenko, both of whom felt that their 
social standing not only did not suffer but actually improved after their respective 
criticisms of the authorities.315 
 
4.2.2 THE ROLE OF SOCIETY  
 
This did not necessarily indicate that ordinary members of society became personally 
opposed to dissenters per se, but that they at least considered it too dangerous to 
associate with them.  This in itself can be regarded as a success for the authorities.  
After all, they were not trying to counter the criticisms that were made by dissenters 
but were attempting to neutralise the impact that they had upon society.  The regime’s 
disfavour did not have to be viewed as legitimate for it to be acknowledged and acted 
upon.  However, in the long term this arguably gave prominent victims of state 
persecution, such as Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, considerable moral authority among 
elements of the population, according to Robert Horvath.316 
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 Pressure to conform did not come solely from above but was also embedded in the 
very fabric of life in the USSR.  The Khrushchev regime was even more invasive into 
citizens’ everyday lives than Stalin’s had been and nowhere was this aspect of social 
control more evident than in the form of the kollektiv (collective).  This was the basic 
unit of Soviet society and all citizens were automatically members of several 
collectives, in workplaces, housing blocks, recreational societies and elsewhere.317 
 
Members of any given collective were increasingly expected to take an active interest 
in the ideological lives of their fellow members; as Elena Zubkova has argued, 
‘personal life was considered a public matter’.318  By placing a degree of 
responsibility on the collective as a whole for the actions of its individual members, 
an unseen but powerful deterrent was added to prevent undesirable behaviour.  Being 
‘against the collective’ remained one of the most serious accusations that could be 
levelled at a Soviet citizen.319 
 
Agitators also played an important role in this process of maintaining conformity.  
The KGB’s internal history textbook stated that one of its main domestic tasks around 
this time involved holding agitation sessions with workers, peasants and the 
intelligentsia and ‘warning them of the danger posed by Western propaganda’.320  
These sessions could also entail discussing cases of a specific individual’s 
misbehaviour at Party, Komsomol or trade union meetings with the aim of shaming 
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them into conformity.321  Agitators were apparently also expected to keep detailed 
records of questions that they were asked at their sessions that were then passed on to 
the Party hierarchy and used as a kind of barometer for public opinion – an example 
of which has already been cited in chapter 1.322   
However, outside of the major cities these agitators were often poorly trained and 
largely ineffective.  Anatoly Marchenko’s account of compulsory Political Instruction 
Sessions that took place in labour camps shows that agitational work there was often 
particularly inept and effectively little more than a token gesture.323  In all likelihood 
this did not indicate that the authorities were any less concerned about the threat of 
dissent in the provinces but instead reflected the regime’s long-standing inability to 
get ‘good people’ to work and live outside of the major cities. 
 
4.2.3 PREVENTING FUTURE UPRISINGS 
 
From 1962 onwards the regime took a growing interest in gauging public moods – an 
implicit acknowledgment of the fact that they had been genuinely rocked by the 
disorders that took place at Novocherkassk and elsewhere.  This was entirely 
understandable since no regime could be expected to survive repeated disturbances 
and disquiet on the scale of that which arose during the summer of 1962.  The 
message that these events had sent to the authorities was clear: another major swelling 
of popular discontent had the potential to pose a very real threat to the stability of the 
regime.  With their determination to maintain social passivity at practically any cost, 
this was a message that the authorities could not ignore. 
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The desire to avoid a re-run of the Novocherkassk disaster was palpable.  An example 
of this can be seen in the way that a potentially dangerous situation was averted in 
Pskov the following year.  Radio Liberty monitoring reports recorded that, following 
the poor harvest in 1963 the town had suffered prolonged bread shortages which led 
to widespread discontent and a series of strikes were planned to take place during 
October.  On being informed of the situation there the leadership in Moscow moved 
quickly and decisively to snuff out the danger.  They immediately ordered the release 
of flour held in strategic reserves elsewhere around the country and had it sent directly 
to Pskov in order to placate the population there.  The monitoring report’s conclusion 
that ‘the local authorities would probably have let matters get out of hand and produce 
another Novocherkassk’ most likely reflected the judgement of the leadership.324     
 
An article published in the Washington Evening Star in November of the same year 
offered further evidence on the same theme when it reported that there were strong 
rumours of unrest in the Russian countryside and stated that the remarks of the 
leadership had been ‘unusually conciliatory recently’.  It went on to say that Soviet 
radio stations had been dedicating a great deal of time to addressing listeners’ 
complaints in recent weeks and that the government had made it known that 
overcoming these ‘temporary shortages’ was a top priority.325  How far one can put 
faith in Western media reports about the Soviet domestic situation is open to debate, 
though this particular scenario does fit into the government’s general pattern of 
behaviour at this time.   
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With bread queues forming even in the Ukraine – long regarded as the ‘bread basket’ 
of the Soviet Union – Khrushchev opted to import grain from abroad for the very first 
time rather than risk another series of domestic uprisings.  The opprobrium that 
dissenters heaped upon Khrushchev as a result of this move has already been 
described.  That such a humiliating step was taken, both for Khrushchev personally 
and for the regime as a whole, ultimately demonstrated just how much the regime had 
begun to understand that social stability was contingent on the provision of a 
generally acceptable standard of living. 
 
Analysing 570 occasions of public unrest during the Soviet period, evidence presented 
in a study by Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Valery Chalidze supports this assessment.  
They showed that between the 1960s and 1980s the number of people involved in 
large civic disturbances had dropped consistently and concluded that this could be 
attributed to ‘…the stabilization of power and improvements in the methods of 
averting confrontations’, and specifically cited the stability of food prices as an 
example of this.326   
 
4.2.4 THE PROPHYLACTIC CHAT 
 
The central feature of profilaktika as it touched upon the lives of individual Soviet 
citizens was the ‘prophylactic chat’ (profilakticheskaya beseda).  What this usually 
involved was for individuals who were considered to be ideologically wayward or 
potentially troublesome, but not implacably hostile toward Soviet the regime, to be 
summoned to their local KGB offices for a ‘chat’.  Unfortunately, no records have yet 
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been uncovered on how this new practice came to be added to the corpus of policy 
against dissent but, judging from their growing influence on policy formulation in this 
sphere, it is probably safe to assume that the security organs were the driving force 
behind the adoption of the ‘prophylactic chat’.   
 
During the course of their meeting with the KGB, the person in question was usually 
bullied and cajoled into admitting and then renouncing any kind of dissenting activity. 
It was made clear that they were being watched by the security organs and that a 
resumption of ‘undesirable behaviour’ could have serious consequences such as the 
loss of one’s job, refusal of a university place to one’s children or the threat of 
imprisonment for either the interviewee or friends and family members.  For the 
solitary individual to be brought face to face with the coercive power of the state in 
this way must have been particularly unnerving, especially considering the security 
organs’ brutal past only a few years previously.  This selective application of 
intimidation stood in great contrast with the mass repression of the Stalin years.   
 
The criteria for what kinds of cases were resolved by the use of these prophylactic 
chats was broadly predictable but never entirely consistent.  In many cases this would 
involve people who had played a relatively minor role in any particular act of dissent, 
whose names had come up in connection with an ongoing investigation or whom 
KGB agents and informants had picked out as being in some way politically 
unreliable.  Those who were considered misguided dissenters – often this referred to 
young people apparently under the influence of harmful foreign propaganda – 
received this response, as did those who were not judged to be ‘genuinely anti-
Soviet’.  However, this is not to say that all those who were jailed for dissenting 
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activity since the introduction of prophylaxis were hardened opponents of the regime 
since inconsistencies still remained in the way that these prophylactic measures were 
applied.      
 
Most likely, this element of inconsistency was in itself a part of the authorities’ 
strategy, meaning that any given act of protest and criticism could theoretically still 
end with imprisonment rather than prophylaxis, thus preventing an individual from 
being able to ‘go right up to the line without crossing it’. It may also be that the 
authorities themselves had no fixed criteria on the matter but instead worked on a 
case-by-case basis in evaluating individuals’ attitudes toward the regime before 
deciding whether they were genuine enemies or simply misguided and, importantly, 
whether a warning would prevent further dissenting activity.  This would involve 
assessing evidence such as individuals’ work records and details of any previous 
clashes with the authorities.  By no means could one call this the foundation of a 
perfect or sophisticated legal system, yet it was clearly a massive improvement on the 
Stalin years. 
 
Exactly how many of these ‘prophylactic chats’ were undertaken by the KGB is hard 
to say because only a limited amount of data has been made available.327  
Nonetheless, there are sufficient scraps of evidence to show that this became by far 
the most common form of official response to breaches of political norms from the 
early 1960s onwards.  A KGB report to the Central Committee from 25 July 1962 
stated that in the first half of that year 105 people had been sentenced for preparation 
and distribution of anti-Soviet documents, while a further 568 had been subjected to 
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prophylactic measures.328  An analogous report sent a little under two years later said 
that of the 385 authors of anti-Soviet documents uncovered in the first five months of 
1964, 39 had been jailed while 225 had been subjected to prophylactic measures.329  
The above figures would, therefore, suggest that the ratio of prophylaxis to 
imprisonment was approximately 5:1.  
 
Evidently, the regime had come to accept that camps and prisons were not always the 
most appropriate or effective means of response, especially since political prisons 
were becoming ‘schools of revolution’ according to Kozlov.330  The authorities had 
clearly also begun to see that even some of the regime’s sharpest critics were not 
entirely beyond salvation.  One case, albeit a rather extreme one, that was uncovered 
in Voronezh oblast’ during July 1963 saw a self-styled fascist youth group that had 
managed to acquire various explosives and a machine gun, spared jail after they were 
uncovered by the KGB.  The four members of the ‘National Socialist Party’, along 
with their parents, were subjected only to a series of prophylactic chats instead of 
imprisonment.331 
 
Another example can be seen in the case against Yuri Grimm and Abdulbai 
Khasyanov, the authors of a series of anti-Soviet leaflets discussed in the previous 
chapter.  The investigation protocol named a further nine accomplices who had helped 
the pair to distribute the leaflets around Moscow but who, unlike Grimm and 
Khasyanov, were not jailed.332  What cases such as those above demonstrate is that if 
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and when detailed KGB records pertaining to the application of individual 
prophylactic measures become available, historians may well see that the volume, and 
perhaps also the intensity, of dissenting behaviour across the USSR was several times 
greater during the post-Stalin era than has been supposed.     
 
The contrast with the repressive activity of the Stalin years was particularly sharp and 
highlights the extent to which serious changes had been enacted under Khrushchev.  
One ought to be wary of seeing this solely as a reflection of greater liberality during 
the Khrushchev years, however.  There were, after all, various benefits for the 
authorities in adopting this new course.  While Stalin’s Gulag and massive arbitrary 
terror had done untold damage to the fabric of society and the regime, prophylaxis 
was a practice that came at little economic, demographic or political cost.  
Furthermore it avoided the kind of large-scale antagonism of society and international 
opprobrium that mass imprisonment would have incurred and which the authorities 
were desperate to avoid. 
 
Most importantly, it appears that these individual prophylactic sessions were highly 
effective at stifling dissent. The KGB’s account of the period stated that ‘the majority 
of those subjected to prophylactic measures did not offend again.333  That the practice 
was not only continued but also significantly expanded under the subsequent 
Brezhnev regime can be seen as further testimony of this fact.334  Had prophylaxis not 
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been effective in keeping dissent at manageable levels around the country it seems 
likely that the authorities would have had no option but to revert to a more aggressive 
means of maintaining domestic stability – as was the case with those hardcore 
dissenters who refused to be silenced by these attempts at intimidation. 
 
4.3 CAMPS AND PRISONS 
 
As F.J. Feldbrugge pointed out in a 1963 article reviewing Soviet legal developments: 
‘The social straggler is invited to rejoin the ranks immediately, and if he cannot or 
will not do so, he is annihilated’.335  Feldbrugge’s assessment may have been a little 
hyperbolic but its message was not misleading.  Even though the authorities were 
showing an increasing tendency to resist employing custodial sentences against 
dissenters, the number of people jailed for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda 
during the early 1960s was far from insignificant.  Over 1,200 individuals were 
sentenced for anti-Soviet activity between the turn of the decade and Khrushchev’s 
ouster – a figure that still exceeded that of any comparable period during the 
Brezhnev years.336 
 
4.3.1 THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
The Soviet legal system underwent a period of significant development after Stalin’s 
death as the promise of ‘strengthening socialist legality’ was offered as a guarantee 
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that there would be no return to the abuses of the recent past.337  Many of the key 
changes that took place in this respect – such as the diminution of the security organs’ 
power, the end of state reliance on Gulag labour and the curtailment of entirely 
groundless repression had actually begun soon after Stalin’s death, during the period 
of collective leadership.  However, the regime was still operating on the basis of a 
criminal code that had been enacted during the 1920s, when the Soviet Union was a 
very different place.338 
 
The first significant change to the Soviet legal system came when a new ‘Law on 
State Crimes’ was published at the end of December 1958.339  Combined with the 
introduction of prophylaxis at around the same time, this clearly marked a new stage 
in the regime’s responses to dissenting behaviour.340  A key point of the new 
principles as they related to dissenters was that they abolished the legal classification 
of ‘counter-revolutionary crimes’, and thus also the notorious article 58-10.  There 
were numerous reasons why the regime might have chosen to abolish the concept of 
‘counter-revolutionary crimes’.  These included an attempt to emphasise the break 
with the illegalities of the Stalin era and to reduce the degree of arbitrariness that the 
vague concept of ‘counter-revolutionary’ had entailed.341 
 
                                                 
337 For the best coverage of developments within the Soviet law enforcement apparatus see A. 
Pyzhikov, Khrushchevskaya ‘ottepel’’ Moskva: Olma Press, 2002 and Lewin, The Soviet Century 
338 The criminal code referred to here is that of the RSFSR which was promulgated in 1926.  Each 
union republic had its own criminal code yet in practice they differed very little from that of Russia. 
339 Those crimes that were defined as ‘anti-state’ fell under the jurisdiction of the federal government 
rather than that of individual union republics.  
340 The ‘Law on State Crimes’ came as part of a package of reforms concerned with the general 
principles of criminal law and criminal procedure at a federal level and included the ‘Basic Principles 
on Criminal Legislation’, the ‘Basic Law on Criminal Procedure in the USSR’ and the ‘Law on 
Military Crimes’. 
341 See P. Taylor, ‘Treason, Espionage and Other Soviet State Crimes’, Russian Review, Vol.23, No.3, 
July 1964, pp. 247-258. 
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In place of ‘counter-revolutionary crimes’ the new law featured the classification of 
‘crimes against the state’ and ‘especially dangerous crimes against the state’.342  
However, this change appears to have been something of a semantic slight-of-hand.  
In place of article 58-10 came articles 70 and 72; the former dealt with ‘anti-Soviet 
agitation and propaganda’ and the latter with ‘activity by organised groups leading to 
especially dangerous crimes against the state and participation in anti-Soviet 
organisations’.  In practice there was virtually no difference in the kinds of behaviour 
that the new principles saw dissenters jailed for.  Critical leaflets, letters and 
underground groups all remained a potential trigger for arrest and imprisonment.343         
 
The principles that had been laid out in the ‘Law on State Crimes’ were subsequently 
included in the new criminal codes of each union republic that were enacted during 
1960 and 1961.  Moshe Lewin has suggested that this overhaul of the legal system can 
be seen as an attempt to create a ‘proper justice system’ that was the product of 
extensive professional discussion and subjected to rigorous drafting and redrafting.344  
However, the Soviet concept of justice continued to be centred upon the ideals and 
aims of the CPSU and although the authorities had begun to make a more convincing 
pretence at operating within these new laws, they could always be bent to the Party’s 
will when necessary.  It is worth restating that despite major improvements, the law 
enforcement apparatus and judiciary were very much under the sway of the Party.  In 
this light, an alternative assessment of the post-Stalin legal system has been provided 
                                                 
342 The difference between ‘ordinary’ crimes against the state and ‘especially dangerous’ crimes against 
the state was defined as being the presence of anti-Soviet intent.  Thus, for example, sabotage or fraud 
would generally be regarded as ‘ordinary’ crimes against the state but if anti-Soviet intent were proven 
they would then be tried as ‘especially dangerous’ crimes against the state.   
343 It is also notable that the almost-definitive anthology of people imprisoned under article 58-10 in the 
post-Stalin era also includes those jailed under articles 70 and 72 after the changes of December 1958.  
See V. Kozlov, and S. Mironenko, eds. 58-10 Nadzornye proizvodstva prokuratury SSSR po delam ob 
antisovetskoi agitatsii i propaganda: annotirovannyi katalog Mart 1953 – 1991, Moskva: 
Mezhdunarodnyi Fond ‘Demokratiya’, 1999. 
344 Lewin, The Soviet Century, p. 161. 
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by Louise Shelley: ‘commitment to the rule of law, intrinsic to democratic policing, 
was conspicuously absent from the Khrushchev reforms’.345   
 
One of the general trends that was witnessed across numerous articles of the new 
criminal codes, including those dealing with anti-Soviet activity, was a lowering of 
the maximum penalties prescribed for those who were convicted.  In the case of anti-
Soviet agitation and propaganda this meant a reduction from a maximum sentence of 
twenty five years imprisonment down to ten years imprisonment with an additional 
five years of internal exile.  Nonetheless, it is instructive to refer back to Procurator 
statistics cited in chapter two which show that even prior to the new code’s 
promulgation the average sentence under article 58-10 had been approximately five 
years in length.346  As such this can be seen as a codification of existing practice 
rather than a liberalising measure in its own right. 
 
Among the most interesting aspects of the way in which sentences for anti-Soviet 
activity were handed down during the first half of the 1960s is that of regional 
distribution.  For example, when taken together the citizens of the USSR’s Central 
Asian republics (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan) made up almost 11 per cent of the overall Soviet population yet 
accounted for a combined total of less than 1 per cent of all political sentences.347  
Between 1960 and 1964 these five republics witness only seven sentences for anti-
Soviet activity between them – a considerably lower number than individual republics 
                                                 
345 Shelley,  Policing Soviet Society,  p. 45. 
346 GARF, f. 8131, op. 32, d. 5080, l. 7.   
347 Population data on this subject is taken from the 1959 census. See Tsentral’noe statisticheskoe 
upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrove SSSR, Chislennost’, sostav i razmeshchenie naseleniya SSSR: kratkie 
itogi Vsesoyuznoi perepisi naseleniya 1959 goda, Moskva, 1959, p. 3-8. Data on the nationality of 
those sentenced for anti-Soviet activity has been taken from the files of the USSR Procurator.  See 
Kozlov and Mironenko eds, 58-10 Nadzornye proizvodstva prokuratury SSSR, p. 1-662. 
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such as Belarus (17 political sentences), Georgia (11 sentences) and Armenia (8 
sentences). 
 
There were numerous socio-cultural reasons why the republics of Central Asia would 
have produced a disproportionately low number of dissenters – such as generally 
lower education levels and fewer major industrial centres – yet it also seems that there 
were growing regional differences in policing too.  This is particularly evident when 
one considers that chapter 2 showed the distribution of sentences during the campaign 
of 1957-1958 to have been roughly proportionate throughout the USSR.  Already the 
Brezhnev era trend of local elites running these republics as personal fiefdoms had 
begun to take hold and there was consequently little desire to arouse Moscow’s 
interest in their internal affairs – something that political arrests and trials would have 
been sure to do.348  Instead, one would most likely have seen a tendency to deal with 
any outbursts of protest and criticism ‘in house’ as far as possible.  Furthermore, these 
were most liable to be the parts of the USSR where there would be the lowest 
concentration of law enforcement agents and fewest resources for combating protest 
and criticism – meaning that anonymous acts of dissent in those areas would probably 
be more likely to go undetected. 
 
Cases of groundless repression were far rarer than in the Stalin years but for those 
who were jailed the situation in labour camps and prisons remained particularly harsh.  
One need only read through Anatoly Marchenko’s My Testimony or the relevant 
sections of Gulag Archipelago to see that any notion of liberalisation in this sphere of 
                                                 
348 For example, in the Uzbek SSR Sharof Rashidov ruled between 1959 and 1983.  In the Kirgiz SSR 
Turdakun Usubaliev was first secretary from 1961 to 1985 and in the Tadzhik SSR Dzhabar Rasulov  
was head of the Communist Party between 1961 and 1982.  
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Soviet life was strictly relative to what had gone before.349  While the immediate 
period following Stalin’s death was described by Solzhenitsyn as ‘the mildest three 
years in the history of the archipelago’, in later years conditions had deteriorated to 
the point where the same author could write that the difference between the camps of 
the Khrushchev period and those of the Stalin period lay in their composition rather 
than their regime.350 
 
4.3.2 DETERIORATING CONDITIONS 
 
Many of the Stalin era camp officials who had been dismissed in the early 
Khrushchev years now began to return to their former positions as the camp system of 
the Brezhnev era was fundamentally established more than two years prior to 
Khrushchev’s removal from office.  The ratio of dissenters who were convicted for 
anti-Soviet activity may have been dropping markedly but the situation for those who 
were jailed for political crimes actually worsened.  Numerous sources on the 
Khrushchev-era camps have pointed to 1961-1962 as having witnessed a noticeable 
tightening up of camp regimes.351    
 
This turn for the worse in regard to inmates’ conditions was presumably not unrelated 
to a major review of the prison and camp system that was carried out in April 1961 – 
the most immediately noticeable result of which was the scrapping of proposed plans 
                                                 
349 See Marchenko, My Testimony and A. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, Vol. 3, London: 
Collins/Fontana, 1978. 
350 Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, Vol. 3, p. 427 and p. 493.  The difference in composition that 
Solzhenitsyn referred to was that the majority of inmates during the Khrushchev years tended to be 
from the Ukraine or the Baltic States rather than from Russia.  This was largely a result of the fact that 
most who had been arrested for nationalism were not included in the amnesties that drained the Gulag 
of much of its population after Stalin’s death. 
351 See, for example, Marchenko My Testimony, p. 209 and Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago Part 3, p. 
501.  
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for an early release programme – a portent of things to come.352  The most widely 
cited indicator of this increasing persecution against ‘politicals’ came in a change to 
the official classifications of camp regime in 1962.  Four grades of confinement were 
defined for prisoners: in ascending order of severity they were ‘normal’, ‘intensified’, 
‘strict’ and ‘special’.  Political prisoners immediately began their sentences on strict 
regime and were liable to be ‘upgraded’ to special regime at the slightest infraction of 
the rules.  As Rasma Karklins noted: ‘the more severe the camp regime, the worse the 
conditions and the harder the work’.353 
 
The new guidelines issued in 1961 provided for 1.75 square metres of living space per 
inmate and decreed an eight hour working day of heavy physical labour, although 
Walter Connor has suggested that this was often prolonged beyond ten hours. 
Prisoners’ daily lives were strictly regimented.  Privileges, such as family visits and 
food parcels could be withdrawn at the slightest sign of ‘failure to co-operate’ with 
the camp administration, rations were kept only a little above starvation level and 
criminal prisoners continued to be employed for the purpose of terrorising ‘politicals’, 
though to nothing like the same extent as in previous years.354 
 
Whereas the second half of the 1950s had seen political prisoners scattered across a 
range of camp complexes, the 1960s saw them increasingly concentrated in just three 
locations: Mordova and Perm camps and Vladimir prison.  These came to be the 
regime’s preferred depositories for political prisoners right up until glasnost’ with 
practically every prominent dissenter who was sentenced during the post-Stalin era 
                                                 
352 See Lewin, The Soviet Century, p. 160. 
353 R. Karklins, ‘The Organisation of Power in Soviet Labour Camps’, Soviet Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2, 
April 1989, p. 277. 
354 See W. Connor, ‘The Soviet Criminal Correction System: Change and Stability’, Law and Society 
Review, February 1972, pp. 368-390. 
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serving their sentence in one of the two camp complexes as well as a spell in Vladimir 
prison at the start or end of their incarceration. 
 
There is a wealth of evidence in this chapter which demonstrates a growing 
conservatism and sense of continuity with the Brezhnev era.  However, to see this as a 
‘Brezhnevisation’ of the system may not be entirely accurate: primarily on the basis 
that this pre-supposes a liberality during the Khrushchev years that did not exist in 
this respect.  In Gulag Archipelago Solzhenitsyn suggested that conservatives had 
discreetly brought pressure to bear on Khrushchev to tighten up the camp system, yet 
one should not blindly accept this assertion.355  The very same author had also written 
that Khrushchev had been unaware that there were still political prisoners during his 
period of rule – a statement that was almost certainly wrong.356   
 
When one looks to other fields, such as that of culture, it is quite clear that certain 
powerful hardliners, like Party ideologist Mikhail Suslov and Central Committee 
secretary Frol Kozlov, were occasionally able to exert a strong conservative influence 
over Khrushchev, particularly after his perceived failure in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.357  On the question of those who actively struggled against the regime, the 
distinction between conservatives and liberals was not so great. Khrushchev did not 
always have to be persuaded or suborned by conservatives before cracking down on 
dissent.   
 
Alongside this growing trend of harsh conservatism one can also see the emergence of 
another scenario that was characteristic of the changing relationship between the 
                                                 
355 Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, Part 3, p. 476. 
356 See Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, Part 3, p. 476.   
357 See A. Mikoyan, Tak bylo: Razmyshleniya o minuvshem, Moskva: Vagrius, 1999. 
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regime and dissenters.  Although few inmates were fully aware of their legal rights 
around this time, their complaints did not go entirely unnoticed.  Physical abuse of 
political prisoners became rare because of the risk of provoking intense protests 
among their fellow ‘politicals’.  In cases when news of these protests reached the 
outside world it tended to trigger the intervention of higher authorities in Moscow and 
result in the removal of those members of the camp administration deemed 
responsible.358  In this sense the greatest restraint upon the behaviour of camp 
authorities was the fear that information would leak out into wider society and the 
international arena.  Again, this was clearly rationalisation instead of liberalisation. 
 
4.3.3 REHABILITATION 
 
Although it remained flawed, and tended to show preference to communists and camp 
informers, the process of reviewing and re-evaluating dissenters’ convictions provides 
a useful commentary on the period.  It is instructive to return to the case of Yakov 
Rizoi, a sovkhoz (state farm) chairman from Odessa.  In September 1961 Rizoi had 
been arrested after posting ‘slanderous’ leaflets attacking Party policy, calling on 
workers to stand up for their rights and to demand an improvement in their standard of 
living as well as sharply abusing Khrushchev.  After he was uncovered as the source 
of the leaflets, the KGB investigation against Rizoi also revealed that he had been a 
dedicated CPSU member for twenty years and was twice decorated in the army but 
had lost his job because of the military cutbacks in April 1958.  Nonetheless, on 21 
                                                 
358 See Karklins, ‘The Organisation of Power’, p. 285.  
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December 1962 Rizoi was sentenced to seven years of corrective labour followed by 
three years of internal exile – practically the maximum term allowed.359 
 
Rizoi immediately appealed against the judgement of the Odessa court and 
subsequently had his case reviewed by the Ukrainian Supreme Court.  The review 
acknowledged that Rizoi was guilty of producing and distributing the documents in 
question but argued that the original case had not established whether he had actually 
intended to undermine the regime.  Citing a line spoken by the defendant in court: ‘I 
have never been an enemy of Soviet power.  After we were demobilised it was a blow 
to the heart, where I saw any kind of shortages I incorrectly understood this to be the 
fault of improper policies by our leaders’, it was decided that there were no grounds 
for considering Rizoi an ‘especially dangerous state criminal’.360  On 17 January 
1963, less than a month after he had originally been convicted, the sentence handed 
down by the Odessa oblast’ court was revoked by the Ukrainian Supreme Court and 
Rizoi was freed. 
 
This case demonstrates one of the most interesting facets of the authorities’ struggle 
against dissent.  Essentially, officials operating at lower levels of power, in this case 
the Odessa oblast’ court, were less likely to respond to acts of dissent with any 
notable lenience.  Whether this was because the people who occupied these positions 
were inherently more conservative in outlook or because they were ‘erring on the side 
of caution’ is unclear, though it would seem that both may have played some part.  It 
has already been argued earlier in the present work that regional officials were 
                                                 
359 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 94020, ll. 1-4. 
360 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 94020, l. 6. 
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responsible for exacerbating the campaign attitude of 1957-1958 – something that a 
number of authors have also suggested was the case in the Great Terror.361 
 
Looking at the theme of rehabilitation from a slightly wider perspective, there are two 
striking trends that one immediately notices.  The first is how few of the victims were 
subsequently rehabilitated in the Gorbachev era and the second is how many were 
either rehabilitated, reclassified or had their sentences reduced while Khrushchev was 
still in power.362  Those rehabilitated, for the most part, were people who had been 
jailed during the campaign of 1957-1958 rather than across the period as a whole: a 
tacit acknowledgement that errors had been made at that time.  The lack of 
rehabilitations under Gorbachev was perhaps a result of the way in which the horrors 
of the Stalin years were more fully exposed for the first time and occupied the public 
and political mind during the glasnost’ era: a time when official discourse viewed 
Khrushchev in a broadly positive light, particularly in comparison with his 
predecessor and successor.363 
 
In regard to the second point, on rehabilitations that took place under Khrushchev, 
there seems to have been little in the way of a discernable pattern or logic as to who 
was and was not deemed worthy of rehabilitation. For example, the worker N.A. 
Derzhavin of Osh oblast’ had been sentenced in May 1957 after repeatedly cursing 
the regime and declaring his support for the Hungarian rising, yet was fully 
rehabilitated as early as June 1958 while many hundreds who had committed what 
                                                 
361 See, for example, J. Getty and O. Naumov, The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-destruction of 
the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2002. 
362 See A. Yakovlev et al eds, Reabilitatsiya: Kak eto bylo Fevral’ 1956 – nachalo 80-x godov, 
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363 See D. Nordlander, ‘Khrushchev’s Image in the Light of Glasnost and Perestroika’, Russian Review, 
Vol.52, No.2, April 1993, pp. 248-264. 
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could be viewed as equal or lesser acts of protest received neither rehabilitation nor a 
reduction in their sentence.364  F.F. Shul’ts, for example, a pensioner and Party 
member since 1919 who had been sentenced in March 1957 for sending critical letters 
to Pravda, was not rehabilitated until June 1964.365  This not only highlights the 
element of unpredictability that remained within the system but probably also 
demonstrates the fact that appeals could at times be stalled or blocked as a result of 
resistance from various sources such as the security organs or the administration of 
the relevant labour camp.366 
 
We know that there was considerable resistance from the KGB in regard to re-
evaluating cases against convicted dissenters.  One example of this could be seen in a 
letter written by the head of the Ukrainian KGB, V. Nikitchenko, in November 1960 
to KGB chairman Aleksandr Shelepin complaining that the lack of unity between the 
courts, Procurator and KGB meant that those who had been convicted were being 
freed or having their sentences downgraded on appeal.367  Shelepin then forwarded 
the letter on to the Supreme Court demanding greater unity in combating dissent yet 
was effectively rebuffed as the Court defended its right to re-evaluate cases that it 
considered had been improperly conducted.  Previous and subsequent confidential 
memoranda on the theme of dissent repeatedly called for the courts, police and 
investigating authorities to work more closely together, most likely meaning for them 
to do as they were instructed by the KGB.  Evidently the security organs were 
uncomfortable operating within even the basic framework of a legal system. 
                                                 
364 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 78317, ll. 1-9. 
365 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 74356, ll. 1-6. 
366 See, for example, N. Adler, ‘Life in the ‘Big Zone’: The Fate of Returnees in the Aftermath of 
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 The number of people who were both sentenced for political crimes and subsequently 
rehabilitated during the Khrushchev period was only a few dozen, rather than 
hundreds or thousands, yet this is nonetheless a remarkable phenomenon which shows 
that the Khrushchev years were rather unique in some respects.  As well as 
rehabilitating many thousands of those who had been groundlessly repressed under 
Stalin – a process that was, in fact, already tailing off in the early 1960s – the 
Khrushchev regime also acknowledged its own mistakes and rehabilitated some of 
those that it had repressed.  This shows that the notion of strengthening socialist 
legality was more than just empty rhetoric and that the authorities were genuinely 
interested in seeing that those who were not ‘anti-Soviet’ were not treated as such. 
 
What one quickly notices when looking at rehabilitations and sentence reductions of 
those who had been convicted during the campaign against dissent was that they 
almost all took place between August 1959 and April 1960.  Exactly why the majority 
of rehabilitations were processed during this period is somewhat unclear.  One could 
perhaps point to the dismissal of the notoriously hard-line Ivan Serov as KGB 
chairman in 1958 or the fact that this was a time when Khrushchev’s power was least 
fettered by conservatives within the leadership as being factors that had an influence 
on this.  However, in reality the timing of these re-evaluations may have been caused 
by nothing more than the typically slow pace of the appeals process.  What one can 
safely infer is that this must have been a period when the relative influence of the 
KGB and the legal establishment were more evenly balanced than was the case in 
later years when the security organs enjoyed clear supremacy. 
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Finally, it is also worth reflecting on the question of how frequently the authorities 
opted to circumvent the process of arrest and sentencing under the political articles of 
the criminal code in favour of alternative charges such as hooliganism or parasitism.  
Although it is possible to cite a handful of examples where this occurred, such as the 
case against Joseph Brodsky, it is almost impossible to say anything concrete in 
regard to the practice except that it did happen on occasion.  For example, when 
Aleksandr Ginzburg was arrested in 1959 it was, officially at least, not on account of 
his having edited the underground literary journal Phoenix but on the basis that he had 
fraudulently sat a university exam on behalf of a friend – something that he had 
indeed done – even though the authorities well knew that Ginzburg had been involved 
in compiling and distributing the samizdat poetry anthology Syntaxis.368 
 
Sources of information on Soviet political repression such as the Chronicle of Current 
Events or research by Western journalists and academics were practically non-existent 
at the time and official sources are likely to yield little.  The practicalities of sifting 
through an inestimable number of investigation protocols in order to find evidence of 
cases where dissenters might have been sentenced under non-political articles make 
such an operation a virtual impossibility.369  The admittedly limited primary evidence 
available, such as Andrei Amalrik’s account of his own experience of being sentenced 
under parasitism laws in 1965, seems to suggest that these articles did not ensnare 
                                                 
368 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 89189a, ll. 1-98 
369 It is worthwhile to point out that the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), where the 
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catalogue (opis) provides no information other than the name of the sentenced individual.  As such one 
could conceivably work for months on end before finding a single example of political activity being 
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great hordes of dissenters, though as his own case demonstrated, they did undoubtedly 
affect some.370 
 
4.4 PUNITIVE PSYCHIATRY 
 
One of the less commonly acknowledged aspects of punitive policy against dissenters 
in the Khrushchev period was that of psychiatric detention.  It is, for example, a 
practice that goes entirely unmentioned in numerous major works on Khrushchev and 
his period.371  Generally associated with the Brezhnev era, during which time it came 
to be more widely employed and globally condemned, the practice of systematically 
confining dissenters in psychiatric wards actually had very distinct roots in the late 
1950s and early 1960s.   
 
To give some idea of the extent to which the application of psychiatric punishment 
against dissenters originated in the Khrushchev period, it is worthwhile to cite a few 
facts from the Biographical Dictionary on Psychiatric Abuse in the USSR.372  Several 
of the most notorious institutions of the 1960s and 1970s including the Serbsky 
Institute, Leningrad SPH (Special Psychiatric Hospital), Kazan SPH and Mordova 
SPH, were already holding dissenters in the Khrushchev years.  Practitioners such as 
Daniil Lunts, Georgii Morozov, Andrei Snezhnevsky and numerous other 
‘psychiatrist executioners’ were already becoming dominant in the field during the 
                                                 
370 See A. Amalrik, An Involuntary Journey to Siberia, Newton Abbot: Readers Union, 1971. 
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period.373  Finally, prominent Brezhnev era dissidents diagnosed as mentally ill under 
Khrushchev included Vladimir Bukovsky, Aleksei Dobrovolskii, Natal’ya 
Gorbanevskaya and Petr Grigorenko.  A lack of reliable data on the subject makes it 
impossible to say how many people were imprisoned in this way, but one can 
probably assume that the total figure ran to hundreds at least. 
 
Aleksandr Esenin-Volpin had actually experienced his first period of psychiatric 
confinement in 1949 but this does not seem to have reflected any wider policy of 
psychiatric imprisonment at that time.374  Esenin-Volpin himself considered that it 
was an act of mercy on the part of the diagnosing psychiatrist and one that ultimately 
saved him from being sent to the Gulag – considered much worse than forced 
hospitalisation during the Stalin era.375  
 
He may have received his first experience of psychiatric confinement under Stalin but 
for Esenin-Volpin the Khrushchev years included three separate spells of psychiatric 
incarceration in 1957, 1959 and 1962.376  The first of his three spells of confinement 
under Khrushchev was a result of advising an impressed French tourist against 
applying for Soviet citizenship during the 1957 World Youth Festival.  The second 
came after he had refused to give evidence against a friend charged with treason and 
the third came after his philosophical treatise A Leaf of Spring was smuggled abroad 
and published in the West.377 
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4.4.1 THE PARTY LEADERSHIP AND PUNITIVE PSYCHIATRY 
 
That individuals at the highest level were aware of this general abuse of psychiatry in 
this manner is undoubted, largely thanks to the efforts of Sergei Pisarev.  Himself a 
psychiatrist by profession, Pisarev had been arrested after writing to Stalin in order to 
protest that the Doctors’ Plot was a fabrication.  He was held first at the Serbsky 
Institute in Moscow, where he was diagnosed with schizophrenia, and then at 
Leningrad Prison Psychiatric Hospital.378  Upon being released after Stalin’s death, 
Pisarev undertook to expose the use of punitive psychiatry and force the regime to 
abandon the practice.  After three years Pisarev’s efforts paid off and a commission 
was established under A.I. Kuznetsov, a senior Central Committee official, to 
investigate the accusation that the Serbsky Institute was being used to incorrectly 
diagnose and imprison healthy people. 
 
This commission appears to have been a sincere undertaking, made up as it was of 
numerous eminent professors of psychiatry and directors of psychiatric institutions. 
Pisarev’s allegations were found to have been correct and the commission concluded 
that the process of diagnosing patients needed to be radically revised and that prison-
psychiatric hospitals should be transferred from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MVD) to the Ministry of Health.379  This seems to suggest that the 
use of psychiatric confinement was initially a localised and unsanctioned 
phenomenon.   
 
                                                 
378 Subsequently renamed as Leningrad Special Psychiatric Hospital. 
379 C. Mee, The Internment of Soviet Dissenters in Mental Hospitals, Cambridge: John Arliss Limited, 
1971, p. 3. 
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However, sources differ on what the ultimate outcome was: Fireside stated that the 
main changes to the system which took place were cosmetic ones (such as changing 
the names of institutions from Prison Psychiatric Hospitals to Special Psychiatric 
Hospitals) while Alexeyeva has claimed that hundreds of those who had been 
misdiagnosed were released and numerous ‘bad’ psychiatrists demoted.380  With little 
clarity in regard to the sources that either Alexeyeva or Fireside based their arguments 
upon, one is forced to enter into a process of deduction relating to which of the two 
was closer to the truth.   
 
As someone who was deeply involved in the dissident movement and the struggle 
against punitive psychiatry for many years prior to her emigration in 1977, one’s 
inclination is to side with Alexeyeva.  The fact that her version of events is contained 
in what is still the benchmark work on Soviet dissent over twenty years after it was 
first published further strengthens this inclination.  However, Fireside’s version is 
broadly supported by several other authors, such as Cornelia Mee and Peter 
Reddaway.  Furthermore, it is Fireside’s account that tallies most closely with what 
we know of the Soviet regime, and as such his version of events is presumed to be the 
more accurate of the two alternatives.     
 
What all sources agree on is that the commission’s report was not considered by the 
top Party leadership and its members were gradually removed from their positions.381  
Unfortunately punitive psychiatry in general, and during the Khrushchev years in 
particular, is a subject where the availability of documentation is extremely limited 
and we consequently know nothing of how and why the report was suppressed.  
                                                 
380 Fireside, Soviet Psychoprisons, p. 38 and Alexeyeva,  Soviet Dissent, p. 311. 
381 Mee, The Internment of Soviet Dissenters, p. 3. 
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Cornelia Mee has suggested that it was Viktor Churaev, at that time the head of the 
RSFSR Department of Party Organs, who suppressed the findings of the report yet 
she has given no indication as to why Churaev may have done so, or even how she 
knew that he did.  As such, one must treat this assertion with an element of caution.  
 
Members of the leadership may have been unaware of the use of punitive psychiatry 
in the early stages of the era but it seems clear that they knew of it by the turn of the 
decade.  The fact that the practice had gained a degree of approval at the highest level 
could be seen when, in May 1959, Pravda made explicit the supposed link between 
political non-conformity and mental illness: ‘…to those who start calling for 
opposition to communism … we can say that now, too, there are people who fight 
against communism…but clearly the mental state of such people is not normal’.382  
Clearly, one could not expect that everything contained in the pages of Pravda or any 
other newspaper was precisely dictated by the highest authorities yet neither were 
they in the habit of printing anything that might be considered objectionable by the 
leadership. 
 
Although conclusive evidence on the matter is yet to surface, it seems that there may 
be a reasonable case for ascribing the growth of this practice to Khrushchev himself.  
As a caveat to his numerous declarations that there were no longer any political 
prisoners in the USSR, Khrushchev was known to remark that anyone dissatisfied at 
the Soviet political system must by definition be mentally ill.383  Whether this had 
been intended as an off-the-cuff quip by the First Secretary or was a genuine signal to 
those charged with policing dissent remains unclear.  However, in a system where the 
                                                 
382 Pravda, 24 May 1959.  
383 See, for example, Bukovsky, To Build a Castle, p. 155.  
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utterances of a single leader carried so much authority it seems doubtful that such 
remarks would have been entirely inconsequential. 
 
Most damning of all is the assertion by Vladimir Bukovsky that Khrushchev 
personally ordered the psychiatric confinement of the writer Valery Tarsis in August 
1962.384  Tarsis’ crime had been to send his satirical novel The Bluebottle, which 
contained an unflattering portrait of Khrushchev, to the United Kingdom for 
publication earlier that year.385 According to Bukovsky’s memoirs, the book was 
shown to Khrushchev by one of his aides with the result that ‘he flew into a rage and 
gave orders for Tarsis to be incarcerated in a lunatic asylum’.386  That Khrushchev 
was particularly sensitive to real or perceived insults against his person has been 
extensively depicted by William Taubman and the fact that he had the capacity to ‘fly 
off the handle’ has long been recognised as one of his personality traits.  It is also true 
that, while Khrushchev is often accepted to have been a fundamentally decent man at 
a personal level, an overview of his career shows that he was nonetheless capable of 
taking ruthless steps such as this.387 
 
Since Bukovsky is certainly not an impartial source on such matters, it should be 
considered on what evidence this accusation was based.  The first point to be 
established is that, although it was he who put the words into print, the accusation did 
                                                 
384 Interview with Vladimir Bukovsky, Cambridge, March 2007.       
385 Tarsis made no secret of the fact that he had sent the work abroad and even refused to allow its 
publication under a pseudonym, insisting that his real name be used. His subsequent experiences in 
Kashchenko OPH (Ordinary Psychiatric Hospital) provided the basis for his next novel Ward 7 (the 
title of which referred to Chekhov’s story Ward 6).  See V. Tarsis, Ward 7: An Autobiographical 
Novel, London: Collins and Harvill Press, 1965. 
386 Bukovsky, To Build a Castle p. 194. 
387 For example, it was Khrushchev who sanctioned the use of force against protesters in Hungary and 
at Novocherkassk.  His time as Stalin’s potentate in the Ukraine was also sufficiently bloody to earn 
him the nickname ‘the Butcher of Kiev’.  See, for example, Zh. Medvedev and R. Medvedev Nikita 
Khrushchev: Otets ili otchim sovetskoi ‘ottepeli’, Moskva: Yauza, 2006.  
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not originate with Bukovsky but with Tarsis himself.  Tarsis told Bukovsky that this 
information had come from conversations with senior figures within the KGB who 
were uneasy at detaining him in such a fashion.388  As a reasonably prominent writer 
it is entirely possible that Valery Tarsis would have been sufficiently well connected 
for such a conversation to have occurred, and as a Soviet citizen with an international 
profile one would not expect his case to have proceeded without at least having the 
consent – or most likely, the active encouragement – of the leadership.  Nonetheless, 
considering the seriousness of the matter and the lack of conclusive evidence it is 
important to present this as an allegation rather than a fact. 
 
4.4.2 PROCESSES AND CONDITIONS 
 
Scholars generally suggest that there was no totally reliable way to predict which 
cases would ‘go the psychiatric route’.389  This seems to be true, though one can point 
to a relative wealth of cases in which individuals who criticised or lampooned 
Khrushchev, as Tarsis had done, subsequently found themselves confined in 
psychiatric wards.  Petr Grigorenko also fell into this category.  Although the 
immediate cause of his arrest in March 1964 had been involvement in the 
underground group ‘the Union of Struggle for the Restoration of Leninism’, the fact 
that his initial break with the regime had come in a public speech denouncing the 
burgeoning cult around Khrushchev, and the fact that members of the Central 
Committee Presidium had apparently monitored the progress of his investigation, 
                                                 
388 Interview with Vladimir Bukovsky, Cambridge, 2007. 
389 See, for example, S. Bloch and P. Reddaway, Russia’s Political Hospitals, London: First Futura 
Publications, 1978 and Fireside, Soviet Psychoprisons. 
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would suggest that the orders for his detention had come from ‘on high’.390  
Furthermore, whilst being held in Leningrad SPH, Grigorenko made the acquaintance 
there of Yuri Grimm – one of the authors of several anti-Khrushchev leaflets 
discussed in the previous chapter.391 
 
There were two ways for the authorities to initiate psychiatric repression: the first was 
known as ‘criminal confinement’ and the second was ‘civil confinement’.  The former 
involved people who had been arrested by the KGB and were subsequently submitted 
for ‘psychiatric evaluation’ during the course of their investigation and declared 
mentally unsound.  One example of this could be seen in the case against Yuri Belov, 
a Russian tourist in Moscow who had been staying at the hotel Zarya during February 
1962 where he had written anti-Soviet slogans on the door of the men’s toilet.  He 
later visited the Kremlin, again leaving hostile graffiti on a toilet door.392  Belov was 
quickly tracked down and an investigation was initiated.  An entry in the case file 
from 12 April simply stated that ‘in the course of this investigation doubts have arisen 
regarding Belov’s psychiatric state’ and he was sent to the Serbsky Institute to be 
assessed.  The resulting evaluation stated that he was ‘unfit to be held responsible and 
constitutes a social danger’: meaning he was to be detained in a psychiatric unit.393 
 
It is possible that a few dissenters who were confined to psychiatric prisons in this 
manner did have some kind of mental problems.  Kasym Minibaev, for example, was 
confined in an asylum after travelling from Frunze to Moscow, vaulting over a barrier 
inside Lenin’s mausoleum and repeatedly kicking the glass case surrounding Lenin 
                                                 
390 See Grigorenko, Memoirs. Grigorenko was duly released from psychiatric incarceration shortly after 
Khrushchev’s ouster. He was, however, confined again in 1969.  
391 Grigorenko, Memoirs, p.329.  
392 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 92580, ll. 1-3. 
393 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 92580, l. 4. 
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until it broke.394  One would struggle to argue that these were the actions of a rational 
and healthy individual.  Nonetheless, a huge wealth of evidence shows that most 
diagnoses of psychiatric illness against dissenters were neither valid nor mistaken but 
were deliberate and cynical attempts to silence critics.  
 
In other cases, those who were imprisoned in this way had not even committed a 
verifiable ‘crime’ before they were apprehended.  Civil confinement was essentially 
the equivalent of ‘sectioning’: forcibly removing an individual from society on the 
basis that their behaviour constituted a danger to either themselves or those around 
them.  In many cases those who were held by civil commitment were kept in Ordinary 
Psychiatric Hospitals (OPHs) which featured slightly less severe regimes than Special 
Psychiatric Hospitals but were, nonetheless, harrowing.395  Already open to abuse, 
new guidelines for civil confinement were issued in 1961, entitled ‘Directives on the 
Immediate Hospitalisation of Mentally-Ill Persons Who Are a Social Danger’.  These 
new guidelines contained sufficiently vague technical provisions and wording as to 
allow practically untrammelled scope for the immediate and forcible incarceration of 
anyone.396  This piece of legislation undoubtedly facilitated countless instances where 
healthy individuals were confined in asylums over the next three decades. 
 
In SPHs conditions were often intolerably harsh; sometimes inmates were subjected to 
forced medication and brutal treatment by orderlies (usually criminal prisoners 
                                                 
394 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 89189, ll. 1-16.  According to the investigation protocol, Minibaev only 
ended his attack when wrestled to the ground by guards on duty at the time. 
395 Probably most famous instance in which this process was employed was in the confinement of 
Zhores Medvedev at Kaluga in June 1970.  His case quickly received vocal support from the likes of 
Andrei Sakharov, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (who famously labelled the practice ‘spiritual murder’) and 
Petr Kapitsa.  This in turn provoked widespread international condemnation and Medvedev was soon 
released.  For more details see R. Medvedev and Zh. Medvedev, A Question of Madness, New York: 
Alfred Knopf, 1971.    
396 Bloch, and Reddaway Russia’s Political Hospitals, p. 152. 
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themselves) and forced confinement among the genuinely and sometimes violently 
insane.  Even the most hardened dissenters held in this way generally succumbed to 
pressure to repent.  Devoid of practically all rights, entirely sealed off from the 
outside world and without a defined period of imprisonment, it was entirely possible 
for individuals never to emerge from such institutions or to do so only after their 
health had been completely ruined. 
 
There were many advantages for the authorities in branding critics mentally 
unhealthy.  It not only rejected the validity of dissenters’ criticisms but bypassed legal 
procedural requirements and negated the need to establish evidence of any kind of 
anti-Soviet activity.397  This in turn meant that potentially embarrassing political trials 
could be avoided – a not unimportant consideration while Khrushchev continued to 
insist that there were no political prisoners in the USSR.  Furthermore, because those 
imprisoned in this way received a diagnosis rather than a sentence it was possible to 
hold them indefinitely or, in many cases, until they recanted their former views and 
behaviour.  Even after their release, former psychiatric prisoners remained particularly 
vulnerable; once diagnosed as suffering from mental illness they were liable to be 
resubmitted for further treatment at the first sign of a ‘recurrence of their former 
condition’.  This tended to include brief periods of forced hospitalisation around 
major public events and holidays. 
 
The only potential drawback for the authorities lay in the practice being exposed.  
This would mean widespread international opprobrium for the regime – something 
that the Soviet authorities sought to avoid partly because of their burgeoning interests 
                                                 
397 See A. Pyzhikov, Khrushchevskaya ‘ottepel’, Moskva: Olma Press, 2002. 
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around the world and partly because they were increasingly keen to be viewed as a 
responsible and respectable international power.  The biggest breakthrough in regard 
to international awareness of the Soviet use of punitive psychiatry did not come until 
the World Psychiatric Association condemned the Soviet regime for the practice in 
1977, but the first cracks had begun to show even before Khrushchev’s ouster.398  The 
imprisonment of Valery Tarsis was one of the earliest cases to draw international 
attention but even this had been proceeded by that of the writer Mikhail Naritsa who 
was confined to Leningrad SPH in 1961 after his book The Unsung Song was 
published in West Germany.399 
 
It is particularly important to note that this was not a practice to which all Soviet 
psychiatrists acquiesced, but one that was concentrated around a small number of 
individuals and institutions.  Numerous cases arose where individual psychiatrists 
resisted pressure from above and refused to diagnose healthy individuals as being 
mentally unsound.  Aleksandr Ginzburg’s arrest in July 1960 featured such an 
instance when, after refusing to plead guilty, he was instead sent for psychiatric 
evaluation.  After some time the case was directed back to the Procurator’s office 
because the psychiatrists evaluating Ginzburg declared themselves unable to provide a 
diagnosis of his being mentally unwell.400 
 
This demonstrates that the inner workings of the Soviet system were by no means 
entirely monolithic and unquestioningly obedient.  However, it must also be qualified 
                                                 
398 The resolution condemning the use of punitive psychiatry was passed at the Sixth World Congress 
of Psychiatrists in Honolulu on 30 August 1977.  The same debate had been raised six years earlier at 
the organisation’s previous congress in Mexico City but had been dropped when Soviet delegates 
threatened to walk out.   
399 Naritsa was eventually freed in 1965.   
400 GARF, f. 8131, op. 31, d. 89189a, ll. 7-10.  
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by pointing to the fact that pressure to acquiesce to the will of the authorities was no 
longer so great as it had been a decade previously when the consequences of refusal 
could have been fatal.  Like scientists and jurists, Soviet psychiatrists could refuse to 
bend to the authorities’ demands when professional considerations were at stake.  
Nonetheless, when issues of medical efficacy thwarted the regime’s intention to 
punish an individual, it remained possible for them to subvert proper and established 
practices.  Those who were initially spared a diagnosis of mental illness could still be 
referred to ‘master case-makers’ such as Andrei Snezhnevskii or Daniil Lunts who 
would invariably be able to ‘prove’ the existence of some condition or other.401  Most 
infamously, Snezhnevskii was known to diagnose an illness that he labelled ‘sluggish 
schizophrenia’ which was a form of schizophrenia that he asserted could exist entirely 
without observable symptoms.   
 
Large-scale and random terror may have been abandoned but the regime remained 
capable of immense cruelty against individual critics.  Moreover, the fact that the 
practice was carefully concealed from the Soviet and international public not only 
shows the extent to which the authorities wished to avoid generating negative public 
opinion at home and abroad but also that this was not intended to intimidate the wider 
population into conformity but one that was intended to neutralise or remove the 
threat posed by certain dissenters.  Owing to the paucity of available documentation 
this may eventually prove to be another field in which our current perceptions of the 
Khrushchev era are significantly challenged if and when new sources come to light. 
 
                                                 
401 See, for example, Bloch and Reddaway, Russia’s Political Hospitals.    
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4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main trend that can be seen in regard to official responses to dissent during the 
period in question is that those who were considered genuine enemies continued to be 
forcefully suppressed while others were given the opportunity to abandon their former 
behaviour.  The struggle against dissent was no longer conducted on an ad hoc basis 
in response to immediate challenges.  Instead, this was a field in which an integrated 
series of measures were put in place to stifle dissent and to maintain social order.  The 
Party and state leadership continued to dictate the tone of repression but it was the 
KGB that tended to take the lead in policing dissent on a day-to-day basis.     
 
Perhaps the most pertinent question relating to policies against dissent is to consider 
whether they actually worked.  On the level that the regime continued to rely on most 
of the same policies and survived for over two and a half decades after Khrushchev’s 
ouster – and indeed was not widely expected to fall when it eventually did – one must 
accept that they were to a large extent successful.  They did not prevent the 
development of a small but globally famous dissident movement within a few years of 
Khrushchev’s departure, however.  The main point in this respect is that the dissident 
movement does not appear to have been particularly influential on public attitudes 
inside the USSR, which was the regime’s overriding goal.402   
 
It is also useful to note in this respect that from the end of the 1950s the authorities’ 
actions demonstrated even more clearly that their goal was to stifle dissent and to 
                                                 
402 In respect of the dissident movement’s influence on Soviet society it is worth referring the reader 
back to Alexei Yurchak’s research, cited earlier.  However, Robert Horvath has shown that former 
dissidents did have a considerable impact on the way that post-Soviet Russia was shaped.  See A. 
Yurchak, Everything Was Forever Until it Was No More : The Last Soviet Generation, Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2006 and Horvath, The Legacy of Soviet Dissent. 
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minimise its impact rather than to crush it decisively.  The aim was to control people’s 
behaviour rather than their ideological beliefs.  There were new constraints upon the 
authorities, such as the desire to minimise negative publicity abroad, but the main 
reason for this unwillingness to take decisive steps for the eradication of dissent could 
be found in the changed relationship between society and the regime.  The authorities 
had learned that society could be effectively controlled without recourse to the use of 
large-scale repression and would, in all likelihood, respond negatively to any sign of 
such a development.  After the summer of 1962 in particular, it had become 
abundantly clear to the regime that there were limits of tolerance beyond which 
society could not be pushed without risking a dangerous response.  Public moods and 
social passivity came to play an integral role in the authorities’ behaviour thereafter as 
the era of stagnation approached.    
 
Another of the themes that has been raised throughout this thesis is how the present 
subject relates to the era’s reputation as one of ‘thaw’.  The second half of the 
Khrushchev period presents something of a contradictory picture.  There were some 
definite liberal episodes during the second half of the Khrushchev period, but they 
were also offset by events and processes of startling conservatism.  For example, 
Khrushchev’s attack on Stalin at the XXII CPSU Congress in October 1961 came 
shortly after a significant deterioration in conditions for political prisoners; the year 
that Solzhenitsyn’s Ivan Denisovich was published also witnessed the sentencing of 
more than three hundred and twenty dissenters along with twenty four dead and over a 
hundred wounded in the massacre at Novocherkassk.  One must, therefore, exercise 
considerable caution in depicting the second half of the Khrushchev era as a liberal 
passage in Soviet history.   
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 One of the most notable points arising from the present chapter is the extent to which 
the policies that were used to combat dissent during later years actually had very 
distinct roots in the second half of the Khrushchev period.  Practices such as 
psychiatric imprisonment, prophylaxis and ‘smearing’ dissenters in the media were 
already being employed by the early 1960s, as were the laws under which dissenters 
were convicted and the labour camps and regimes that existed into the Brezhnev era 
and beyond.  While still undeniably harsh, one can see that the transition away from 
Stalinist methods of social control had progressed about as far as it ever would.  The 
combination of ‘soft’ measures, such as prophylaxis, and ‘hard’ measures, such as 
imprisonment and psychiatric confinement was fundamentally established and lasted 
almost until the eventual fall of the Soviet regime in 1991. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Previous studies on the Khrushchev period have often failed to address the issue of 
dissent, while studies on dissent have generally paid little attention to the events of the 
Khrushchev era.  In regard to the former, one can see this in the exaggerated notion of 
the era as one of liberality and ‘thaw’.  The latter can be seen in the way that 
Alexeyeva, for example, depicted the dissenting activity of the Khrushchev years only 
as an ‘incubation period’ for the subsequent human rights movement.403  There is 
undoubtedly some validity to both of these characterisations, yet they provide only a 
partial view of events, as this thesis has shown.   
 
Acts of political protest and criticism were far more frequent in number and more 
diverse in form during the Khrushchev era than has previously been supposed, and the 
authorities’ responses to dissent betrayed a much more limited degree of liberality 
than one might expect.  This was a period in which the Soviet regime faced its most 
widespread domestic unrest between the late 1930s and the commencement of 
glasnost’ in the 1980s.  Furthermore, it was not just members of the intelligentsia who 
criticised the regime.  Dissenters came from all parts of the country and all social 
classes at this time, though there was practically no unity among them.  
 
The renunciation of mass terror meant that the authorities were forced to find new 
ways of keeping society in check.  From the uncertain and ad hoc policing of dissent 
in the early Khrushchev years through to the variegated and precise methods of the 
                                                 
403 L. Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and Human Rights, 
Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1987, p. 269. 
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1960s, one can see that the regime steadily became more sure-footed and 
sophisticated in suppressing dissenting behaviour.  The range of acceptable criticism 
had in fact expanded very little since the Stalin years and the main difference actually 
lay in the manner of response that the authorities deemed appropriate.   
 
5.1 KHRUSHCHEV AND THE KHRUSHCHEV ERA 
 
As one of the most celebrated figures to emerge during the Khrushchev years, and 
indeed during the entire Soviet period, it is instructive to consider Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn’s assessment of Khrushchev and his era: ‘historians attracted to the ten 
year reign of Nikita Khrushchev…will inevitably be astounded to see how many 
opportunities were briefly concentrated in those hands, and how playfully, how 
frivolously they were used before they were nonchalantly tossed aside.  Endowed with 
greater power than anyone else in our history except Stalin…he used it like Krylov’s 
Mishka in the forest clearing, rolling his log first this way, then that, all to no 
purpose.’404 
 
This assessment is, of course, inextricably tied in with its author’s own complex 
relationship with the period, with Khrushchev himself and with the Soviet regime in 
general.  Solzhenitsyn had spent the early post-Stalin years serving exile in 
Kazakhstan and then risen to global fame after Khrushchev had personally sanctioned 
the publication of Ivan Denisovich, but had also seen official favour quickly 
disintegrate and ultimately found himself out in the cold before Khrushchev was even 
                                                 
404 A. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, Vol. 3, London: Collins/Fontana, 1978, p. 492. Ivan 
Krylov was a renowned writer of Russian fables involving animals.  ‘Mishka’ refers to an ‘industrious 
bear’ in one of Krylov’s fables. 
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ousted from power.405  Nonetheless, aside from the ‘baggage’ that accompanies 
Solzhenitsyn’s evaluation of Khrushchev and his period, this is an assessment that 
broadly reflects the views of many commentators. 
 
Essentially, what Solzhenitsyn meant was that Khrushchev had the chance to effect 
real change in the Soviet system but failed to do so – especially in respect of 
liberalisation.406  There is an element of truth in this, yet the case is not so ‘black and 
white’ as Solzhenitsyn typically suggested.  The Khrushchev years continued to 
witness some harsh state repression against Soviet citizens but it was neither of the 
scale or the severity of that which occurred under Stalin.  Not only had random terror 
been brought to an end but, by the 1960s in particular, the likelihood was that 
dissenters would be warned or otherwise intimidated by the state as a first line of 
response, instead of simply being jailed – or worse.  The regime did show a greater 
inclination to act roughly within its own laws for the majority of the time, though it 
also reserved the prerogative to sweep aside practically all other considerations and to 
respond ruthlessly to critics on occasion, particularly if domestic stability were 
deemed to be under threat.  
 
However, it is important to note that, contrary to the assumption often inherent in 
criticism of his uneven record of liberalisation, Khrushchev was not a ‘liberal’ in the 
full sense of the word.  The fact that he exposed and reined in many of the worst 
                                                 
405 The most compelling evidence of Solzhenitsyn’s declining favour in official circles could be seen in 
the concerted drive that was undertaken to ensure that he did not win the 1964 Lenin Prize for 
literature, despite the global acclaim for Ivan Denisovich and the support of prominent cultural figures 
such as  Novyi Mir editor Aleksandr Tvardovsky and film director Mikhail Romm.  See M. Scammell,  
Solzhenitsyn: A Biography, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1984, p. 481 or M. Zezina, Sovetskaya 
khudozhestvennaya intelligentsiya i vlast’ v 1950e-60e gody, Moskva: Dialog MGU, 1999, p. 261.   
406 We know this was on Solzhenitsyn’s mind from the opening line of the next paragraph: ‘he never 
carried anything through to its conclusion – least of all the fight for freedom!’.  Solzhenitsyn, Gulag 
Archipelago, Vol. 3, p. 492. 
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excesses of his predecessor has, to some extent, obscured that point.  In this case the 
term ‘liberal’ has to be understood in a relative sense.  For example, it has been 
demonstrated at numerous points throughout this thesis that he was not only an 
inconsistent force for liberalisation but also capable of sanctioning harsh repressive 
measures against dissenters himself.  Furthermore, issues such as genuine 
democratisation and freedom to criticise the regime were little short of anathema to 
Khrushchev’s political beliefs.  As he himself was known to acknowledge from time 
to time, decades of Stalinism had taken deep roots in Khrushchev’s political outlook. 
 
Historians have spent many years addressing myriad facets of the Stalin regime’s 
repressive activity.  Under Brezhnev this was a task that was undertaken by political 
scientists, Western journalists and organisations such as Amnesty International at the 
time that persecution took place.407  For the Khrushchev years there simply has not 
been anything like the same volume of work carried out on this subject.  This could 
mean that notions of Khrushchev as a liberal leader and of his era as one of ‘thaw’ 
may require a thoroughgoing reassessment as and when a more in-depth view of 
repression during the era is formed.   
 
Western historians have, it seems, overwhelmingly formed their evaluations of the 
period and of Khrushchev on the basis of comparison with the regime’s past and 
future.  In many ways this is a very useful approach – and one that would obviously 
depict Khrushchev in a positive light – but it does not necessarily give a fully rounded 
picture.  For this, one must complement and qualify such an approach with a wealth of 
                                                 
407 Two of the most notable political scientists who consistently publicised various of the regime’s 
abuses were Peter Reddaway and Frederick Barghoorn .  Some of the journalists who became most 
closely associated with the Soviet dissidents were George Krimsky (an Associated Press journalist who 
was expelled from the Soviet Union in 1977), Robert Toth (of The Los Angeles Times) and David 
Bonavia (of The Times).   
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detail specific to the time and the individual in question.  In addition, one must 
acknowledge, as historians generally do, that Khrushchev was in many ways a 
contradictory figure and the period was a time of great political and social 
oscillation.408  One of the best examples of this could be seen in the fluctuating 
number of people who were sentenced for political crimes from one year to the next.  
 
With the Khrushchev era increasingly attracting the attention of historians, it is now 
important to question some of the long-standing assumptions that have been made 
about the period.  The impact of the Secret Speech in particular requires a little de-
mystifying.  For example, this thesis has shown that, in the short term at least, the 
Soviet invasion of Hungary actually produced a much more vociferous response than 
did the Secret Speech.  It must be restated, however, that impassioned reactions to 
events in Hungary were partly a result of hopes that had been raised by the XX 
Congress.   
 
Furthermore, the Secret Speech did not signal the beginning of a more tolerant 
attitude toward criticism of the authorities.  Firstly, the number of people being 
sentenced under article 58-10 had already dropped to only a few hundred per year 
during the years of collective leadership.  Secondly, the relative leniency of the 
immediate post-XX Congress period can be at least partly attributed to widespread 
uncertainty on the part of those who were expected to police dissent within the Party 
and Komsomol.  Finally, less than one year after Khrushchev’s indictment of Stalin 
                                                 
408 Among these changes, one could mention the fact that the Khrushchev years witnessed the point at 
which the urban population finally overtook that of the countryside, steeply rising education levels 
among the population and rapidly growing Party membership or the process of releasing a huge volume 
of Gulag inmates.  
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was delivered, the Soviet leadership had signalled the beginning of a major 
clampdown on dissent. 
 
The theme of how people related to Khrushchev as a leader is a particularly 
interesting one.  We have seen in chapter 3 that Ludmilla Alexeyeva came to admire 
Khrushchev after his ouster but had found him boorish and objectionable at the time.  
Vladimir Bukovsky too recalled that he had ‘detested’ Khrushchev while he was in 
power but went on to view him in a slightly more positive light afterward.409  One 
ought not to assume that the activities of dissenters were always an accurate reflection 
of the popular mood yet this theme of criticism was so marked that it should not be 
ignored.  The evidence presented in this thesis shows that there was some particularly 
sharp opposition to Khrushchev during his time as First Secretary.   
 
This stands in great contrast to the generally positive accounts of Khrushchev and the 
Khrushchev era that have been provided by many historians.  One can point to a wide 
range of reasons why such a divergence of opinion exists.  It is undoubtedly true that 
historians now have access to information which was unavailable to Soviet citizens at 
the time and that the ability to view both the man and the period in a wider historical 
context can give a more rounded picture.410  However, that argument can also be 
turned around to say ‘this is how it was for us at the time’ – a similarly valid point.  
After all, one usually does not live from day to day in the wider context of history and 
nor can one make allowances for a future that has not yet happened.  As such, the 
present work has tried to look at the question of dissenting behaviour not just in 
regard to the ‘bigger picture’ but also as it happened at ground level.   
                                                 
409 V. Bukovsky, To Build a Castle: My Life as a Dissenter, London: Andre Deutsch, 1978, p. 113. 
410 Nonetheless, access to archival sources on the Khrushchev period remains rather patchy in parts, 
especially in relation to the work of the KGB. 
 295
Bearing in mind the apparently small number of people who were directly involved in 
the dissident movements of the Brezhnev years, it is somewhat startling to see how 
many citizens engaged in quite serious dissenting behaviour under Khrushchev.  For 
example, referring back to the section on prophylaxis in the previous chapter, a July 
1962 KGB report stated that almost seven hundred people were traced as the authors 
of anti-Soviet leaflets in the first half of that year.  The same report then stated that 
sixty anti-Soviet groups had been uncovered already that year, including a total of 
over two hundred participants.411  A subsequent report sent a year later said that 
almost four hundred people had been traced for producing leaflets in the first five 
months of 1963.412 Taken together, these figures add up to approximately 1,300 active 
dissenters who were traced by the KGB over an eleven month period alone.  It is 
again worthwhile to point out that these were cases that the security organs had 
actually uncovered, rather than all instances of such activity. Clearly then, we are 
looking at a phenomenon that involved thousands of people.  
 
One of the key reasons for the growth of protest and criticism under Khrushchev was 
the fact that, even though it remained considerable, the price to be paid for dissenting 
behaviour had dropped significantly.  This was perhaps the Secret Speech’s greatest 
impact.  However, this decline in fear was a development that facilitated protest and 
criticism rather than provoked it outright.  From the XX Congress onward, one can 
look to a multitude of short and long-term catalysts for dissenting behaviour, 
including disagreement with individual policies and opposition to specific members of 
the leadership, poor handling of legitimate grievances about living standards, through 
to a deeper sense of resentment at the failings and injustices of the regime. 
                                                 
411 RGANI, f. 89, op. 51, d. 1, l. 2.  
412 RGANI, f. 89, op. 51, d. 1, ll. 1-4 and f. 5, op. 30, d. 454, l. 110. 
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In essence, protest over material problems, such as goods shortages and low wages, 
was most liable to occur among workers and to be rather ephemeral in nature, even 
though it could be quite vociferous in tone.  Although manifested in political 
language, such as attacks on Khrushchev or criticism of Soviet aid to client states, this 
kind of dissenting behaviour can be largely seen as ‘lashing out’ at authority and 
generally did not imply a fundamental rejection of the communist system.  By the end 
of the 1950s the Soviet authorities had come tacitly to accept this point and 
understood that, with a sophisticated system of social control in place, only minimal 
pressure was usually required in order to force discontented elements back into line.  
After the disorders of summer 1962 in particular, when the link between social 
stability and living standards was made glaringly obvious, the regime largely ‘bought 
off’ discontent among the working class until the failing economy no longer enabled 
them to do so. 
 
Less liable to result in volatile manifestations of anger than worker protest, 
intelligentsia dissent posed more fundamental questions of the regime; initially in 
regard to the prevailing interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and in later years 
increasingly of communist ideology itself.  These were precisely the kind of attitudes 
that the Soviet authorities had in mind when they spoke of the need to identify 
whether an individual was ‘truly anti-Soviet’.  Of course, many of those who the 
authorities still labelled ‘anti-Soviet’ did not consider themselves in this way at all – 
showing that although the nature of social control had indeed become far more 
rational and less brutal, it remained fundamentally intolerant of heterodoxy, especially 
in the public sphere.  Protest and criticism rooted in discontent at strictly political 
issues, such as desire for greater democratisation, were not so easily bought off as 
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were most workers’ complaints but instead had to be intimidated into silence or else 
harshly punished with camp sentences and psychiatric imprisonment.  It was from this 
environment that the human rights movement of the Brezhnev years principally 
emerged.   
 
5.2 STATE AND SOCIETY 
 
One can see that the relationship between state and society was changing significantly 
during the early Khrushchev years in particular, before settling down again in the 
1960s.  The regime communicated to society through newspaper articles, speeches 
and various other avenues, what had and had not changed since Stalin’s death in 
regard to the boundaries of permissible and impermissible behaviour.  Society then 
communicated the same information to the authorities, primarily by acts of protest, 
and a new set of ‘ground rules’ was gradually and implicitly established between the 
two. Although still very much weighted in its favour, the balance of power in the 
relationship shifted away from the state slightly during the Khrushchev era.  It had 
become clear that the aspirations and frustrations of society could no longer be all but 
ignored and to do so would ultimately be at the regime’s peril. 
 
The early part of the Khrushchev period, and also the preceding three years of 
collective leadership, witnessed a considerable degree of uncertainty and 
apprehension in the way that the authorities related to society.  Even during Stalin’s 
last years it was becoming clear to his successors that the system could not go on in 
the same brutal manner indefinitely.  Stalin’s death, the Secret Speech and the 
Hungarian rising were all points where members of the leadership voiced fears that 
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the regime could be in danger of a major revolt from below.  This was reflected in the 
inconsistent and panicked ‘fire-fighting’ approach to policing dissent that was 
employed in the early years as the authorities tried to work out how to maintain 
effective social control without reliance on the kind of mass repression that would 
most likely have further antagonised society.  
 
Perhaps the most significant change in the relationship between state and society 
came after this uncertain situation began to stabilise.  From the end of the 1950s 
onwards, one can argue that the authorities no longer sought to control the private 
thoughts of its citizens but instead tried only to control their public behaviour.413  That 
the regime sought to manage dissenting behaviour rather than to eradicate it has been 
raised at several points throughout the present work.  The clearest indication of this 
trend can be seen in the extent to which prophylactic measures became far more 
common than a directly punitive approach in official responses to dissent.   
 
This situation lasted virtually until the collapse of the Soviet regime, it went hand-in-
hand with the stagnation of the Brezhnev years and saw the regime sacrifice its 
original raison d’être (building communism) in order to maintain power.  For society 
at large, material factors increasingly took precedence over political ones as personal 
concerns rose at the expense of wider social issues.414  Although effectively anathema 
to the construction of communism, the authorities implicitly accepted this situation 
and even used it to their advantage on occasion – arguably because they had no other 
option if they wanted to maintain social stability.  In return they demanded only 
                                                 
413 See V. Shlapentokh, Public and Private Life of the Soviet People: Changing Values in Post-Stalin 
Russia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 32. 
414 See for example, Shlapentokh, Public and Private Life and E. Zubkova, Obshchestvo i reformy 
1945-1964, Moskva: Izdatel’skii tsentr ‘Rossiya molodaya’, 1993. 
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public obedience and a few basic demonstrations of loyalty such as participation in 
elections and outward hostility toward the West.  With the exception of a relatively 
small band of dissidents, this is how the relationship between state and society 
remained for much of the next three decades. 
 
In general, there is little evidence that any popular desire for revolution or mass unrest 
existed, with the possible exception of the few days immediately after the June 1962 
price rises.  Indeed, it is possible that the disturbances of summer 1962 could well 
have been much more serious if the authorities had not acted quickly to ensure that 
protests remained localised and information on what had happened at Novocherkassk 
did not reach the wider population.  What we have seen at various points in this thesis 
is that among workers practically any cause of anger was liable to be reflected in quite 
sharp political statements and behaviours.  The first reason for this – most common 
among camp and prison inmates – was the fact that political statements would cause 
the authorities greatest offence.  The second reason was the highly politicised nature 
of everyday life, which meant that political language and imagery were always liable 
to come to the surface in times of anger.   
 
By looking at the subject through the medium of dissenting behaviour, we can draw 
some useful outlines of the way that people related to the Soviet state and to Marxist-
Leninist ideology.  The question of how far the opinions of dissenters represented 
those of wider society is an important subject to address in this respect, but without 
access to reliable data on public opinion one must be cautious in drawing any 
sweeping conclusions.  However, the fact that dissenters were drawn from practically 
all social strata and geographical regions does imply that these were not the 
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complaints of a small section of the population as was sometimes the case with 
Brezhnev era dissidents.  Furthermore, most dissenters were not genuine opponents of 
the regime – and many were in fact dedicated communists – showing that these were 
‘ordinary’ members of society in most respects. 
 
The indications are that the XX CPSU Congress re-ignited a sense of utopianism 
among many young people in particular, but the stimulus for reform that it had created 
soon faded in the face of conservative resistance.  As the era progressed one can 
witness a marked process of decline in idealistic enthusiasm for communism as 
criticism began to spread from policies in force and specific abuses of power, to the 
Party leadership and then, by the middle of the 1960s, began to look to political 
philosophies that entirely rejected the existing regime.  This could be seen in the 
growing popularity of Milovan Djilas’ work, for example.  Although this by itself 
does not prove that idealism and communist zeal were waning throughout society as a 
whole, it does offer some support for the general hypothesis that communist 
utopianism was increasingly subsumed by cynicism in the Brezhnev era. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting point on the question of the regime’s legitimacy in the 
eyes of dissenters was that most did not disagree with the general principles and goals 
that the regime professed to stand for.  Lenin remained almost entirely untouched by 
criticism throughout the entire period, for example.  In the early part of the period one 
finds that most dissenters felt that the problems of the regime could be ‘fixed’ but 
later years saw a growing body of opinion that the situation had become irreparable 
and required a whole new start – although one that was still based upon the principles 
of socialism in many cases.    
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The majority of dissenters were neither in favour of revolution nor were they 
outwardly opposed to the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism.  However, 
the signs are that popular respect for the regime was deteriorating.  According to 
Elena Zubkova, by the end of the period, most people had stopped believing what was 
said by Khrushchev and his government.415  Many of the leaflets and comments cited 
throughout in the present work strongly support Zubkova’s assertion.  This was a 
trend that seems to have continued throughout the rest of the post-Stalin era and 
heightened the extent to which the regime’s legitimacy became dependent not on 
ideological credibility but upon its capacity to provide an acceptable standard of 
living. 
 
The final major point to emphasise in respect of the changing relationship between 
society and the regime under Khrushchev was the way that the outside world, and the 
West in particular, came to occupy a position of growing significance in the actions of 
both sides.  It was not yet the intermediary between dissenters and the regime that it 
became in the Brezhnev years, but if one were to compare the situation with the Stalin 
era, when the Soviet Union was almost entirely sealed off from the outside world, the 
scale of this change soon becomes apparent.   
 
One of the most significant developments in this respect was the regime’s growing 
interest in courting international public opinion, something that helped to restrain the 
authorities’ more repressive tendencies.  Furthermore, although scholars will have 
long been aware that outside powers were engaged in some degree of agitation against 
                                                 
415 Zubkova, Obshchestvo i reformy, p. 177. 
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the Soviet regime, this thesis has shown that organisations such as NTS, Radio 
Liberty and the Chinese government all expended considerable effort and resources 
on exacerbating tensions within the USSR.  Even though it consistently overstated the 
role of foreign subversion, the Soviet regime was quite correct to assert that outside 
powers were attempting to take advantage of its domestic tensions.  
 
Contrary to the expectations of the authorities, rather than thanks to their efforts at 
forestalling such a problem, foreign attempts to stir unrest in the USSR often fell on 
stony ground.  However, Western broadcasts and greater contact with foreigners did 
contribute to steadily eroding the regime’s credibility in the eyes of its citizens by 
exposing the extent of its hypocrisy and deceit.  Furthermore, they also contributed to 
the opening up of new philosophical avenues that had long since been sealed off by 
the Soviet regime, and thus exacerbated the decline of belief in communism among 
dissenters.   
 
5.3 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 
 
As this thesis has consistently demonstrated, neither dissenting behaviour nor the 
authorities’ responses to it were static phenomena but instead evolved throughout the 
period, often in response to each other.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, one can see elements 
of both the Stalin era and the Brezhnev years in the acts of protest and criticism that 
occurred and in official responses to them.  The most noticeable trend when one looks 
at the ‘bigger picture’ is that of change from the Stalin era and continuity into the 
Brezhnev era.  In regard to dissent this can be seen in the way that more considered 
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and purposeful criticism developed while isolated outbursts of hooligan-type 
behaviour seem to have declined markedly by the end of the Khrushchev period.   
The general characterisation of the Khrushchev years as having consisted of a more 
liberal early period and an increasingly conservative second half finds both support 
and contradiction in the evidence presented in this study.416  The late 1950s in 
particular proved to be something of a ‘mixed bag’ in this respect.  If one looks at the 
data on convictions under article 58-10 during the second half of that decade, they 
were immeasurably lower than they had been during the Stalin years yet they were 
also considerably higher than any subsequent period of Soviet history.  Furthermore, 
it is worth restating that developments such as reducing the powers of the security 
organs and curtailing mass repression had actually begun during the years of 
collective leadership rather than during Khrushchev’s time as the dominant leader.  In 
other words, the supposed ‘thaw era’ was not some kind of liberal oasis sandwiched 
between two periods of arch-conservatism.   
 
The evidence of growing conservatism in official policy against dissenters is not hard 
to find during the early 1960s.  One can cite examples such as worsening conditions 
for political prisoners, legal reforms that expanded the scope for psychiatric detention 
and the allocation of greater resources and influence for the KGB.  However, we can 
also see that a growing majority of those who were found to have been involved in 
dissenting activity were no longer arrested and sent to camps but were dealt with 
administratively instead.  Nonetheless, a reversion to a far harsher means of dealing 
with critics was always possible.  This could be seen throughout the campaign against 
dissent, in the rising at Novocherkassk and in the psychiatric confinement of 
                                                 
416 One encounters this broad periodisation in numerous secondary sources.  See, for example, W. 
Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era, London: Free Press, 2003 and R. Medvedev and Zh. 
Medvedev,  Nikita Khrushchev: Otets ili otchim sovetskoi ‘ottepeli’, Moskva: Yauza, 2006. 
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dissenters.  Khrushchev himself summed up the position most eloquently when, 
during a harangue delivered to a gathering of intelligentsia figures in March 1963, he 
enquired menacingly of his audience: ‘what, do you think we’ve forgotten how to 
arrest people?’417        
 
Even allowing for the above failings in the above periodisation’s consistency, this 
division of Khrushchev's rule into 'liberal' and 'conservative' parts is largely consistent 
with the 'dynamic' and 'stable' paradigm that has emerged in this thesis.  The liberal 
period can be seen as dynamic because it was then that long-standing policies and 
practices of harsh social control were being abandoned or adapted to the new post-
Stalin environment.  Similarly, one can hardly separate the two notions of 
conservatism and stability, especially in regard to the Soviet domestic scene from 
around the mid-1960s onwards.    
 
In regard to dissenting behaviour, one can draw strong continuities between the 
worker dissent of the Stalin era and that of the Khrushchev period as well as between 
the intelligentsia dissent that emerged under Khrushchev and the human rights 
movement of the Brezhnev years.  Sarah Davies’ examples of voters writing ‘Trotsky’ 
on their ballot paper in the late 1930s or daubing swastikas on walls are thematically 
consistent with outbursts calling for communists to be killed ‘like in Hungary’ or with 
prisoners declaring their support for figures such as President Eisenhower or Mao-Tse 
Tung.418  For the most part, these acts were meant to offend the authorities rather than 
to elicit any kind of real change and were ultimately of little or no consequence unless 
                                                 
417 S. Volkov, The Magic Chorus: A History of Russian Culture from Tolstoy to Solzhenitsyn, New 
York: Alfred Knopf, 2008, p. 207. 
418 See S. Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia. 
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they reached some kind of ‘critical mass’.  The extent to which these behaviours 
appear to have tailed off during the 1960s, as living standards began to approach 
something like an acceptable level for most citizens, is particularly indicative of their 
link with material shortcomings.   
 
One of the themes that can be traced throughout the course of the present work has 
been the extent to which the struggle between dissenters and authority that took place 
in the Brezhnev years had its roots in the Khrushchev era.  Most of the principal 
characters on both sides of the struggle were already in place for some time before 
Khrushchev was removed from power.  Lessons that were learned in the 1950s and 
1960s – such as the intelligentsia’s rejection of underground activity in favour of 
legalistic struggle and the authorities’ pioneering of prophylaxis – were to play a 
notable role in the way that both sides conducted themselves during the later 1960s 
and throughout the 1970s.  One would be on unsafe ground to assert that the dissident 
movement of the Brezhnev era was caused by what had taken place under 
Khrushchev, but it would surely be correct to assert that this recent past had a major 
influence on the way that the confrontation between dissidents and the regime was 
subsequently played out. 
 
A hypothesis that has been gaining some credibility over recent times has been to 
suggest that in the last couple of years before he was removed from power, 
Khrushchev had been effectively out-manoeuvred and neutered by conservatives 
within the leadership and the bureaucracy, prompting a ‘Brezhnevisation’ of the 
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system even while Khrushchev remained First Secretary.419  It is, however, worth 
pointing out that this is not a universally accepted argument – Sergei Khrushchev in 
particular was entirely unconvinced by it.420  This thesis offers support for the 
suggestion that one can discern a growing conservatism within the ruling apparatus 
for some time prior to Khrushchev’s ouster yet it also raises the question as to whether 
this ought to be viewed as ‘Brezhnevisation’. 
 
The continuities in state activity against dissenters across the eras of Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev were huge; practically all of the foundations for the persecution of 
dissidents in the 1960s, 70s and 80s had been laid during Khrushchev’s tenure as First 
Secretary, but by no means entirely during his last few years in power.  The fact that 
more dissenters were jailed during 1957 and 1958 than at any other time since Stalin’s 
death demonstrates this succinctly.  The question this begs is whether scholars are too 
readily accepting the paradigm which states that Khrushchev was a liberal leader and 
Brezhnev was a conservative one; implying that growing conservatism must, 
therefore, be a consequence of ‘Brezhnevisation’.  In some respects this is an 
unhelpful over-simplification.  In reality, Khrushchev’s overthrow initially seemed to 
offer the prospect of further liberalisation, though this did not turn out to be the case 
in the long run.   
 
Looking at the matter from this perspective prompts one to ask the question of 
whether one can indeed see a ‘Brezhnevisation’ of the system during the late 
Khrushchev period or whether growing conservatism was part of a policy trajectory 
that was already mapped out during his earlier years in power.  Pivotal developments 
                                                 
419 See, for example, V. Shlapentokh, Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power: The Post-Stalin Era, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 77.  
420 Interview with Sergei Khrushchev, Rhode Island, November 2006.   
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in policy formulation, such as the campaign against dissent and the pressure from the 
legal establishment that brought it to an end, had actually taken place by the end of the 
1950s and were thereafter honed but not fundamentally altered.  As such, it seems 
that, in respect of policy against dissent at least, one cannot discern a marked process 
of ‘Brezhnevisation’ during the late Khrushchev period.   
 
5.4 THEMES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
With a growing number of scholars now looking at the Khrushchev period and a large 
volume of sources still to be tapped into, this is undoubtedly a subject that holds great 
potential for future research.  Aside from archival materials accessible in Russia, a 
wealth of additional documents have become available in Georgia in recent times, to 
add to the large volume of declassified papers that exist in former Soviet republics 
such as Ukraine and the three Baltic States.   
 
Among the subjects that have been raised in this thesis, a number stand out as being 
particularly worthy of future study.  The subversive activity of NTS – such as sending 
agents and propaganda materials across the Soviet border – and the Chinese regime’s 
anti-Soviet agitation would make fascinating smaller research projects with a 
significance that transcends the history of the Soviet regime alone.  Larger studies 
with the potential to contribute significantly to our understanding of the Soviet 
regime, and particularly in regard to the relationship between state and society under 
Khrushchev, include focusing more closely on the changing dynamics of underground 
group activity, the domestic impact of Western radio broadcasts to the USSR, 
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changing attitudes toward Marxist-Leninist ideology and the use of prophylactic 
measures against dissenters. 
 
The latter of these subjects could prove to be the most revealing of all, if and when 
relevant documentation that is presently held in the KGB and Presidential Archives is 
made available to researchers.  It would give an even greater insight into the scale of 
protest and dissent that took place all across the USSR from the second half of the 
Khrushchev era onwards and may well provoke a significant reassessment of the way 
that historians view the domestic tensions facing the Soviet authorities in its later 
years and perhaps even add a new dimension to the way that we view the eventual fall 
of the regime in 1991.      
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APPENDIX 1 
 
 
ANNUAL CONVICTIONS FOR POLITICAL CRIMES 
 
Year Article 58-10/ 
Articles 70 and 72 
Article 190 
1956 384 - 
1957 1,964 - 
1958 1,416 - 
1959 750 - 
1960 162 - 
1961 207 - 
1962 323 - 
1963 341 - 
1964 181 - 
1965 20 - 
1966 48 - 
1967 38 65 
1968 54 75 
1969 72 123 
1970 83 121 
1971 66 102 
1972 68 115 
1973 73 105 
1974 47 131 
 310
1975 22 74 
1976 5 55 
1977 6 54 
1978 12 44 
1979 4 65 
1980 35 67 
1981 39 88 
1982 26 69 
1983 44 119 
1984 25 57 
1985 16 57 
1986 11 17 
1987 1 6 
Total 6, 543 1,609 
 
Article 58-10 of the RSFSR criminal code – superseded in 1959 by articles 70 and 72 
– dealt with anti-Soviet activity and propaganda aimed at undermining or 
overthrowing the Soviet regime. 
 
Article 190 dealt with materials ‘defaming the Soviet state and social system’.  Most 
commonly this was employed against individuals who produced and distributed 
samizdat literature. The article was added to the RSFSR criminal code shortly after 
the January 1966 trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel when the authorities had struggled to 
prove that the pair had actually intended to undermine the Soviet regime.   
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
Bukovsky, Vladimir – Cambridge – March 2007 
Vladimir Bukovsky was one of the most renowned dissidents of the Brezhnev era and 
was repeatedly imprisoned by the authorities.  He was eventually expelled from the 
USSR in December 1976 in a prisoner exchange for the Chilean communist leader 
Luis Corvalan.    
 
Daniel, Aleksandr – Moscow – May 2008 
Aleksandr Daniel is the son of the famous dissidents Yuli Daniel and Larissa Bogoraz.  
He is also the head of the Moscow branch of Memorial and a renowned scholar of 
Soviet dissent.  
 
Esenin-Volpin, Aleksandr – Revere – November 2008 
Aleksandr Esenin-Volpin is the son of the celebrated poet Sergei Esenin.  A 
mathematician by profession, he is widely referred to as ‘the father of the Soviet 
human rights movement’.  Repeatedly subjected to psychiatric confinement, Esenin-
Volpin emigrated to the United States in May 1972. 
 
Grigorenko, Andrei – New York City – October 2006 
Andrei Grigorenko is the son of the late Petro Grigorenko and was an active dissident 
in his own right.  He emigrated from the USSR in the late 1970s and now heads the 
Petro Grigorenko Foundation in New York. 
 
Litvinov, Pavel – New York City – December 2006 
Pavel Litvinov is the grandson of famous Soviet diplomat, Maxim Litvinov. He was a 
participant in the famous ‘Demonstration on Red Square’ and co-authored ‘An 
Appeal to World Public Opinion’ with Larissa Bogoraz.  After a period of exile in 
Chita he left the Soviet Union in 1974. 
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Medvedev, Zhores – London – March 2007 
Zhores Medvedev is the brother of historian Roy Medvedev – with whom he has co-
authored several volumes on Soviet history  – and a prominent biologist.  He was 
temporarily confined to a psychiatric institution in 1970 and later expelled from the 
Soviet Union in 1973. 
 
Orlov, Yuri – Ithaca – December 2006 
Yuri Orlov was a co-founder of the Soviet branch of Amnesty International in October 
1973 and later created the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group in 1976.  After being jailed 
in 1978 Orlov was freed and expelled from the USSR in 1986.  
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